Thompson v. Thompson, 23209.

• Decision Date: 08 January 1932
• Docket Number: 23209.
• Citation: 166 Wash. 270,6 P.2d 617
• Parties: THOMPSON v. THOMPSON et ux.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

6 P.2d 617

166 Wash. 270

THOMPSON v. THOMPSON et ux.

No. 23209.

Supreme Court of Washington

January 8, 1932

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Chester A. Batchelor Judge.

Action by Erma L. Thompson against Thomas Thompson and wife. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal.

Remanded with direction.

Ryan, Desmond & Ryan, of Seattle, for appellants.

Geo Olson and Leo W. Stewart, both of Seattle, for respondent.

BEELER J.

March 1929, the plaintiff, Erma L. Thompson, then a feme sole, became acquainted with the defendants' son, Waldo Thompson, a minor. After a brief but strenuous courtship they were married on August 25, 1929. She was nineteen and he was twenty years of age. They lived together until March 8, 1930; thereafter they lived apart. On March 9, 1930, she swore to a complaint charging him with abandonment and nonsupport, and a warrant was issued for his arrest under the Lazy Husband Act (Rem. Comp. Stat. § 6908). This warrant was not served until the time of the trial in the lower court, and no reason appears for the delay. On April 11, 1930, she brought an action against her husband for separate maintenance, but the record does not show what disposition, if any, was made thereof. On the same day she brought this action against her father-in-law and mother-in-law to recover damages for the alienation of her husband's affections. The cause was tried to the court and a jury December 3, 1930, resulting in a verdict in her favor in the sum of $7,500. The defendants' motions for judgment non obstante veredicto, or, in the alternative, for a new trial, were overruled, and a formal judgment was entered against the defendants from which they have appealed.

The appellants seasonably interposed motions for a nonsuit, for a directed verdict, and for judgment n. o. v., challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence. The appellants contend that the court erred in overruling these several motions. As to these assignments we need but say that the evidence, if believed, as the triers of the facts evidently did, was sufficient to support the verdict and judgment.

The appellants next contend that the trial court erred in the giving and in refusing to give certain instructions, but we find it unnecessary to analyze and discuss them separately. The instructions as given were comprehensive, and, in our opinion, defined the law applicable to the case with fairness to both parties; while those that were refused consisted in part of duplications of what in effect were given.

The appellants next contend that the verdict is so excessive and exorbitant as to indicate passion and prejudice on the part of the jury, and that the court erred in overruling their motion for a new trial. This assignment presents a more serious question. The facts applicable thereto may be briefly summarized: 'A few weeks after the respondent and Waldo became acquainted, and up to the time of their marriage, she visited Waldo's parents once a week and frequently dined with them, and as to their attitude towards her during that period she testified: 'His parents showed a fondness for me and we got along just splendidly.' Those weekly visits continued after the marriage and up to practically the time of their separation. She was employed in a restaurant or coffee shop during their courtship. Following the marriage they resided in a hotel at Seattle for a few days, and then moved to an apartment near the business section of the city, where they resided for about two weeks, during which time Waldo contributed nothing towards her support--but instead she supported him. She testified: 'I paid for the apartment when we were first married, I was working. I paid it.'

On September 10 the appellants turned over to the respondent and Waldo a small meat shop, and a truck used in connection therewith, with the hope that he would be able to support his wife. Their living quarters were above the meat shop. Waldo operated the shop from September 10 to November 6, 1929, and about midnight on the latter date without notice to the appellants, he, in company with the respondent, drove appellants' truck to a point near the waterfront and there abandoned it, taking passage on a boat for Los Angeles. A few days later the appellants, through the aid of the Seattle police department, regained possession of their truck. Upon Waldo's departure, the respondent took up her former employment. About November 22, Waldo returned to Seattle and again lived with the respondent. From that time until the following January he was unemployed and contributed nothing towards her support. She testified: 'When Waldo returned from California he had no money and I paid the room rent.' On April 19, 1930, Waldo left for Alaska, and while there sustained an...