Thorne v. Callahan, 31613
| Decision Date | 02 August 1951 |
| Docket Number | No. 31613,31613 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | THORNE, v. CALLAHAN, Sheriff. |
James Tynan, John M. Warnock, Everett, for appellant.
Charles O. Carroll, Frank Harrington, Seattle, Philip Sheridan, Everett, for respondent.
June 15, 1950, Lottie Thorne filed in the office of the clerk of the superior court for King county her petition for a writ of habeas corpus directed to Harlan S. Callahan, sheriff of King county, alleging that her son, Fred L. Thorne (herein referred to as Thorne or the prisoner), was then in custody in the King county jail at Seattle pursuant to a judgment and sentence of the superior court for Snohomish county, entered June 5, 1950, finding and adjudging Thorne guilty of the crime of carnal knowledge, and sentencing him to confinement in the state penitentiary for the term of his natural life.
The petitioner alleged that Thorne's restraint was illegal, in that he had been deprived of his rights under the constitution of the state of Washington and the constitution of the United States; that he had been arrested June 3, 1950, and confined in the Snohomish county jail at Everett until he was brought before the superior court at 9:30 a. m., Monday, June 5, 1950; that, June 4th, Thorne was visited in jail by a deputy prosecuting attorney and was advised by the deputy that Thorne's wife had accused him of carnal knowledge of his nine-year-old daughter; that Thorne had no knowledge of the events which occurred about the time alleged crime was said to have been committed and so advised the prosecutor, who then told him that he was charged with a serious crime; that he could be sentenced to as much as twenty years' confinement; that it would be best for him to plead guilty, in which case the prosecutor would recommend a light sentence and he would not have to serve more than one year; that the prosecutor further told Thorne that he would be brought before the superior court the following morning and asked if he desired an attorney, to which he should answer in the negative; that the information filed against him would be read; that he would be asked what he desired to plead to the charge; and that he should tell the court that his plea was guilty.
The petitioner then alleged that, relying upon these assurances and not being acquainted with any attorney as he was at a distance from his home, Thorne did not consult an attorney or take any steps to ascertain his rights or the possible consequences which might follow his failure to secure an adequate defense; that, June 5, 1950, Thorne was brought before the superior court and the information was read to him, whereupon he was asked what he wished to plead; that Thorne then informed the court that he had no recollection of the events which occurred at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, but that he had been informed that his wife had told the arresting officers that he had criminally assaulted his daughter; that Thorne had no knowledge as to whether this statement was true, but that, if his wife said so, it might be true because she had never lied to him before; and that the court thereupon directed that a plea of guilty be entered, and sentenced Thorne to confinement in the state penitentiary for the term of his natural life.
The petitioner further alleged that Thorne had since learned that, to the knowledge of the prosecuting attorney, no such crime as that with which he was charged was ever committed; that the advice given him by the prosecuting attorney was fraudulent and, consequently, the judgment and sentence imposed were void; that, to the further knowledge of the prosecuting attorney, Thorne's mind was in such a state, due to his having indulged freely in intoxicating liquor during the afternoon and evening of June 3, 1950, that he could not realize the nature of any acts performed by him during the time in question; that Thorne had for a period of years indulged in intoxicating liquor to excess; that he suffered from amnesia; that, after he was arrested, he was mentally confused and did not recover possession of his mental faculties until after the rendition of judgment and the imposition of sentence; that his condition from the time of his arrest until after the imposition of sentence 'was one of temporary insanity'; that his plea of guilty to the charge was not the action of his normal mind, and that he was not guilty of the crime with which he was charged.
The petitioner prayed that a writ of habeas corpus be issued requiring the sheriff to bring Thorne before the court.
On the day the petition was filed, an alternative writ of habeas corpus was issued by the superior court, requiring respondent sheriff to bring Fred L. Thorne before the court at the time and place fixed in the order or show cause why he should not do so.
