Thornton v. Barrett

Decision Date27 March 2019
Docket NumberCase No. 2:18-cv-00182-DCN
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Idaho
PartiesJOHN F. THORNTON, Plaintiffs v. KENNETH J. and DEANNA L. BARRETT, a married couple residing in Michigan, LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S., a Washington Professional Services Corporation, MICHAEL SCHMIDT, an individual residing in Idaho, TERRI BOYD-DAVIS, a married woman residing in Idaho, BONNER COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, a governmental agency, DARYL WHEELER, in his capacity as Bonner County Sheriff, SALLY MITCHELL, in her capacity as Bonner County Deputy Sheriff, and LEANNE BANKSON, in her capacity as Bonner County Deputy Sheriff, Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION

Pending before the Court is Defendants Kenneth and Deanna Barretts' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 7), Defendants Terri Boyd-Davis, Lukins & Annis, P.S., and Michael Schmidt's Motion to Dismiss and Joinder in Barretts' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 13), and Defendants Bonner County Sheriff's Department, Daryl Wheeler, Sally Mitchell and Leanne Bankson's Motion to Dismiss and Joinder in Barretts and Terri-Boyd Davis, Lukins & Annis, P.S. and Michael Schmidt's Motions to Dismiss (Dkt. 17). Having reviewed the record, the Court finds that the facts and legal argument are adequately presented in the briefs. Accordingly, in the interest of avoiding further delay, and because the Court finds the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument, the Court decides the Motions on the record without oral argument. Dist. Idaho Loc. Civ. R. 7.1(d)(2)(ii). For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS each Motion to Dismiss.

II. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a 2013 state court case, Thornton v. Mary E. Pandrea and Kari A. Clark, CV 2013-1334 ("state court action") and its aftermath. Because the history of the state court action (and its brief foray into federal court) provides the background for this case, some detail with respect to the state court action is necessary.

On August 14, 2013, Plaintiff John F. Thornton ("Thornton") sued Mary Pandrea and Kari Clark, two sisters who owned land bordering Thornton's property, to quiet title to his land and for damages. The dispute involved a "Well Piece," which was on land Thornton believed he owned and claimed to have exercised control over.1 In 1993, prior to owning the land, Thornton rented the property from Mary Pandrea and Robert Wiltse, Pandrea's husband at the time. When Thornton first took possession of the property to rent, he claimed Wiltse and Pandrea described the physical boundaries of the property asincluding the Well Piece.

In 1998, Thornton purchased the land he had been renting (hereinafter the "Property") via a Warranty Deed, recorded May 7, 1998, in Bonner County. Thornton claims he believed the land he had purchased included the Well Piece, but that in December of 1993, without his knowledge, Wiltse and Pandrea deeded the Well Piece to Clark and Pandrea, as tenants in common, via a Quitclaim Deed. The Quitclaim Deed was recorded on December 27, 1993, in Bonner County, and reserved unto Clark and Pandrea "the right and use of the existing well." Dkt. 2, ¶ 3.6. Despite this recording, Thornton claims he did not learn the Well Piece had been alienated from the Property until 2013, when he had the Property surveyed and discovered the Well Piece was also omitted from the property description contained in his 1998 Warranty Deed.

Thornton subsequently filed the state court action against Pandrea and Clark to quiet title to the Well Piece, as well as to quiet title to an easement located on another area of the Property and designated by the parties as the "Driveway Piece." Pandrea filed a Motion to Dismiss Thornton's Complaint on November 7, 2013. Because both the Motion to Dismiss and Thornton's Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss contained matters outside the pleadings which were not subject to judicial notice, the State Court treated Pandrea's Motion to Dismiss as a Motion for Summary Judgment. See, 2:17-cv-00367, Dkt. 1-6, p. 9.2

In her Motion, Pandrea claimed Thornton was not a bona fide purchaser of the Well Piece because the 1993 Quit Claim Deed gave Thornton constructive notice of Pandrea's interest in it. In addition, Pandrea argued the Well Piece was not included in Thornton's 1998 Warranty Deed for the Property so he could not consider himself to be a bona fide purchased for value. Thornton responded that the physical property description contained in his deed did not, but should have, included the Well Piece, that he had no notice of Pandrea's 1993 conveyance of the Well Piece, and that his 1998 Warranty Deed did not include "any language reflecting the [1993] conveyance, or otherwise referring the right to use the water from the well." Id., pp. 4-6. However, both Pandrea and Thornton failed to provide the state court with a copy of Thornton's 1998 Warranty Deed to the Property. Thus, the state court could not decide Pandrea's claim that "since the [Well Piece] is not contained in Thornton's property description, Thornton cannot consider himself to be a bona fide purchaser for value" on summary judgment. Id., p. 11. In addition to the parties' omission of Thornton's 1998 Warranty Deed, other issues of material fact, such as Pandrea's representations to Thornton regarding the Well Piece, precluded summary judgment on Thornton's claim that he had purchased the entireProperty in good faith and without constructive notice of Pandrea and Clark's ownership of the Well Piece.

