POWELL, J.
The Court of Civil Appeals states the case in part as follows:
"The Missouri State Life Insurance Company on February 13, 1918, issued two policies of life insurance, each in the sum of $1,000, payable upon the death of Thomas A. Thornell to Patty L. Thornell, wife of the insured, as beneficiary. The policies each stipulated: `In case of death by self-destruction, sane or insane, within one year from date of issue, the liability of the company shall be limited to an amount equal to the premiums paid hereon.'
"The insured died May 6, 1918. The beneficiary brought the suit to recover the amount of the two policies and the statutory penalty, interest, and attorney's fees. The insurance company answered by general denial and specially pleaded, in avoidance, that the insured came to his death by self-destruction, which fact rendered the insurance company liable only, as stipulated, for an amount equal to the premiums paid, which was tendered into court. Plaintiff filed a supplemental petition in denial of the answer of the defendant.
"The case was tried before a jury, and the verdict was in favor of the insurance company. The court charged the jury as follows: `You are instructed to find for the plaintiff the amount of the two life insurance policies and 6 per cent. interest from May 6, 1918, and the penalty of 12 per cent. upon the face amount of the two policies, and reasonable attorney's fees, agreed upon to be $300 unless you find for defendant in the following: You are instructed that if you find from the evidence that Thomas A. Thornell came to his death by self-destruction, sane or insane, then you will find for defendant upon that issue, and find for plaintiff $68.20 premiums paid. The burden of proof is on the defendant insurance company to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Thomas A. Thornell came to his death by self-destruction, sane or insane, and unless you find that the defendant has done this you find against the defendant on this issue.'
"There is involved in the verdict of the jury the finding of fact that the insured committed suicide, and the circumstances in evidence strongly support this finding of fact, which, in deference to the verdict, is here adopted."
Upon the verdict of the jury, the trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff for $68.20, the amount of the premiums paid, with interest thereon from date of judgment, and also for costs of court.
Upon appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals, the judgment of the district court was affirmed. See 229 S. W. 653. Upon proper application therefor by plaintiff in error, the Supreme Court granted a writ of error herein "on conflict with De Garcia v. Cherokee Life Ins. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.) 180 S. W. 153."
We think, in passing upon the controlling question upon this appeal, it will be helpful for us to quote further from the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals as follows:
"The insurance company proved by its secretary that the company had `received from the plaintiff in this case some papers as proofs of the death of the insured, T. A. Thornell,' and the witness then identified the papers `now in my possession' as `the originals of such papers.' The insurance company then offered in evidence such original proofs of the death of the insured made to it by the beneficiary in the policy as admissions against the beneficiary of the facts therein stated. The appellant objected, and the court overruled the objection to the admission in evidence of such proofs of death; and the first, second, third, and fourth assignments of error complain of the ruling and predicate error in the two propositions made thereunder: (1) That `the attending physician's certificate and coroner's certificate offered in evidence by the defendant as a part of the proofs of death are not admissible or competent to show the cause or manner of death of T. A. Thornell, insured'; and (2) `the evidence on the issue of suicide being conflicting, the death proofs offered in evidence were calculated to and did influence the jury in determining this issue against the appellant.' The appellee did not offer `the proofs of death' as original evidence to prove `the cause or manner of death of the insured' was self-destruction, but as evidence of admission by the beneficiary of the facts therein stated. The appellee claimed in its answer that the insured committed suicide, and for which death there was no liability. The appellant by supplemental petition denied the fact alleged in the answer. Therefore the insistence of appellant was in her pleading that the insured did not commit suicide. The question then is: Was it error to permit the insurance company to offer in evidence the proofs of death furnished by the beneficiary, as in the nature of admissions by her of the facts therein stated? The original proofs of death as submitted to the company, and, as offered in evidence, were all bradded together, and consisted of a `claimant's statement' and affidavit thereto of the beneficiary, and `attending physician's statement' and his affidavit, and `undertaker's statement' with his affidavit, and a certified copy of a coroner's verdict, and an affidavit of the beneficiary. The statements, except the coroner's verdict, were on blanks, in question and answer form, furnished by the insurance company. The `claimant's statement,' which was the first document, was signed and sworn to by the appellant, and is in effect proof of claim of the beneficiary for the amount of the policy because of the death of the insured. The next document was the `attending physician's statement,' signed and sworn to by a physician, and, as material, states:
"`Q. 6. When did deceased show the symptoms of final illness? A. 5—6—18 a. m.
