Thornock by Baugh v. Boise Independent School Dist. No. 1

• Decision Date: 01 July 1988
• Docket Number: No. 16455,16455
• Citation: 767 P.2d 1241,115 Idaho 466
• Parties: , 52 Ed. Law Rep. 272 Gabriel THORNOCK, by his next friend and mother Lana (Thornock) BAUGH and Lana (Thornock) Baugh, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. BOISE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT # 1, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 1241

767 P.2d 1241

115 Idaho 466, 52 Ed. Law Rep. 272

Gabriel THORNOCK, by his next friend and mother Lana (Thornock) BAUGH and Lana (Thornock) Baugh, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. BOISE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT # 1, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16455.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

July 1, 1988.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 29, 1988.

Stewart A. Morris, Boise, for defendant-appellant.

J. Brent Marchbanks, CO-AD, Inc., Boise, for plaintiffs-respondents.

HUNTLEY, Justice.

This case presents three issues: (1) whether the district court employed the appropriate standard of review for an administrative proceeding under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA); (2) whether the Boise Independent School District fulfilled its legal obligation to offer Thornock a Free Appropriate Public Education (FAPE); (3) whether the school district's duty to provide a FAPE is obviated because of Thornock's parent's selection of private school placement for their son.

Gabriel Thornock, a multiply handicapped child, is the son of Lana Baugh and has been classified as "trainable mentally retarded." During the 1981-82 school year, Gabriel resided in the Meridian School District, where he was placed in the public school's "contained classroom," a class consisting solely of handicapped children taught by special education teachers. Gabriel's parents decided to place him in a private school to better attain social integration and achievement goals. All of the private schools contacted by his parents required that he have the assistance of a full time one-to-one aide. They enrolled him in St. Joseph's parochial school in the Boise School District for the 1982-83 school year.

Once Gabriel was enrolled in a private school, his parents started administrative proceedings to obtain reimbursement for the one-to-one aide.

Since Gabriel's legal residence was still in the Meridian School District, Meridian contracted with the Boise School District to provide special education services. In June 1983, the Thornocks changed their residence to the Boise School District. Gabriel's parents requested the Boise School District to provide special education related services including publicly funded services of a full time one-to-one aide.

On August 29, 1983, a Child Study Team (CST) meeting was convened to develop a program of special education related services and discuss the financial responsibility for the full time one-to-one aide.

The Boise Independent School District had been advised by its legal counsel that it was not financially responsible for the services of a full time one-to-one aide provided in a private school setting. On November 15, 1983, the Child Study Team meeting reconvened, meeting with Gabriel's parents to inform them of opportunities available to Gabriel through the public education system. The district made no offer to consider any placement other than in a segregated classroom for "special education" children. Gabriel's parents contended that he was entitled to receive "mainstreaming" under federal statute, that is, placement in a classroom with non-handicapped children. The district offered to pay for related services in a private school, but would not pay for the full time one-to-one aide. However, Gabriel's parents chose to keep him in the private school setting and initiated administrative proceedings in which they sought reimbursement for the cost of the one-to-one aide and the tuition at the private school.

The hearing officer ruled in favor of the Boise Independent School District. The decision was appealed to the State Department of Education where the decision was affirmed. Gabriel next filed a petition in district court for judicial review of the administrative decision. The district court reversed and ruled in favor of Gabriel Thornock and the district now appeals.

I.

We first address whether the district court applied the appropriate standard of review under the EAHCA.

In 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2), Congress states that "the court shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence of the request of a party, and, basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate."

The school district, citing Board of Education of the Hendrick Hudson Central School District v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982) claims that the district court's review is not a de novo review where the decision is based on the preponderance of the evidence. Rather, the district would impose an "implied limitation" on the court's review and require "due weight" to be given to the hearing officer's decision.

Rowley, supra, involved a student who was mainstreamed and received passing grades in the standard program of study. The dispute in Rowley was whether the district should be using federal money to provide the student with a deaf language interpreter. Given the court's holding that the student was receiving an appropriate education, the court understandably stated that "courts must be careful to avoid imposing their view of preferable education methods upon the states." Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207, 102 S.Ct. at 3051.

Unlike Rowley, the instant case does not involve a school district's choice between two appropriate educational alternatives. Rather, the question here is whether the education offered was appropriate at all. The district court did not abuse the preponderance of the evidence standard by measuring the educational policies of the school district against the Congressional requirements. The question before the district court was whether the education offered Thornock was appropriate.

Rowley required that due weight be given to the proceedings before the hearing officer. This would indicate that the evidence presented in the hearing be considered as much a part of the record as any proceedings before the district court as long as those proceedings comply with 20 U.S.C. § 1415. It does not imply that the hearing officer's findings and conclusions should rise beyond whatever persuasive value they have in the district court's decision on the merits.

In Gregory K. v. Longview School Dist., 811 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir.1987), both the standard applicable to the trial court and that applicable to the appellate court in these cases was discussed. As to the deference to be given state administrative findings, the Gregory court noted:

As the Supreme Court has held, courts must give "due weight" to judgments of education policy when they review state hearings under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e). Hendrick Hudson Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3050, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). Citing Rowley, we have held that "courts should not substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review." Wilson v. Marana Unified School Dist., 735 F.2d 1178, 1183 (9th Cir.1984). How much deference to give state educational agencies, however, is a matter for the discretion of the courts:

The traditional test of findings being binding on the court if supported by substantial evidence, or even a preponderance of the evidence, does not apply. This does not mean, however, that the findings can be ignored. The court, in recognition of the expertise of the administrative agency, must consider the findings carefully and endeavor to respond to the hearing officer's resolution of each material issue. After such consideration, the court is free to accept or reject the findings in part or in whole.

Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Ed., 736 F.2d 773, 792 (1st Cir.1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 359, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985).

The district court in the instant case noted:

[T]hat the school district's argument is irrelevant to the outcome of this case. The evidence in this case, unlike most cases, is clear and uncontroverted as to every relevant fact. By any standard of evidentiary review this Court's ruling would have to be the same as is herein announced.

The Boise School District put forth no evidence rebutting the substantial evidence that mainstreaming was appropriate for Gabriel.

As to this Court's standard of review, the Court in Gregory, supra, commented:

The Court of Appeals reviews the district court's findings of fact for clear error. Burlington Northern, Inc., v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 719 F.2d 304, 307 (9th Cir.1983). "A finding of fact is deemed clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. Even where, as here, the district court relies on a written record of administrative proceedings, the clearly erroneous standard applies to findings of fact. Id.

The Court of Appeals reviews de novo the district court's conclusions of law. Id. Unless a mixed question of fact and law is primarily factual, we review mixed questions de novo. United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1199-1204 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984). For example, whether the school district's proposed IEP was a "free appropriate public education" as required by the Education for all Handicapped Children Act is a mixed question that we review de novo. Wilson v. Marana Unified School District, 735 F.2d 1178, 1181 (9th Cir.1984); Department of Education, State of Hawaii v. Katherine D., 727 F.2d 809, 814 n. 2 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117, 105 S.Ct. 2360, 86 L.Ed.2d 260 (1985).

The district court followed the standard of review provided in 20 U.S.C. § 1415, and there is no showing that it violated the preponderance of evidence standard by finding that the education offered by the Boise School District was not appropriate.

II.

With the appellate court standard of review enunciated in Gregory, supra, in mind, we now pass on to the major issue on appeal, which is whether the district court erred in ruling that the school...