Thorncreek Apartments I, LLC v. Vill. of Park Forest, an Ill. Mun. Corp.

• Decision Date: 20 May 2015
• Docket Number: 08 C 869,08 C 1225,08 C 4303
• Parties: THORNCREEK APARTMENTS I, LLC, THORNCREEK APARTMENTS II, LLC, and THORNCREEK APARTMENTS III, LLC, Plaintiffs, v. VILLAGE OF PARK FOREST, an Illinois municipal corporation, TOM MICK, in his individual capacity and as Village Manager, MAE BRANDON, in her individual capacity and as Village Trustee, BONITA DILLARD, in her individual capacity and as Village Trustee, GARY KOPYCINSKI, in his individual capacity and as Village Trustee, KENNETH W. KRAMER, in his individual capacity and as Village Trustee, ROBERT McCRAY, in his individual capacity and as Village Trustee, GEORGIA O'NEILL, in her individual capacity and as Village Trustee, LAWRENCE KERESTES, in his individual capacity and as Village Director of Community Development, and JOHN A. OSTENBURG, in his individual capacity and as Mayor of the Village of Park Forest, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

THORNCREEK APARTMENTS I, LLC, THORNCREEK APARTMENTS II, LLC,and THORNCREEK APARTMENTS III, LLC, Plaintiffs, v. VILLAGE OF PARK FOREST, an Illinois municipal corporation, TOM MICK, in his individual capacityand as Village Manager, MAE BRANDON, in her individual capacity and as Village Trustee,BONITA DILLARD, in her individual capacity and as Village Trustee, GARY KOPYCINSKI,in his individual capacity and as Village Trustee, KENNETH W. KRAMER,in his individual capacity and as Village Trustee, ROBERT McCRAY, in his individual capacityand as Village Trustee, GEORGIA O'NEILL, in her individual capacity and as Village Trustee,LAWRENCE KERESTES, in his individual capacity and as Village Director of Community Development,and JOHN A. OSTENBURG, in his individual capacity and as Mayor of the Village of Park Forest, Defendants.

08 C 869

08 C 1225

08 C 4303

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

May 20, 2015

Judge Feinerman

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

The Village of Park Forest, Illinois, brought the first of these three consolidated suits against Thorncreek Apartments II, LLC, in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, alleging zoning code and building code violations. After removing the suit to federal court, Doc. 1 (08 C 869), Thorncreek II counterclaimed against the Village and filed third-party claims against several Village officials, Doc. 102 (08 C 869). In February 2008, Thorncreek Apartments III, LLC, filed suit in federal court against the Village and several of its officials. Doc. 1 (08 C 1225). And in July 2008, Thorncreek Apartments I, LLC, filed a materially identical suit infederal court. Doc. 1 (08 C 4303). For ease of reference, and unless otherwise indicated, the three Thorncreek entities (there are others, but they are superfluous and may be ignored) will be referred to collectively as "Thorncreek," the Village and its officials will be referred to collectively as "the Village," Thorncreek's claims and counterclaims will be referred to simply as "claims," and all docket entries will refer to Case 08 C 1255.

Thorncreek's claims against the Village, which were brought under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986, and Illinois law, arose from the Village's denial of Thorncreek's requests for licenses to operate a multifamily dwelling, denial of "certificates of occupancy" required to house new tenants, promulgation and allegedly discriminatory enforcement of an electricity ordinance, and denial of a conditional use permit for Thorncreek's leasing office. Thorncreek alleged that the Village targeted it because the vast majority of its tenants were African-American, and also out of irrational animus towards Thorncreek's principal owner, David Clapper. Although the three cases were assigned to three different judges, the parties agreed to consolidate their cross-motions for summary judgment for decision in 08 C 1225 before the undersigned judge. Doc. 132. The court denied Thorncreek's motion, and granted in part and denied in part the Village's motion. Docs. 198-199 (reported at 970 F. Supp. 2d 828 (N.D. Ill. 2013)). The three cases were then consolidated for all purposes, including trial, before the undersigned judge. Doc. 202.

After a thirteen-day trial, the jury found in favor of Thorncreek on its § 1983 class-of-one equal protection claims against the Village and Village Manager Tom Mick, and on its § 1985(3) conspiracy claim against Mick and Village Director of Community Development Lawrence Kerestes; the jury found in favor of the Village, Mick, and Kerestes on Thorncreek's race discrimination claims, and in favor of the other defendants (all defendants other than Mick, theVillage, and Kerestes) on all of Thorncreek's claims. Doc. 372. The jury awarded $1.00 to Thorncreek I, which operated a group of buildings known as Area F; $2,014,00.00 to Thorncreek II, which operated a group of buildings known as Area G; and $1.00 to Thorncreek III, which operated a group of buildings known as Area H. Id. at 8. The jury awarded punitive damages of $5,000.00 against Mick and $1,000.00 against Kerestes. Id. at 9. The court entered judgment consistent with the verdict. Doc. 370.

Discussion

Before the court are three motions challenging or seeking to amend various aspects of the judgment.