"`Q. 7. Date of your first visit or prescription in deceased's last illness. A. 5—6—18. Saw him after death (no one saw him before death).
"`Q. 8. Date of your last visit. A. 5—6—18.
"`Q. 9. Place and date of death. A. Corsicana, Tex., 5—6—18.
"`Q. 10. State the disease of which the deceased died and any important medical facts connected therewith. A. Carbolic acid poisoning; suicide.
"`Q. Describe the injuries, stating whether or not there were any contusions or wounds. A. Lips white from acid burns.'
"The `undertaker's statement,' the next document
was a showing of date of death, identity of deceased as the insured, and place of interment. The next document was the coroner's verdict, certified, and reading:
"`The State of Texas, County of Navarro.
"`In the matter of the death of T. A. Thornell.
"`I, J. E. Norwood, justice of the peace, and acting coroner over the dead body of T. A. Thornell, having viewed the body and after having made diligent inquiry into the cause, time, and manner of his death, find that the said T. A. Thornell is dead; that he came to his death on the morning of May 6, 1918, by swallowing carbolic acid administered by his own hand.
"`Given under my hand this 6th day of May, 1918. [Signed] J. E. Norwood, Justice of the Peace and Acting Coroner.'
"The `instructions' on the blank provide: `When a coroner's inquest has been held, a copy of the verdict duly certified must be furnished.' Then follows the subscribed affidavit of the appellant: `That I am the beneficiary named under policies Nos. 171918 and 171919 on the life of the late Thomas A. Thornell, and I further certify that my name is Pattie L. Thornell, whose name is shown in the application for the said policies, and further I say not.'
"As seen, the statements in the proofs show that the death was occasioned in such manner as to relieve the insurance company from responsibility and are inconsistent with the subsequent claim of the beneficiary in her suit that the death was not suicide. * * *
"It is believed that a statement as to the cause of the death of the insured presented to the insurance company by the beneficiary, as here, as proofs of death of the insured, and which is inconsistent with the subsequent claim of the beneficiary, is competent evidence against such beneficiary, as an admission. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Newton, 89 U. S. (22 Wall.) 32, 22 L. Ed. 793; K. of P. v. Beck, 181 U. S. 49, 21 Sup. Ct. 532, 45 L. Ed. 741; Leman v. Ins. Co., 46 La. Ann. 1189, 15 So. 388, 24 L. R. A. 589, 49 Am. St. Rep. 348; Walther v. Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 417, 4 Pac. 413; Knights of Modern Maccabees v. Gillis, 59 Tex. Civ. App. 109, 125 S. W. 338; 7 Ency. of Evid. p. 754; 3 Elliott on Evid. § 2387. See 2 Wigmore on Evid. §§ 1048 and 1073."
It is contended by counsel for the beneficiary that these proofs of death, particularly the statements of the physician and coroner, were not admissible in evidence for any purpose. Strangely enough this very question seems never to have reached the Supreme Court of Texas, directly or indirectly. We shall now refer to the only five cases we can find in the Courts of Civil Appeals of Texas which discuss the admissibility of such proofs of death for any purpose.
The instant case was decided by the Court of Civil Appeals at Texarkana, and we have already shown that its decision holds them admissible for certain purposes. In the case at bar the court refers to its own former opinion in the case of American Yoemen v. Hickey, 191 S. W. 162, and shows that this latter decision is not in conflict with its later opinion in the instant case.
The Court of Civil Appeals at El Paso, in the...
