Thornock v. Cook
Decision Date | 24 December 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 16231,16231 |
Citation | 604 P.2d 934 |
Parties | Lucille Jesse Moffat THORNOCK et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Lois S. COOK et al., Defendants and Appellant. |
Court | Utah Supreme Court |
Milton A. Oman, Salt Lake City, for defendants and appellant.
LeRoy S. Axland, Larry G. Reed of Suitter, Axland & Armstrong, Robert Walter Jensen (with them on the brief), Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and respondents.
Plaintiffs, heirs of Aden Woodruff Thornock, initiated this action for the purpose of quieting title to mineral rights, allegedly reserved to Thornock, in real property owned by defendant Lois Cook. The trial court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs. We affirm.
Thornock received the land subject to the present dispute by a deed dated April 25, 1947. On May 14, 1950, a contract was executed by and between Thornock, party of the first part, and Lawrence B. Johnson, party of the second part, for the sale of the subject property. The contract contained the following provision:
No. 5. The party of the first part herein reserves all rights according to what rights may have been conferred in the patents to the above-described land for all coal, oil and other minerals on the above-described land.
Pursuant to the contract, on June 30, 1950, a warranty deed was executed, conveying the subject property, except for a 40-acre tract, to Lawrence B. Johnson. That deed contained an error regarding the mineral rights reserved to Thornock by the terms of the contract. The deed provided:
Reserving to the Grantees herein all coal, oil and other minerals as may have been granted in the original patents to the above-described land. (Emphasis added.)
On December 1, 1952, Howland J. Cook, now deceased, and defendant Lois S. Cook obtained title to the property, again except for the 40-acre tract, 1 through a warranty deed executed by Lawrence B. Johnson and his wife. That deed perpetuated the erroneous language reserving the mineral rights to the grantee. 2
To alleviate any confusion generated by the error in the reservation clause, and to satisfy potential lessees of the mineral estate with whom he was negotiating, Thornock requested the Cooks to execute a quitclaim deed as to the mineral rights in the subject property. A document entitled "Quitclaim Deed for Coal, Oil and Other Minerals" was executed by Howland J. Cook and Lois S. Cook on September 2, 1959, and subsequently recorded. This deed describes the interest intended to be conveyed as follows:
The Grantors (Howland J. Cook and Lois S. Cook) intend by this instrument to convey to the Grantee (Aden Thornock) only the rights reserved to the Grantee for coal, oil and other minerals as may have been granted in the original patents to the above-described land and as reserved . . . (in certain identified documents) . . . in the official records of Rich County, Utah.
Defendant Lois S. Cook has since challenged the validity of the quitclaim deed.
To definitively establish their claim to full mineral rights in the subject property, plaintiffs initiated a quiet title action against Lois S. Cook and other parties. Default judgments were granted against all defendants except Lois S. Cook. Following two hearings, the consideration of memoranda submitted by the parties, and the examination of the deeds and abstract of title, the trial court found there were no genuine issues of material fact and granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs.
On appeal defendant Cook contends that the trial court erred in entering summary judgment because there were triable issues of fact with respect to the validity of the quitclaim deed from the Cooks to Thornock. Cook also contends that Thornock's title was defective and that Cook holds title to all rights in the subject property by adverse possession.
Our inquiry on review is whether there is any genuine issue as to any material fact, and if there is not, whether the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Frederick May & Co., Inc. v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P.2d 266 (1962); Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d 1, 354 P.2d 559 (1960). The defendant cannot rely upon the mere allegations or denials of her pleadings to avoid a summary judgment but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial, Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P.
Turning to Cook's first contention, we note that the trial court considered the deposition, documents, and affidavits and concluded that under the applicable law there was no material issue of fact and that plaintiffs had title to the subject mineral rights based on the reservation in the Thornock-Johnson deed...
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