Thorn v. Phillips, 64769
| Decision Date | 19 October 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 64769,64769 |
| Citation | 164 Ga.App. 47,296 S.E.2d 251 |
| Parties | THORN, et al. v. PHILLIPS. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Charles J. Vrono, Forest Park, for appellants.
Steven L. Head, Atlanta, for appellee.
Charles F. Thorn and Evelyn Thorn, husband and wife, brought an action against Frankie Phillips, Jr., for personal injuries received by Charles Thorn on February 19, 1980 when he was struck by a vehicle being driven by the defendant. Charles and the defendant were both employed by Jiffie Jonnie Service Co., Inc., at the time of the incident.
After answering the complaint and asserting that the exclusive remedy of the plaintiffs was to be found under the Georgia Workers' Compensation Act and the present action was barred, the defendant moved for summary judgment on this same basis. After both sides proferred affidavits and the defendant offered the plaintiffs' responses to his request for admissions, the issue came on for hearing. Thereafter, the trial judge granted the defendant's motion and plaintiffs' appeal. Held:
Code Ann. § 114-103 () provides: "The rights and the remedies herein granted to an employee shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representative, parents, dependents, or next of kin, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service or death: Provided, however, that no employee shall be deprived of any right to bring an action against any third-party tortfeasor, except employees of the same employer ..." [Emphasis supplied.] It is now established beyond peradventure that Workers' Compensation provides the exclusive remedy for the plaintiff and his wife for injuries caused by acts of a fellow employee, arising out of and in the course of plaintiff's employment. Gulf States Ceramic v. Fenster, 228 Ga. 400, 185 S.E.2d 801; Williams v. Byrd, 242 Ga. 80, 247 S.E.2d 874.
Counsel for plaintiffs attempts to assert in this court (and endeavored to show by affidavits in the court below) that the acts causing the injury did not arise out of and in the course of Charles Thorn's employment and that the injuries were in fact caused by willful and intentional acts of the defendant, a fellow employee.
We find this effort and argument to be specious. The plaintiff admitted in response to request "that the plaintiff Charles F. Thorn was engaged in the course and scope of his employment with Jiffie...
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Smith v. Ellis
...because the plaintiff had previously entered a Board-approved settlement with the employer for the same injury); Thorn v. Phillips, 164 Ga.App. 47, 48, 296 S.E.2d 251 (1982) (“[T]he plaintiffs, having affirmatively obtained benefits [from the employer] under the Workers' Compensation Act, a......
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Dickey v. Harden
...in this instance that plaintiff Evelyn Dickey's injury arose out and in the course of employment. See generally Thorn v. Phillips, 164 Ga.App. 47, 48, 296 S.E.2d 251 (1982). Moreover, although the record is unclear as to whether plaintiff affirmatively applied for benefits or her employer v......
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Mann v. Workman, 72711
...for damages due to their receipt of workers' compensation benefits. The trial court relied upon the case of Thorn v. Phillips, 164 Ga.App. 47, 296 S.E.2d 251 (1982), as controlling authority. The court found that "[i]n that case, the plaintiff settled a workers' compensation claim with the ......
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Ridley v. Monroe
...189 (1988) (employee could not sue employer for personal injuries after settling workers' compensation claim); Thorn v. Phillips, 164 Ga.App. 47, 48, 296 S.E.2d 251 (1982) (employee who settled workers' compensation claim for injuries suffered when he was struck by a vehicle at work could n......