Thomson v. United States

• Decision Date: 18 March 1966
• Docket Number: No. 206-61.,206-61.
• Citation: 174 Ct. Cl. 780,357 F.2d 683
• Parties: Waldemar P. THOMSON v. The UNITED STATES.
• Court: U.S. Claims Court

174 Ct. Cl. 780, 357 F.2d 683 (1966)

Waldemar P. THOMSON v. The UNITED STATES.

No. 206-61.

United States Court of Claims.

March 18, 1966.

Waldemar P. Thomson, pro se.

Herbert Pittle, Washington, D. C., with whom was Asst. Atty. Gen. Edwin Weisl, Jr., for defendant.

Before COWEN, Chief Judge, and LARAMORE, DURFEE, DAVIS and COLLINS, Judges.

DAVIS, Judge:^*

Plaintiff claims $7,125 for land appraisal services he asserts were ordered by the United States under an alleged contract. The basic issue is whether the Government, at any time, contracted for these services, and bound itself to pay the plaintiff.

In 1959, the United States Attorney's Office in Los Angeles¹ was charged with litigating two condemnation cases (C.A. Nos. 1836-ND and 1904-ND) brought to acquire land for the United States Naval Air Station at Leemore, California. An expert was needed to appraise certain of the land and property rights. Plaintiff, an experienced real estate appraiser, was recommended to the Assistant United States Attorney in charge of the land work of the Office, Mr. Albert Minton. As a result, plaintiff contacted Mr. Minton and, on January 6, 1959, met with him and another Assistant United States Attorney (Mr. H. M. Weiser), who was under Mr. Minton's supervision, to discuss the possibility of employing plaintiff to make certain appraisals and to appear as an expert in the pending condemnation proceedings. At this meeting, these men engaged in a general discussion of the appraisals, including the details of the problems to be handled by the plaintiff.

At the time of this meeting (and at all times important to this action), the authority of United States Attorneys with respect to the services of real estate appraisers (like plaintiff) was circumscribed by Department of Justice Memorandum No. 162, dated June 1, 1955. It provided that "the Lands Division appropriation will * * * be charged for services of expert witnesses, appraisers, * * *, etc. Specific authority must be obtained prior to incurring this type of expense and the vouchers forwarded to Washington as heretofore." Because of this restriction, Mr. Minton told plaintiff that no one in the United States Attorney's Office was authorized to enter into any contract for the employment of an appraiser without authority from the Department of Justice in Washington; that it would be necessary for the United States Attorney to seek, and obtain, authorization from the Attorney General before plaintiff could be employed as an appraiser; that plaintiff would have to submit a Bid for Services which would be forwarded to the Department by the United States Attorney's Office; and that plaintiff could not be notified to proceed unless his bid was accepted and authorization was issued by the Attorney General, or his delegated officer.

After this January 6th meeting the plaintiff and representatives of the United States Attorney's Office undertook to effect a contract for the needed appraisals. On January 9, Mr. Weiser, the assistant handling the two condemnation cases, wrote to Mr. Thomson that, in connection with C.A. No. 1836-ND, "I desire to obtain your opinion of fair market value as of the date of taking of said enumerated parcels, January 9, 1958. The parcels I should like to have you appraise are * * * those listed below." He also cautioned that "before I can authorize you to commence work on this project, I shall require the submission of your bid for services, which must be approved by the Attorney General." On January 16, plaintiff submitted to the United States Attorney a Bid for Services. He offered to appraise the property referred to in Mr. Weiser's letter; estimated that it would take him 60 days to complete the work; and agreed to perform at the rate of $75 per day, for a total of $4,500. The bid form provided, in part, that "The Department of Justice expects the appraisal to be completed within the estimated time", and that "* * * The estimated time must not be exceeded without prior approval of the Department of Justice, and full justification for the additional time required must be submitted." In a letter accompanying this bid, plaintiff stated that he intended to try to complete the work in 60 days and clearly indicated that he was aware of the fact that it was necessary for his "employment" to be authorized by the Department of Justice. Plaintiff's bid was forwarded to the Department, and authorization was given on February 19. The United States Attorney was notified to that effect. On March 3, Mr. Weiser informed plaintiff of such authorization by telephone and directed him to proceed with the appraisal. Plaintiff commenced his appraisal work under this bid on March 4, 1959, and completed it by June 1. He has been paid for that work.²