I. Mick and Kerestes' Rule 50(b) Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Mick and Kerestes have moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) for judgment as a matter of law. Doc. 384. They argue that because § 1985(3) liability can lie only where there has been race- or class-based discrimination, and because the jury found only a class-of-one equal protection violation and rejected Thorncreek's race-based equal protection claim, the jury's verdict against them on the § 1985(3) claim cannot stand. Id. at 3-5. Thorncreek defends the § 1985(3) verdict only on the merits; it does not contend that Mick and Kerestes failed to preserve their ability to seek such relief under Rule 50(b). Doc. 404.

Section 1985(3) creates a civil damages action against two or more persons who "conspire ... for the purpose of depriving" the plaintiff of "the equal protection of the laws" and who take or cause to be taken "any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy." 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Settled law holds that a plaintiff can prevail under § 1985(3) only if it first establishes an underlying equal protection violation, meaning that the absence of an underlying equal protection violation precludes § 1985(3) liability. See Xiong v. Wagner, 700 F.3d 282, 297(7th Cir. 2012) ("As discussed, plaintiffs have not made a showing sufficient to establish the existence of racial animus on the part of defendants. Accordingly, plaintiffs' conspiracy claim falls with their equal protection claim, and summary judgment in defendants' favor is appropriate."); Sow v. Fortville Police Dep't, 636 F.3d 293, 305 (7th Cir. 2011) ("The district court also correctly determined that the absence of any underlying violation of Plaintiff's rights precludes the possibility of Plaintiff succeeding on a conspiracy claim."); Bublitz v. Cottey, 327 F.3d 485, 488 n.3 (7th Cir. 2003) ("Our discussion of Mr. Bublitz's § 1983 claim is sufficient to dispose of his other claims. Section 1985 prohibits conspiracies to interfere with civil rights .... Because we hold that neither Mr. Bublitz nor the deceased members of his family have suffered a deprivation of their constitutional rights under § 1983, there is similarly no constitutional violation to support these other claims."); Indianapolis Minority Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Wiley, 187 F.3d 743, 754 (7th Cir. 1999) ("As a threshold matter, we note that the absence of any underlying violation of the plaintiffs' rights precludes the possibility of their succeeding on this conspiracy count.").

Thorncreek does not seriously dispute this proposition, but it contends that the jury did find an underlying equal protection violation. True enough, but that violation was a class-of-one violation, not a race-based violation; in fact, the jury explicitly rejected Thorncreek's race-based equal protection claim. This is significant, for settled law further holds that the equal protection violation necessary to predicate a § 1985(3) claim must be a race-based or other class-based violation, not a class-of-one violation. See Smith v. Gomez, 550 F.3d 613, 617 (7th Cir. 2008) ("Section 1985(3) prohibits a conspiracy to deprive another of equal protection under the law ..., but the conspiracy must be motivated by racial, or other class-based discriminatory animus. Smith has failed to sufficiently allege such animus because status as a parolee is not considered a'suspect class' for equal-protection purposes.") (citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971), and Green v. Benden, 281 F.3d 661, 665 (7th Cir. 2002)); Bowman v. City of Franklin, 980 F.2d 1104, 1109 (7th Cir. 1992) ("§ 1985(3) does not reach bias based on economic status" or "nonracial political conspiracies"); Munson v. Friske, 754 F.2d 683, 695 n.8 (7th Cir. 1985) ("We follow the Seventh Circuit precedent requiring a class-based invidiously discriminatory animus to be proved in all section 1985(3) cases because the Supreme Court added the animus requirement in order to give full effect to the language and purpose of the statute."); Underfer v. Univ. of Toledo, 36 F. App'x 831, 833-34 (6th Cir. 2002) (citable pursuant to 6th Cir. L. R. 32.1) (holding that a class-of-one claim cannot underlie a § 1985(3) claim); Grimes v. Smith, 585 F. Supp. 1084, 1089-90 (N.D. Ind. 1984) (Posner, J.) (rejecting a § 1985(3) claim because "there is no racial or similar hostility behind the conspiracy in the present case that would take it out of the category of purely political conspiracies"), aff'd, 776 F.2d 1359 (7th Cir. 1985); Snyder v. Smith, 7 F. Supp. 3d 842, 850 (S.D. Ind. 2014) ("Neither the Supreme Court nor the Seventh Circuit has credited a 'class of one' conspiracy claim under Section 1985(3), and such a broad interpretation would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's command that the statute be construed in a limited manner."); Gross v. Town of Cicero, 2006 WL 288262, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 1, 2006) ("a 'class of one' theory does not support a claim under Section 1985(3)"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 619 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 2010); McCleester v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 2007 WL 2071616, at *15 (W.D. Pa. July 16, 2007) (compiling cases). Accordingly, Thorncreek's victory on its class-of-one claim does not provide the indispensable predicate for its § 1985(3) claim, which means that Thorncreek's verdict on the § 1985(3) claim cannot stand.

Because the jury found against Kerestes only on Thorncreek's § 1985(3) claim, and because that particular finding cannot stand, the court grants Rule 50(b) relief to Kerestes andvacates the judgment against him. The judgment against Mick will not be disturbed, however, because he...