Thornton v. Brown

• Decision Date: 03 February 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-1258,94-1258
• Citation: 47 F.3d 194
• Parties: Rodger THORNTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gregory BROWN, Jimmie Mifflin, Jr., and Michael Kelly, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 194

47 F.3d 194

Rodger THORNTON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Gregory BROWN, Jimmie Mifflin, Jr., and Michael Kelly,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 94-1258.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Dec. 1, 1994.

Decided Feb. 3, 1995.

David M. Stahl, Karen Owen Dunlop (argued), Sidley & Austin, Chicago, IL, for plaintiff-appellant.

Nuviah Shirazi, Springfield, IL, Mary E. Welsh (argued), Office of the Atty. Gen., Civ. Appeals Div., Chicago, IL, for defendants-appellees.

Before CUDAHY, ESCHBACH, and MANION, Circuit Judges.

ESCHBACH, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Rodger Thornton appeals from an adverse judgment entered by the district court in his 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 action against three officers of the Illinois Department of Corrections for allegedly violating his rights, under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Thornton contends that the magistrate judge made several key factual findings which were clearly erroneous. We affirm.

I.

Although the two parties provided conflicting trial testimony, the following background facts are undisputed. On September 26, 1989, while incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center ("Menard"), Rodger Thornton suffered multiple stab wounds as the result of an attack by other inmates. At the time of the attack, Thornton was performing his cleaning duties in the West Cellhouse on Gallery 5, the floor on which his cell was located. Defendants Kelly, Brown and Mifflin were all on duty serving as Menard correctional officers. Defendant Kelly was assigned to Gallery 5, where he was responsible for taking the morning count and escorting the inmates to their designated work areas. Defendants Brown and Mifflin were assigned to the West Cellhouse "catwalk," a narrow walkway above the perimeter of the cellhouse, where each was responsible for patrolling with a shotgun and overlooking the various galleries in which the prisoners were housed. Finally, it is undisputed that on September 26, 1989, a prison riot broke out at Menard at approximately 11:45 a.m., just prior to the time the attack on Thornton occurred.

According to Thornton's testimony at trial, Defendant Kelly took possession of the keys to Gallery 5 shortly before 11:45 a.m. and unlocked the gallery door, thereby allowing a group of inmates to attack Thornton on Gallery 5. Thornton further testified that Defendants Brown and Mifflin watched the attack occur and refused to take any action to stop the assault. Thornton stated that the assault continued until Officer Edwards, a "catwalk" officer from the East Cellhouse, arrived at the scene and pointed his shotgun at the attackers.

Defendants' trial testimony was contrary to that of Thornton. Defendant Kelly testified that he dropped off his keys with the door officer shortly after 7:00 a.m. when he escorted the inmates out of Gallery 5, and he did not return to the West Cellhouse until about 2:45 p.m.--several hours after the attack on Thornton took place. Defendants Brown and Mifflin both testified that they did not witness the attack on Thornton because their attention was focused on Gallery 1, where a race riot broke out involving over forty African-American and Hispanic inmates. Officers Brown and Mifflin stated that once they became aware of the attack on Thornton, they fired a warning shot, levelled their guns at the attackers and protected Thornton from any further assault. The defense also called Officer Edwards as a witness, and he testified that he simply helped Officer Brown keep the attackers away from Thornton.

On March 9, 1990, Thornton filed this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983, claiming that Defendants Kelly, Brown and Mifflin had violated his Eighth Amendment rights by facilitating the other inmates' attack on him. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 636(c), the parties consented to allow all proceedings to be conducted by a United States Magistrate Judge, and a bench trial was held on January 19, 1994. On January 21, 1994, the magistrate judge ordered that judgment be entered for the defendants and against Thornton. In this order of the district court, the magistrate judge stated:

The Court concludes that defendants ... did not subject the plaintiff to cruel and unusual punishment on September 26, 1989. Testimony at trial established that defendants Brown and Mifflin took active steps to prevent injury to the plaintiff after becoming aware of the danger that he was in during the riot. As established by the testimony, no defendant observed the attack in which the plaintiff was stabbed. Both defendant Brown and Mifflin took active steps to prevent continued attacks on the plaintiff during the riot. As indicated by the testimony, defendant Kelly was not present in the West Cellhouse during the attack. Since defendant was in the knit shop during the riot, he cannot be held liable for the attack upon the plaintiff.

Order, Jan. 21, 1994, at 8-9. Thornton filed a timely appeal, claiming that several of the magistrate's key factual findings were clearly erroneous. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291.

II.

As this court noted in Goka v. Bobbitt, 862 F.2d 646, 649 (7th Cir.1988), "the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment has been expanded under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to impose upon both federal and state correctional officers and officials the obligation to take reasonable steps to protect inmates from violence at the hands of other inmates." Id. Indeed, it is well established that "[a] prison official's 'deliberate indifference' to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment." Farmer v. Brennan, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1974, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (citations omitted). Thus, "deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury states a cause of action under Sec. 1983." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105, 97 S.Ct. 285, 291, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976).

Thornton, in his Sec. 1983 cause of action, attempted to prove at trial that the defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by acting with "deliberate indifference" to his physical safety; however, the district court entered judgment against him. On appeal, Thornton challenges several of the court's factual findings. Specifically, Thornton contends that Magistrate Judge Cohn, who presided over the bench trial in the district court, erred in finding (1) that defendant Kelly did not unlock the door to Gallery 5 directly prior to the attack on Thornton and (2) that defendants Brown and Mifflin did not witness the attack.

Following a bench trial, we review findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard. Selan v. Kiley, 969 F.2d 560, 567 (7th Cir.1992); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a). "Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(a) directs that a district court's finding of fact 'shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.' " Lange v. United States, 31 F.3d 535, 539 (7th Cir.1994) (quoting Ambrosino v. Rodman & Renshaw, Inc., 972 F.2d 776, 784 (7th Cir.1992)). "A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there may be some evidence to support it, 'the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' " Lange, 31 F.3d at 539 (quoting Savic v. United States, 918 F.2d 696, 700 (7th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 813, 112 S.Ct. 62, 116 L.Ed.2d 38 (1991)). The trial court...