Contract negotiations relating to the appraisal work for which the plaintiff now seeks to recover commenced in earnest on February 3, 1959. At that time, Mr. Weiser sent to plaintiff a second Bid for Services form and suggested that he sufficiently inform himself with respect to certain lands and property interests involved in the other suit, C.A. No. 1904-ND, to enable him to submit a bid for appraising those properties. By a letter of May 2, 1959, plaintiff returned to the United States Attorney's Office a second, completed Bid for Services. In that bid, plaintiff offered to appraise property involved in C.A. No. 1904-ND, and estimated that it would require him 95 days to complete the work. The bid provided that plaintiff would submit his appraisal within 150 days after he had been directed to proceed. While plaintiff's bid referred solely to property in case No. 1904-ND, it is apparent that plaintiff contemplated going forward and completing appraisals involved in both that case and No. 1836-ND within the estimated additional 95 days, and that defendant so interpreted plaintiff's letter.

Plaintiff's bid, which the United States Attorney considered reasonable, was forwarded to the Department of Justice on June 10, 1959. It was authorized on July 10, and the United States Attorney was thereafter notified that authorization had been given to incur the expense. However, plaintiff was never informed of such authorization, either by the United States Attorney or any member of his staff, or by the Department of Justice, or by any employee of the defendant.

Both before and after July 10, plaintiff proceeded, without word whether Washington had authorized his second bid, to perform the appraisal services called for by that proposal. He was not specifically asked to proceed nor was he told not to do the work. But, as will appear, the fair inference is that Assistant United States Attorneys did indicate the desirability of going forward and did encourage him, tacitly, to proceed. From time to time between May 2 (when he submitted his second bid) and the middle of July, he communicated with several Assistant United States Attorneys, and discussed with them appraisal matters relating to the condemnation proceedings. During that period, plaintiff also acknowledged in a letter to the Office that he had not received notice of authorization of his second bid, and stated that he was at a loss as to what to do. Following a meeting on July 16 with an Assistant United States Attorney, plaintiff wrote suggesting that efforts be made to have the Department of Justice expedite authorization of the second bid. Although the Department had already sanctioned the arrangement, plaintiff was not so told.

On July 28, 1959, Mr. Thomson transmitted to the United States Attorney a statement of appraisal "Services rendered in connection with" the two pending condemnation cases, and a bill for $4,200 (covering 56 days' work). Plaintiff did not, however, submit a formal report covering the 56 days for which he claimed compensation. On August 4, an Assistant United States Attorney wrote telling plaintiff not to render further services until directed in writing to do so. He was never given any such direction, and his claim has not been paid.³ On these facts we must decide whether he is entitled to recover any part of the sum of $7,125 for which he now sues.

Plaintiff argues strongly — on the basis of (a) his discussions with various Assistant United States Attorneys, (b) certain correspondence between plaintiff and defendant, and (c) all of the circumstances surrounding the negotiations carried on by the parties — that he was justified in proceeding with the appraisal in C.A. 1836-ND immediately after his initial meeting with Mr. Minton and Mr. Weiser on January 6, 1959, and in continuing with a total appraisal in both condemnation cases, until specifically directed not to do so in August 1959. This contention is predicated primarily on Mr. Thomson's version of the January 6th meeting. He takes the position that at that conference he agreed to make the appraisal in C.A. No. 1836-ND with the clear understanding between Mr. Minton and himself that such action simply would be the initial step in a total appraisal in both cases; that after he had performed sufficient exploratory work to enable him to give an estimate of the total time required to make the appraisals in both cases, he would do so; that he would be given sufficient additional time to complete a total appraisal; and that Mr. Minton told him that the matter of obtaining authorization of his bid from Washington was merely a formality that would be granted as a matter of course.

Trial Commissioner Stone explicitly rejected this depiction of the January 6th meeting, and we certainly cannot say that he was wrong. In addition to the commissioner's opportunity to evaluate credibility, we are persuaded by the following factors. Plaintiff was an experienced real estate appraiser who had previously dealt with the United States. His first bid, submitted in January 1959, referred only to C.A. 1836-ND. In his letter of January 16, 1959, submitting that bid, plaintiff clearly acknowledged his awareness...