Thornton v. Ryan

• Decision Date: 29 July 2016
• Docket Number: No. CV-14-00834-PHX-SPL (JFM),CV-14-00834-PHX-SPL (JFM)
• Parties: Craig Clay Thornton, Petitioner, v. Charles L. Ryan, et al., Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Arizona

Craig Clay Thornton, Petitioner, v. Charles L. Ryan, et al., Respondents.

No. CV-14-00834-PHX-SPL (JFM)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

July 29, 2016

ORDER

Petitioner Craig Clay Thornton, who is confined in the Arizona State Prison Complex-Santa Rita Unit, has filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Doc. 1). United States Magistrate Judge James F. Metcalf issued a Report and Recommendation ("R&R") (Doc. 22), recommending that the petition be dismissed and that a certificate of appealability should be granted in part. Respondents have filed an objection to the R&R (Doc. 27), challenging the latter of the two recommendations. No response has been filed. For the reasons that follow, the Court accepts and adopts the R&R.

I. Background¹

Following a jury trial, in 2010, Petitioner was convicted in Maricopa County Superior Court, Case No. CR2009-115945, of First Degree Murder, Attempted Armed Robbery, and Burglary in the First Degree. The Arizona Court of Appeals summarizedthe facts which led to his conviction as follows:

In January 2009, [Petitioner] and four accomplices unlawfully entered the victim's residence, intending to burglarize the residence, which defendant and accomplices believed contained $200,000 cash and a large quantity of marijuana. [Petitioner] and another accomplice were armed. When [Petitioner] and accomplices entered the home, the victim stood up from the couch and said, "Don't hurt me. You can have everything, don't hurt me." [Petitioner] and the other armed accomplice both shot at the victim. [Petitioner] and accomplices then fled the residence, taking nothing. The victim sustained multiple gunshot wounds, which were determined by the medical examiner to have caused his death.

(Doc. 18-10, Exh. HH.) Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 25 years to life, 10.5 years, and 7.5 years. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on appeal to the Arizona Court of Appeals, and his petitions for post-conviction relief were denied by the Superior Court.

On April 21, 2014, Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in federal court, raising four claims for relief. (Doc. 1.) Respondents filed an Answer (Doc. 18) in which they argue that: (1) the petition should be dismissed as untimely; (2) the claims in Grounds Two, Three, and Four should be dismissed as procedurally defaulted; and (3) and all four claims should be dismissed because they fail on the merits. Petitioner did not file a Reply. Judge Metcalf issued a R&R in which he finds: (1) the petition is time-barred; (2) Petitioner's claims are procedurally defaulted and barred from review; (3) to the extent that Petitioner could be found to have exhausted his claim in Ground One, that claim fails on its merits; and (4) jurists of reason would find the time-bar ruling debatable and Petitioner facially states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right. The R&R therefore recommends that the petition be dismissed and that the Court should grant a certificate of appealability as to a finding that the petition is time-barred.

II. Standard of Review

The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by a magistrate judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court must undertake a de novo review of those portions of the R&R to which specific objections are made. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); United States v. Reyna-Tapia, 328 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003). A party is not entitled as of right to de novo review of evidence and arguments raised for the first time in an objection to the R&R, and whether the Court considers any new facts or arguments presented is discretionary. United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621-622 (9th Cir. 2000).

III. Discussion

The writ of habeas corpus affords relief to persons in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court in violation of the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3), 2254(a). Such petitions are governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA").² 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

A. Statute of Limitations

First, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Petitioner's federal habeas petition is time-barred. The AEDPA imposes a 1-year statute of limitations in which "a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court" can file a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

In the instant case, the 1-year limitations period began to run when the time for seeking direct review expired. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) (the 1-year limitations period runs from the date on which judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review). Following a timely direct appeal, the Arizona Court of Appeals issued its decision affirming Petitioner's convictions on June 7, 2011. Petitioner did not seek review by the Arizona Supreme Court. Therefore, judgment became final on July 7, 2011, when the time for filing apetition for review before the Arizona Supreme Court expired. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.19(a) ("Within 30 days after the Court of Appeals issues its decision, any party may file a petition for review with the clerk of the Supreme Court").

Petitioner properly filed a notice of post-conviction relief on July 8, 2011,³ which statutorily tolled the limitations period. Petitioner's post-conviction relief proceeding remained pending until the Superior Court dismissed his petition on April 2, 2013. (Doc. 18-10, Exhs. LL-VV.) Petitioner did not timely seek review of that ruling and because no application for post-conviction relief was pending following the Superior Court's denial, the limitations period began to run again the following day on April 3, 2013. See Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189, 191 (2006) (an application for state post-conviction review is "pending" during the period between a lower court's adverse determination and the filing of a timely notice of appeal); Robinson v. Lewis, 795 F.3d 926, 928-29 (9th Cir. 2015); Maes v. Chavez, 792 F.3d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 2015) ("an application is pending as long as the ordinary state collateral review process is 'in continuance'- i.e., 'until the completion of' that process'"). Therefore, because the instant federal petition was not mailed until April 17, 2014 (or filed until April 21, 2014), after the one-year limitations period has expired on April 3, 2014, it was untimely.

Petitioner does not show that circumstances existed which prevented him from timely filing a federal habeas petition and entitle him to equitable tolling. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010) ("a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling only if he shows (1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing" his federal habeas petition (internal quotations omitted)). Nor does Petitioner claim actual innocence such that the "fundamental miscarriage of justice exception" is applicable and compels review of histime-barred claims. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013) ("[A]n actual-innocence gateway claim" may serve as an exception to AEDPA's limitations period); Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 314-15 (1995). Therefore, Petitioner's federal habeas petition is time-barred, and will be dismissed on that basis.

Second, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge correctly found that a certificate of appealability should issue with regard to the procedural ruling on the statute of limitations. "The standard for granting a certificate of appealability is low." Frost v. Gilbert, 818 F.3d 469, 474 (9th Cir. 2016). When a district court dismisses claims on procedural grounds, it may grant a COA if: (1) jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling; and (2) jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Murray v. Schriro, 745 F.3d 984, 1002 (9th Cir. 2014); Lambright v. Stewart, 220 F.3d 1022, 1026 (9th Cir. 2000). The Court need only "simply take a quick look at the face of the complaint to determine whether the petitioner has facially alleged the denial of a constitutional right. If [the petitioner] has facially alleged the denial of a constitutional right, and assuming that the district court's procedural ruling is debatable," a COA may issue. Lambright, 220 F.3d at 1026 (internal quotations, citations and brackets omitted).

Respondents do not object to the R&R's finding that the procedural ruling is debatable. (Doc. 27 at 4.) Rather, attempting to distinguish this case from Lambright, Respondents object to the R&R on the basis that "[m]erely showing that a claim is 'facially valid' is not enough; a COA may issue 'only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.'" (Doc. 27 at 8.) Contrary to Respondents' reading, the Court does not find that Lambright is "dubious on its own terms." (Id.) Lambright distinguishes the differing standards for granting a COA applied when the court rejects a habeas petitioner's constitutional claims on the merits, as compared to when a habeas petition is denied on procedural grounds. Respondents' arguments concerning each of the claims may prove they lack merit, but do not negate thepresence of a facially valid claim. And, as determined in the R&R, the Court finds that the petition states a facially valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right. See e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 321 (1979) ("it is clear that a state prisoner who alleges that the evidence in support of his state conviction cannot be fairly characterized as sufficient to have led a rational trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt has...