Thornton v. City of Columbus

Decision Date17 March 2016
Docket NumberCase No. 2:15-CV-1337
Citation171 F.Supp.3d 702
Parties Bonnie Thornton & Guilford Thornton, Plaintiffs, v. City of Columbus, et al. Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

Samuel Harry Shamansky, Donald Lee Regensburger, Samuel H. Shamasky Co., LPA, Columbus, OH, for Plaintiffs.

Michael Robert Halloran, Andrew Donald Matthew Miller, Columbus City Attorney's Office, Columbus, OH, for Defendants.

OPINION & ORDER
ALGENON L. MARBLEY, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Before the Court is Defendant City of Columbus's (‘Defendant‘ or ‘the City‘) June 11, 2015 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim upon Which Relief May Be Granted brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

. (Doc. 12.) The Motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for review. For the reasons below, it is GRANTED .

I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background

Plaintiffs Bonnie and Guilford Thornton (Plaintiffs) brought this suit on April 17, 2015. (Compl., Doc. 2.) Their complaint alleges the following. On April 20, 2013, Guilford Thornton contacted the Columbus Division of Police to report two young men outside his residence, located at 1542 Oakwood Avenue in Columbus, Ohio. (Id. ¶ 17.) Mr. Thornton identified the two individuals as having committed an assault he witnessed several days earlier. (Id. ) Later that evening, responding Columbus police were dispatched to Mr. Thornton's residence in response to a 911 call. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 20.) The caller reported that a man on the porch of 1542 Oakwood Avenue was threatening several people with a gun. (Id. ) After the officers arrived on the scene, a witness informed them that the offending man was now inside Mr. Thornton's residence. (Id. ) Based solely on the foregoing, the responding officers entered the residence. (Id. ¶ 19.) Within moments, they spotted Mr. Thornton and immediately opened fire on him, striking him in the hand and buttocks. (Id. ) The officers placed Mr. Thornton under arrest and transported him to Grant Hospital where he underwent surgery in connection with his injuries. (Id. ) Mr. Thornton was then prescribed several pain medications. (Id. ¶ 20.) He was handcuffed to his bed throughout his hospital stay. (Id. ¶ 21.)

That evening, the responding officers conducted a ‘walk-through‘ of the scene with investigators. (Id. ¶ 22.) The officers gave limited explanation as to where items and individuals had been physically located, and they declined to provide a statement concerning specifics of their conduct. (Id. ) Also, despite being in physical control of the residence, and despite the fact that Mr. Thornton had been seriously wounded

in the incident, the officers conducted no forensic investigation of the scene. (Id. ¶ 23.) Further, investigators did not speak to any of the several eye-witnesses to the confrontation until several days later. (Id. ¶ 24.) Following the ‘walk-through,‘ the responding officers were sequestered from the investigation. (Id. ¶ 26.) Those officers later retained counsel in connection with the shooting. (Id. ¶ 26.)

On April 22, 2013, Ms. Thornton hired counsel in connection with her husband's arrest. (Id. ¶ 27.) Counsel immediately went to visit Mr. Thornton at Grant Hospital but was denied access. (Id. ) Counsel was eventually allowed to speak with Mr. Thornton, but only after contacting various employees of the Columbus Division of Police, including Detective Patricia Clark. (Id. at 2, ¶ 28.) Later that day, Detective Clark conducted a recorded interview of Mr. Thornton in the absence of counsel. (Id. ¶ 29.) During the conversation she informed Mr. Thornton that he was under arrest and that she was aware he had retained counsel. (Id. )

On April 25, 2015, Mr. Thornton was released from Grant Hospital. (Id. ¶ 30.) Still in custody, he was transported to Columbus Police Headquarters where he was placed in an interview room equipped with audio-visual recording equipment. (Id. ) Detective Clark interrogated Mr. Thornton while he was clothed in only a hospital gown and had an IV inserted into his immobilized arm. (Id. ¶ 31.) When Mr. Thornton requested an attorney, Detective Clark threatened him with legal action and incarceration. (Id. )

Mr. Thornton agreed to answer Detective Clark's questions due to fear that he would be incarcerated in his then-present state. He was then charged with six counts of aggravated menacing and sent to the Franklin County Jail. (Id. ¶ 32.) Deputies at the Franklin County Jail refused to accept Mr. Thornton due to his ill health, and he was eventually returned to the hospital. (Id. ¶ 33.) Neither Detective Clark nor any other agent of the Columbus Division of Police contacted Mr. Thornton's counsel regarding either interrogation. (Id. ¶ 34.)

