Thornton v. City of Allegan

• Decision Date: 20 December 1993
• Docket Number: No. 1:93-CV-349.,1:93-CV-349.
• Citation: 863 F. Supp. 504
• Parties: Tommy THORNTON, and The Falco Corporation, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF ALLEGAN, a municipal corporation, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan

863 F. Supp. 504

Tommy THORNTON, and The Falco Corporation, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF ALLEGAN, a municipal corporation, Defendant.

No. 1:93-CV-349.

United States District Court, W.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

December 20, 1993.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Gregory J. Bator, James H. Abresch, Bator & Zartarian, PC, Birmingham, MI, for plaintiffs.

Marcia R. Meoli, Roper Bauer, PC, Zeeland, MI, Carol A. Rosati, Johnson, Rosati, Galica & Shifman, PC, Farmington Hills, MI, Patrick A. Aseltyne, Johnson, Rosati, Galica & Shifman, PC, Lansing, MI, for defendant.

OPINION

ROBERT HOLMES BELL, District Judge.

This case involves alleged discrimination against handicapped housing by exclusionary zoning. Plaintiffs allege that Defendant has violated the equal protection rights of those who would live at Plaintiffs' Adult Foster Care facility as well as the Fair Housing Amendment Act as a result of the discriminatory acts of the City Council. The parties have filed cross-motions in this case, Defendant moving for summary judgment or, alternatively, for dismissal, and Plaintiffs moving for partial summary judgment. Because the Court's decision regarding Defendant's motion for summary judgment will render Plaintiffs' motion moot, the Court need not address Plaintiffs' motion in this opinion.

I.

The plaintiffs in this case are Tommy Thornton and the Falco Corporation.¹ Thornton owns a building in the City of Allegan which he purchased with the intent of obtaining a special use permit in order to use the building as an Adult Foster Care (AFC) facility. His plan was to lease the building to the Falco Corporation for use as an AFC facility for up to twelve "handicapped" individuals, presumably mentally handicapped.

The building at issue in this case is located at 312 Trowbridge in the City of Allegan. Both parties concede that this building is located within the Central Business District (CBD) of the city. There are certain uses for which buildings in the CBD may be used as of right, and other uses which are permissible only after obtaining a special use permit. As of right, an individual may use a building in the CBD as a retail commercial establishment, office space, a personal services establishment, an above-store residence, a "Bed & Breakfast" establishment, or a private gathering facility. With a special use permit a building in the CBD may be used for many uses including as a motel or as a boarding, lodging or rooming house. The zoning ordinance defines "Boarding, lodging or rooming house" as "a dwelling primarily used for the purpose of providing long term lodging or both meals and lodging for compensation. Such house is to be distinguished from a hotel, motel, or an institutional use such as a convalescent or nursing home."

On October 29, 1992, Thornton presented his plan to the Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA) which determined that Plaintiffs proposed use of the building was similar to a "boarding, lodging or rooming house," and would therefore require a special use permit before it would be permitted in the CBD. On November 6, 1992, Plaintiff applied for a special use permit for his intended purpose. On November 16, the Planning Commission held a public hearing in regard to the proposal. At the meeting's conclusion, the Commission recommended that the City Council approve the issuance of the permit. However, at a November 23 meeting of the Council, following discussion of various concerns of neighbors and other interested individuals, the City Council voted against the issuance of the permit. The Council stated that it did not believe that the proposed use of the building would further the Council's goals for the CBD. Following this adverse decision, Plaintiffs appealed the Council's decision to the ZBA. On December 29, 1992, the ZBA considered the matter and by a vote of 3-2 affirmed the decision of the City Council.

At about this same time, Plaintiff purchased another building in the City of Allegan. This site, located at 427 Davis Street, is approximately one-half mile out of the CBD and was, at the time of Plaintiff's purchase, zoned Neighborhood Commercial (NC). Thereafter, Plaintiff applied for a special use permit as to the Davis Street property for use as an AFC facility. On January 18, 1993, the Planning Commission recommended that the Council grant this permit. On January 25, the Council did grant the special use permit to Plaintiff and also remodel the Davis site as Residential-2, such that an AFC facility was permissible with a special use permit.

