Thornton v. Mercantile Stores Co., Inc.

Decision Date31 July 1998
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 96-D-1484-N.
Citation13 F.Supp.2d 1282
PartiesBarbara THORNTON, Sharon Wright, Leroy Jackson and the class they seek to represent, Plaintiffs, v. MERCANTILE STORES COMPANY, INC., d/b/a Gayfer's/J.B. White and Gayfer's/Mercantile South, Gayfer's Montgomery Fair Co., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

Robert F. Childs, Jr., Ann K. Wiggins, Ann C. Robertson, Maury Steven Weiner, Laura M. Hitt, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiffs.

E. Barry Johnson, Charles A Stewart, Montgomery, Fern Singer, E. Barry Johnson, Robert M. Lichenstein, Jr., Birmingham, AL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

DE MENT, District Judge.

Before the court are the following motions: (1) Plaintiffs' Motion For Class Certification, filed July 15, 1997; (2) Gayfer's Montgomery Fair Co.'s ("Gayfer's") Motion To Stay Class Certification, filed August 7, 1997; (3) Gayfer's Motion For Summary Judgment, filed August 18, 1997; (4) Mercantile Store Co., Inc.'s ("Mercantile") Motion For Summary Judgment, filed January 20, 1998; (5) Plaintiffs' Motion To Strike Gayfer's February 6, 1998 Submission Of Evidence In Support Of Reply Brief In Support Of Gayfer's Motion For Summary Judgment, filed March 20, 1998; and (6) Gayfer's Motion To Strike Portions Of Plaintiffs' Brief In Support Of Their Motion To Strike As An Invalid Surreply Filed Without Leave Of Court, filed April 9, 1998. Appropriate responsive pleadings have been filed to all of these motions.

After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, relevant law, and the record as a whole, the court finds that: (1) Plaintiffs' Motion For Class Certification is due to be dismissed without prejudice, however, as explained below, Plaintiffs may renew their motion, if necessary and appropriate; (2) Gayfer's Motion To Stay Class Certification is due to be denied as moot; (3) the court will refrain from ruling on Gayfer's Motion For Summary Judgment; (4) Mercantile's Motion For Summary Judgment is due to be denied; (5) Plaintiffs' Motion To Strike Gayfer's February 6, 1998 Submission Of Evidence In Support Of Reply Brief In Support Of Gayfer's Motion For Summary Judgment is due to be denied; (6) Gayfer's Motion To Strike Portions Of Plaintiffs' Brief In Support Of Their Motion To Strike As An Invalid Surreply Filed Without Leave Of Court is due to be denied.1

Also before the court are the following motions: (1) Mercantile's Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction, filed July 3, 1997; (2) Plaintiffs' Motion To Amend The Court's Uniform Scheduling Order, filed August 22, 1997; (3) Mercantile's Motion For An Extension Of Time To File Dispositive Motions, filed December 5, 1997; (4) the Parties' Joint Motion To Extend Time To Disclose Expert Witnesses, filed December 17, 1997; (5) Plaintiffs' Motion To Set Time For Response To Mercantile's Motion For Summary Judgment, filed January 26, 1998; and (6) Plaintiffs' Motion To Extend Time To Disclose Expert Witnesses, filed May 22, 1998.

After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, relevant law, and the record as a whole, the court finds as follows: (1) the court will refrain from ruling on Mercantile's Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction because Mercantile withdrew its Motion on October 2, 1997. The Clerk of the Court is directed to remove Mercantile's Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Personal Jurisdiction from the pending motion's docket of this action; (2) Plaintiffs' Motion To Amend The Court's Uniform Scheduling Order is due to be denied as moot; (3) Mercantile's Motion For An Extension Of Time To File Dispositive Motions is due to be denied as moot; (4) the Parties' Joint Motion To Extend Time To Disclose Expert Witnesses is due to be denied as moot; (5) Plaintiffs' Motion To Set Time For Response To Mercantile's Motion For Summary Judgment is due to be denied as moot; and (6) Plaintiffs' May 22, 1998 Motion To Extend Time To Disclose Expert Witnesses is due to be denied as moot.2

JURISDICTION

The court properly exercises subject matter jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question); 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a) (civil rights); and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (declaratory judgment). The Parties do not contest personal jurisdiction or venue.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

On a motion for summary judgment, the court is to construe the evidence and factual inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Summary judgment can be entered on a claim only if it is shown "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). As the Supreme Court has explained the summary judgment standard:

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since the complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The trial court's function at this juncture is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citations omitted). A dispute about a material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; see also Barfield v. Brierton, 883 F.2d 923, 933 (11th Cir.1989).

The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of informing the court of the basis for the motion and of establishing, based on relevant "portions of `the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions in the file, together with affidavits, if any,'" that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. Once this initial demonstration under Rule 56(c) is made, the burden of production, not persuasion, shifts to the nonmoving party. The nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his or her] own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e).

In meeting this burden the nonmoving party "must do more than simply show that there is a metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). That party must demonstrate that there is a "genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348; see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

DISCUSSION
I. Factual Summary And Procedural History

Plaintiffs Barbara Thornton, Sharon Wright, and Leroy Jackson are current employees of Gayfer's and Mercantile who work at various Gayfer's stores in Montgomery, Alabama. They are all African-American. The Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants have violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), as well was 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement of contracts, see 42 U.S.C. § 1981, by discriminating against them, on the basis of race, in the areas of advancement opportunities and pay. In Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Jackson also alleges racial discrimination in other terms and conditions of employment in violation of § 1981 and Title VII. The Plaintiffs bring their claims on behalf of a class, alleging that the Defendants have engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination and that certain of their policies have an unjustified disparate impact on African-Americans.

Gayfer's operates two retail stores in Montgomery, Alabama; one at the Montgomery Mall, and one at the Eastdale Mall. Also in Montgomery are a Gayfer's Distribution Center, which stores and ships merchandise to various stores, and a "Group Office," which performs various administrative functions. Gayfer's is a wholly owned subsidiary of Mercantile, which is based in Fairfield, Ohio.

Mercantile subsidiaries are geographically organized into five "operating groups." Gayfer's is in a group with other Mercantile subsidiaries and affiliates called "Gayfer's/J.B. White" or "Mercantile Southeast." Even though Mercantile is the sole shareholder of Gayfer's, Mercantile maintains a separate corporate structure, a separate board of directors and separate bank accounts from Gayfer's. Mercantile contends that although officers in Mercantile subsidiaries, such as Gayfer's, are ultimately responsible to Mercantile officers, "the relationship is one of oversight, not of controlling the details of the work of subsidiary officers and employees." (Mercantile Memorandum Brief In Support Of Its Motion For Summary Judgment ("Mercantile Mem.") at 2.)

Gayfer's Director of Human Resources is Reed Wilbanks, a white male. He has been the Director since March of 1994. The Operations Manager of the Eastdale Mall store is John Myrick, an African-American male. May Ann Hankins is the Human Resource Manager at Gayfer's Distribution Center. Between 1989 and 1994, she was the Human Resource Manager at the Montgomery Mall store. Hankins is a white female.

A. Plaintiff Barbara Thornton

Barbara Thornton began working for...

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