June 24, 1950, respondent sheriff filed his return, alleging the facts above stated concerning Thorne's arrest; that an information had been duly filed charging Thorne with the offense above referred to; that Thorne had entered a plea of guilty to the information, and that he had been sentenced to life imprisonment, copies of the information, judgment and sentence, and the clerk's minute entries being attached to the return. Respondent denied the allegations concerning Thorne's mental incapacity and alleged that Thorne had been accorded all of his legal and constitutional rights, and that he was held in confinement pursuant to a valid judgment and sentence rendered by the superior court for Snohomish county.
A trial lasting four days was had before the superior court for King county (the statement of facts comprises 431 pages of testimony), with the result that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied. Petitioner's motions for a new trial and for reconsideration of the matter by the court having been denied, the trial court, July 14, 1950, filed an order quashing the alternative writ of habeas corpus theretofore issued, from which order petitioner gave oral notice of appeal to this court, seasonably supporting the same by filing a cost bond. A later order further provided that the expense of the appeal to this court should be borne by King county.
Appellant presents the following assignment of errors:
'The court erred:
'(1) In holding that the plea of guilty was in proper form and was properly received.
'(2) In holding that no constitutional or statutory right was violated in not offering one day to plead.
'(3) In holding that there was an understanding waiver of the right to counsel, and that no constitutional rights were violated in accepting the plea without counsel, under the circumstances of this case.
'(4) In holding that there was error without prejudice in the admission and consideration of Exhibit '3', the statement of the defendant relating to another and unrelated incident.
'(5) In holding that the defendant was not deceived or misled by the statements of the deputy prosecuting attorney.
'(6) In holding, at least inferentially, and basing his decision upon, the erroneous hypothesis that there may be a parole after sentence for the crime involved.
'(7) In refusing to discharge the prisoner or grant him a new trial, and in quashing the writ.
'(8) In holding that the actions of the prosecuting attorney before the arraignment, and the actions of the sentencing judge upon the arraignment and plea, were not violative of the prisoner's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United Sates.'
In view of the conclusion we have reached, we will discuss only that portion of the testimony pertaining to assignments of error Nos. 3, 5, 6 and 8.
In connection with the questions here presented, it is appropriate to note that, by Laws of 1947, chapter 256, § 2, p. 1070, Rem.Supp.1947, § 1085-2, the legislature added to the statutes in regard to habeas corpus proceedings the following section 'In the consideration of any petition for a writ of habeas corpus by the Supreme Court, whether in an original proceeding or upon an appeal, if any Federal question shall be presented by the pleadings, it shall be the duty of the Supreme Court to determine in its opinion whether or not the petitioner has been denied a right guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.'
At the hearing before the superior court, Thorne, on whose behalf the petition for a writ of habeas corpus had been filed, was called as a witness, testifying that his name was Fred L. Thorne, Jr.; that he lived with his family, consisting of his wife and four children, at Perrinville, two or three miles north of Edmonds; and that his eldest child, Lottie Lee Thorne, became nine years of age June 8, 1950.
By the information, dated June 5, 1950, Thorne was charged
'* * * with the crime of carnal knowledge, committed as follows, to-wit:
'That he, the said Fred L. Thorne, Jr., in the County of Snohomish, State of Washington, on or about the 3rd day of June, 1950, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously did carnally know and abuse one Lottie Lee Thorne, then and there a female child of the age of eight years, and not then and there the wife of the said Fred L. Thorne, Jr., contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Washington.'
The offense charged was based upon Laws of 1943, chapter 112, § 1, p. 256, Rem.Supp.1943, § 2436, which reads in part as follows:
'Every male person who shall carnally know and abuse any female child under the age of eighteen years, not his wife, * * * shall be punished as follows:
'(1) When such an act is committed upon a child under the age of ten (10) years, by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for life; * * *.'
It should be borne in mind that it is entirely immaterial to the issues here presented whether or not Thorne is guilty as charged in the information quoted above.
It is necessary to now consider the...
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