Plaintiff contends that the Davis site is not an alternative site to the Trowbridge property. Rather, Plaintiff asserts that if allowed, he would utilize both sites as AFC facilities. However, Plaintiff has subsequently applied for and has been granted a building permit with respect to the Trowbridge site. Plaintiff sought the permit to remodel the building for use as office space, apparently on both of the building's floors.

II.

Defendant's motion for summary judgment ask the Court to evaluate the factual support for Plaintiffs' claims. The Court must look beyond the pleadings and assess the proof to determine whether there is a genuine need for trial. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The Court must determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-53, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). If Defendant carries its burden of showing there is an absence of evidence to support a claim, then Plaintiffs must demonstrate by affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553-54, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Thus, Plaintiffs must "present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment." See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. at 2514. If, after a sufficient time for discovery, Plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate that they can produce sufficient evidence at trial to withstand a directed verdict motion, summary judgment is appropriate. See Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478 (6th Cir.1989).

III.

Defendant's motion present the following three issues:

(1) Whether the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case;

(2) Whether Plaintiffs have sufficient evidentiary proof with regard to their claim for the violation of the Equal Protection Clause to withstand Defendant's motion for summary judgment; and

(3) Whether Plaintiffs have sufficient evidentiary proof with regard to their claim under the Fair Housing Amendment Act to withstand Defendant's motion for summary judgment.

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

In its alternative motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Defendant argues that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case because Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by failing to appeal the adverse decision of the ZBA to the Michigan Circuit Court. Plaintiffs respond that the applicable Michigan statute does not authorize the Circuit Court to consider federal issues in appeals of adverse decisions of the ZBA.

Plaintiffs incorrectly interpret MICH.COMP. LAWS § 125.585(11). That subsection does not preclude the Circuit Court from considering federal issues in zoning appeals. Nevertheless, Defendant is also incorrect regarding exhaustion. With regard to equal protection claims brought concerning zoning questions, the Sixth Circuit has indicated that the issue of ripeness must be considered by the district court since it is jurisdictional. Pearson v. City of Grand Blanc, 961 F.2d 1211, 1214 (6th Cir.1992). In Seguin v. City of Sterling Heights, 968 F.2d 584 (6th Cir.1992), the court held that "absent an application for a variance and a final decision on that application, we are unable to determine, at this juncture, whether the city will ultimately deny plaintiffs the equal protection of the laws." Id. at 588. However, in the instant case, Plaintiff did apply for a special use permit and the ZBA's affirmance of the Council's denial of the permit was a final decision within the meaning of MICH.COMP. LAWS § 125.585(11). This application and final decision sufficiently satisfies the requirements of Seguin and this Court therefore has jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Similarly, Marbrunak, Inc. v. City of Stow, 974 F.2d 43 (6th Cir.1992), implies that the same ripeness inquiry applies to a claim under the Fair Housing Amendment Act. Id. at 46. Again, by virtue of Plaintiffs' application for a special use permit and the ZBA's final decision rejecting the application, this issue is also ripe and the Court therefore has jurisdiction over it as well.

B. Plaintiffs' Equal Protection Claim

1. The Applicable Level of Scrutiny

Except where an equal protection case involves a suspect, or quasi-suspect, classification or the denial of a fundamental right to a particular class, state action allegedly violating the Equal Protection Clause will be reviewed under the rational basis level of scrutiny. In the instant case, the issue raised in the zoning context do not involve a fundamental right, see Bannum, Inc. v. City of Louisville, 958 F.2d 1354, 1360 (6th Cir.1992) (citing Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230, 101 S.Ct. 1074, 1080-81, 67 L.Ed.2d 186 (1981)); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 94 S.Ct. 1536, 39 L.Ed.2d 797 (1974), and the class affected, the mentally handicapped, is not a suspect, or quasisuspect, class. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 442, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3255-56, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). While the argument could be made that the Americans With...