However, in his Complaint, Thornton also appeared to claim ownership of the Well Piece by adverse possession. The State Court determined Thornton failed to present material facts to establish he had occupied the Well Piece for the twenty-year statutory period required for adverse possession under Idaho Code section 5-210. Id., pp. 20-23. Because he could not satisfy each element of adverse possession, the Court held as a matter of law that Thornton had not adversely possessed the Well Piece. Id., p. 23. The State Court granted Pandrea summary judgment on this issue, and Thornton did not appeal the Court's ruling.

Following Thornton's Complaint, Clark counterclaimed against Thornton for interference with her easement rights, for permanent injunction, to quiet title, and for damages. Shortly after the State Court issued its decision on Pandrea's Motion to Dismiss, Clark filed her own "Motion for Summary Judgment of Dismissal of Thornton's Complaint and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Clark's Counterclaims." Dkt. 9-1. The primary focus of Clark's claims against Thornton was her right to use the Driveway Piece as an easement, and the allegation that Thornton had interfered with this right when he erected a locked gate to block Clark's access to the Driveway Piece. However, in deciding Clark's Motion for Summary Judgment, the State Court noted:

When this Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant Pandrea's Motion to Dismiss (Motion for Summary Judgment) on February 14, 2014, the Court had not at that time been provided a copy of Thornton's [1998 Warranty Deed to the Property]. Two weeks after that decision was issued, when Clark filed the instantmotion for summary judgment, was the first time the Court was provided a copy of Thornton's deed.... It is now apparent that at all times Thornton was deeded this parcel, the metes and bounds description . . . did not include the 'Well Piece.'

Id., p. 7.

In deciding Clark had an easement appurtenant to the Property, the State Court also explained Thornton's 1998 Warranty Deed contained clear language granting Clark an easement to use the Driveway Piece. Id., p. 18. The Warranty Deed thus put Thornton on notice that Clark had an easement, and Thornton did not have a right to erect a locked gate to attempt to keep Clark from using the easement. The State Court accordingly granted Clark's Motion for Summary Judgment.3 Id., p. 22. The State Court entered Judgment in favor of Clark on April 30, 2014. 2:17-cv-00367-DCN, Dkt. 1-8.

Thornton and Pandrea stipulated to dismiss Thornton's claims against Pandrea on May 21, 2014. Id., Dkt. 1-9. On June 30, 2014, the State Court entered its Amended Judgment awarding Clark $41,530.17 jointly and severally against Thornton and his attorney/wife, Val Thornton. Id., Dkt. 1-10. The award was granted to Clark as the prevailing party and included sanctions against Thornton and his wife based on the State Court's conclusion that Thornton brought the case frivolously because his 1998 Warranty Deed both referenced Clark's easement for the Driveway Piece and did not include theWell Piece. The State Court held Thornton and his wife had not been candid with the Court and should have produced the deed, instead of waiting for Clark to produce it, to resolve the case much sooner. Dkt. 9-8, p. 8. The $41,530.17 Amended Judgment was recorded with the Bonner County Recorder the same day it was entered, on June 30, 2014. Dkt. 9-3. Thornton filed a Notice of Appeal with the Idaho Supreme Court the same day. Dkt. 9-4. Mrs. Thornton also filed a Motion to Intervene in order to appeal the award of sanctions against her. Dkt. 9-6.

Before the appeal was decided, but after Clark recorded her Amended Judgment of $41,530.17 against Thornton and his wife, Defendants Kenneth and Deanna Barrett purchased Clark's property and Clark assigned her rights in the state court action to them. On August 4, 2014, the State Court substituted the Barretts in Clark's stead and entered an order assigning the Barretts Clark's right to collect the Amended Judgment. Dkt. 9-5. The substitution was also approved by the Idaho Supreme Court. Dkt. 9-8, p. 8.

Pandrea subsequently quitclaimed the Well Piece to Thornton on October 23, 2014. Dkt. 9-7. The Barretts thereafter made several attempts to execute on their Amended Judgment, and, though they obtained partial satisfaction, were still owed $17,779.74 as of February 18, 2016. 2:17-cv-...

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