Thompson v. United States

• Decision Date: 09 January 1906
• Docket Number: 596.
• Citation: 144 F. 14
• Parties: THOMPSON v. UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

144 F. 14

THOMPSON v. UNITED STATES.

No. 596.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

January 9, 1906

Thomas W. Proctor (Nason & Proctor, on the brief), for plaintiff in error.

William H. Lewis, Asst.U.S. Atty. (Melvin O.Adams, U.S. Atty., on the brief).

Before COLT and PUTNAM, Circuit Judges, and ALDRICH, District Judge.

ALDRICH District Judge.

The plaintiff in error, Robert Thompson, was tried upon an indictment with several counts charging him in various ways with violating the provisions of section 5415 of the Revised Statutes (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, P. 3662), in respect to counterfeiting or imitating the circulating notes of banking associations acting under the laws of the United States. Some of the counts charged him with falsely making, others with unlawfully aiding and assisting one Fred B. Wilson. The record presents a large number of assignments of error; but in argument the principal discussion centered upon the assignments which direct themselves against the remark of the government's attorney in opening, and the evidence upon the same point, which tended to show that the defendant, who was being tried upon a charge of counterfeiting, was an abortionist. It is particularly urged that the statement of the government's attorney that 'Dr. Thompson, alias Dr. Seidell, Charles H. Roberts and J. R. Brown, Jr., we shall show, was engaged in the business of an abortionist,' was unwarrantable and highly prejudicial.

We must approach the consideration of the question presented by the assignment which is based upon this statement with the idea that it was a rather abrupt way of opening the case to the jury. Still we must not be unmindful of what followed by way of explanation of the statement of the attorney, and as a statement of the ground for it, because it is apparent that the purpose was to point out what the government expected to prove, and that the person charged with counterfeiting had a motive for procuring spurious notes, and that such motive sprang from the fact that he was in danger by reason of the character of his business, and that he would be safeguarded in case of detection if he could have a hundred $100 bills to put up for bail; and it was further explained that it would save bother, and as the paper would not go into circulation nobody would be harmed. At the close of the government's opening the defendant requested the court to take the case from the jury, because the prosecuting attorney had stated in the presence of the jury, that the defendant was an abortionist. The learned judge declined to do that, but in language as forcible as could be employed told the jury that the fact whether he was engaged in the business of an abortionist was of itself of no consequence, and had no bearing on the question of the defendant's guilt or innocence of the crime with which he was charged-- that of counterfeiting. It was further said, reiterating that it had no relevancy, standing as an independent fact, that 'whether it may appear in evidence, by reason of its connection in some other conversation, something about the defendant's business, i do not know, and you need not concern yourselves at all until the question arises.'

An exception was taken to the failure of the court to take the case from the jury, and it was allowed provisionally; that is to say, 'if the ruling be a matter of exception. ' We understand this to mean that the exception was taken, if it does not relate fairly to matter within the final discretion of the trial court. It is quite evident that the presiding judge understood that the purpose of the government's attorney was to give notice that he should offer evidence tending to show motive, and as we hold further on that it is competent for the government to introduce proofs tending to show a defendant guilty of other crimes, though of a different nature, when such proofs tend to show a motive for committing the offense for which he is being tried, it is quite unnecessary to determine whether the statement was prejudicial, or whether the ruling was one within the final discretion of the court below. This follows logically enough upon the reasoning that it be competent to introduce proofs of a motive, though such proofs tend to show the commission of other crimes, it is now the less competent because prejudicial to the defendant upon the ultimate fact of guilt or innocence in respect to the offense for which he is being tried. The very purpose of showing a motive is to influence the jury upon the question of the defendant's guilt in respect to the offense with which he is charged and, if it is competent to introduce the proofs, it is proper to state in opening that such proofs will be offered. So it is only necessary to determine whether under the peculiar circumstances of this case it was competent to introduce evidence which tended to show that Dr. Thompson was engaged in the business of an abortionist; it being the nature of evidence of statements by the defendant himself as to the character and hazard of his business, and as to why he wanted counterfeit notes for his protection in case of arrest.

There is no occasion to question the general rule which excludes evidence of collateral offenses. Such rule is often called 'the rule of logic,' because it is based upon the idea that evidence of the commission of one crime in and of itself has no legitimate tendency to prove the commission of another crime. This general rule in practice is, of course, more absolute when the offenses are of a different nature. It is, however, subject to many exceptions, and the exceptions are rested upon various grounds. Under the exceptions to the general rule of exclusion it is only in rare instances that evidence of the independent fact of collateral crime is received for the purpose of showing that a defendant is in fact guilty of such collateral crime. Such evidence is ordinarily admitted for the purpose of showing a situation, or surroundings, which create a motive for committing the offense for which he is being tried; and it is the fact of the motive, and not the fact of guilt in respect to the collateral crime, which constitutes the essence and force of the evidence, and that is what the jury may weigh upon the question of the innocence or guilt of the party before them in respect to the offense with which he is charged in the indictment.

It is unnecessary to consider the various exceptions to the general rule of exclusion, for it is evident that the proofs tending to show that the defendant was an abortionist were admitted for the purpose of showing, not the collateral crime as a fact, but for the sole purpose of showing a situation which furnished a motive for committing the particular offense with which he was charged and for which he was being tried. Therefore it is only material to determine whether the evidence admitted, which had reference to the defendant's business and what he said about it, was competent for the purpose of showing a motive for the crime charged, though it also had a tendency to show that the defendant was guilty of other crimes, and naturally and necessarily resulting from evidence of indulgence pernicious practices.

One Fred B. Wilson, with whom it is claimed Dr. Thompson cooperated in creating a spurious paper, testified in substance, among other things, that Thompson asked whether he could copy a certain engraving, and that he gave him a $5 bank note, asking him to experiment to see if he could bring out all the details and make everything sharp, clear, and plain; that he wanted to make a test to see if the engraving could be copied and made certain; if it could, he would obtain an outfit; that a copy was made and submitted to Thompson, who examined it with a magnifying glass. Wilson also testified that at another time Thompson said it would be a mighty nice thing for him if he could have 100 $100 bills photographed and nicely finished to keep in his safe, to be used in case of an emergency, so that, if he had trouble, and it became necessary for him to furnish bail, he could take the amount from this package of bills and deposit it with the bail commissioner, and that Thompson further explained the emergency for which he might use these bills by saying there might some trouble come up in his line of business, that he might be arrested, and might require bail and might have to give bonds. This evidence tended to show that the defendant gave a reason for having the spurious paper made. The motive resided in the reason which he gave, and, for purposes of explanation of the emergency and of the reasons given in the conversation, the witness was permitted to state what Dr Thompson said the business was to which he referred in the conversation about which the witness was testifying; and, though the witness did say that he testified from his own knowledge, he in the same breath negatived the idea that he was in fact testifying from his own knowledge, as will be seen by reference to his exact words, which were 'My own knowledge and I took it from his mouth,' and then, after a...