Approximately ten days after the shooting, the responding officers submitted substantially identical written statements through their attorneys. (Id. ¶ 35.) The statements provided demonstrably false information concerning their contact with Mr. Thornton and the circumstances of the shooting. (Id. ¶ 36.) The City of Columbus refused to dismiss the criminal charges against Mr. Thornton and a jury trial commenced on the matters on April 2, 2014. (Id. ¶ 38.) During that trial, the reporting officers provided false testimony. (Id. ¶ 39.) At least one other witness also provided false testimony during the trial. (Id. ¶ 40.)

Mr. Thornton was acquitted of one of the charged offenses. (Id. ¶ 42.) The jury hung 7-1 in favor of acquittal as to the remainder. (Id. ) The City of Columbus dismissed the remaining charges on May 19, 2014. (Id. )

B. Procedural History

On April 17, 2015 Plaintiffs brought suit against the City of Columbus, the Columbus Division of Police and its Police Chief Kim Jacobs, Officers Danny Dupler and Jeffrey Kasza, Jr., Detective Patricia Clark, and other unknown individuals. (Doc. 2.) The Complaint alleged numerous violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983

on the part of Defendants. (Id. at 9-16.) In relevant part, the Complaint alleged violations of Bonnie and Guilford Thornton's Fourth Amendment rights and Guilford Thornton's Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

On May 13, 2015, then-Defendant Columbus Division of Police filed a Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim (Doc. 9). On June 10, 2015, then-Defendant Police Chief Kim Jacobs did the same (Doc. 11). The City of Columbus filed its Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim on June 11, 2015 (Doc. 12). A preliminary pretrial conference was held telephonically on July 15, 2015. (Doc. 16.) At that conference parties agreed that the Motions filed by the Columbus Division of Police and Police Chief Jacobs should be granted. The Magistrate Judge granted the motions and dismissed the claims against the Columbus Division of Police and Police Chief Jacobs on July 15, 2015. (Id. at 3.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court may dismiss a cause of action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Such a motion “is a test of the plaintiff's cause of action as stated in the complaint, not a challenge to the plaintiff's factual allegations.” Golden v. City of Columbus , 404 F.3d 950, 958–59 (6th Cir.2005). Thus, the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Total Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield , 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir.2008). The Court is not required, however, to accept as true mere legal conclusions unsupported by factual allegations.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)

. The allegations need not be detailed but must “give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is, and the grounds upon which it rests.” Nader v. Blackwell , 545 F.3d 459, 470 (6th Cir.2008) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 93, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) ). In short, a complaint's factual allegations “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), and it must contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

III. ANALYSIS
A. State Law Claims

In response to the City's Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs provide no argument concerning their state law claims. Accordingly, they have abandoned such claims and ‘waived any arguments concerning dismissal.‘ Hess v. Huber Heights , No. 3:13–CV–312, 2014 WL 3341346, at *5, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92370, at *17

([W]here, as here, plaintiff has not raised arguments in the District Court by virtue of his failure to oppose defendants' motions to dismiss, the arguments have been waived‘) (S.D. Ohio July 8, 2014) (quoting Humphrey v. United States AG Office, 279 Fed.Appx. 328, 331 (6th Cir.2008) (citing Resnick v. Patton, 258 Fed.Appx. 789, 793, n. 1 (6th Cir.2007) (finding that arguments are waived in the absence of opposition to a motion to dismiss in the district court) (citations omitted))).

Defendant argues that it is immune from Plaintiffs' state law claims under Title 27, Chapter 2744 of the Ohio Revised Code, also known as the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act. (Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss, Doc. 12 at 6.) The act requires a three-tiered analysis for determining municipal tort liability. First, it sets forth ‘the general rule that 'a political subdivision is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury...caused by any act or omission of the political subdivision of an employee of the political subdivision in connection with a governmental or proprietary function.’Scott v. Columbus Dep't of Pub. Utils. , 192 Ohio App.3d 465, 467, 949 N.E.2d 552 (Ct.App.Ohio 2011)

(quoting R.C. 2744.02(A)(1) ). Next, it carves out five exceptions to the general rule. Id. at 468, 949 N.E.2d 552. Finally, if one of those five exceptions apply, the political subdivision may assert one of the affirmative defenses in R.D. 27044.03 to...

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