Thornton v. State
| Decision Date | 25 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. CR-18-40,CR-18-40 |
| Citation | 2019 Ark. 124 |
| Parties | JUSTIN JAMAILLE THORNTON APPELLANT v. STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
APPEAL FROM THE LINCOLN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
AFFIRMED.
Appellant Justin Thornton appeals an order dismissing his petition to correct an illegal sentence. For reversal, he contends that the circuit court erred in dismissing his petition because this court reversed and dismissed all of his convictions in Thornton v. State, 2014 Ark. 157, 433 S.W.3d 216 (Thornton I). We affirm.
Following a bench trial held in February 2013, the Lincoln County Circuit Court found Thornton guilty of capital murder, felon in possession of a firearm, unauthorized use of a vehicle, and abuse of a corpse for which he was sentenced to life without parole plus ten years for his commission of the murder with a firearm. Thornton appealed to this court. His sole claim for reversal was that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict on the capital-murder charge because the proof failed to establish that he acted with the requisite premeditation and deliberation. Thornton I, 2014 Ark. 157, at 1, 433 S.W.3d at 217. We held that the evidence was insufficient to support a conclusion that Thornton killed the victim with a premeditated and deliberate intent; therefore, we reversed and dismissed. Further, we stated, "While the evidence cannot sustain the charge of capital murder, we offer no opinion about whether it would sustain a lesser offense." Id. at 15, 433 S.W.3d at 224. The State filed a petition for rehearing contending that this court committed errors of law in its analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence for the capital-murder conviction. In addition, the State contended that because "only the sufficiency of the element of premeditation and deliberation of the capital murder conviction was raised on appeal, the Court should clarify that the convictions of felony theft of property,1 possession of a firearm, and abuse of a corpse still stand." We denied the State's petition for rehearing. Thereafter, we issued our mandate, which stated, in pertinent part, "After due consideration, it is the decision of the court that the conviction is reversed and dismissed for the reasons set out in the attached opinion."
After this court's mandate issued in Thornton I, the State filed in the circuit court a "Motion for Court to Consider Lesser-Included Offenses." The circuit court granted the State's motion and set a hearing for December 1, 2014. At the hearing, Thornton argued that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to consider the lesser-included offenses, that the conviction of a lesser-included offense following the reversal and dismissal of a greater offense violates double-jeopardy principles, that his right to a speedy trial was violated, and that the circuit court denied him due process at the hearing when it did not allow him to argue that there wasinsufficient evidence to sustain convictions of the lesser-included offenses. The circuit court rejected Thornton's arguments, ruled that the evidence from the February 2013 bench trial was sufficient to prove that Thornton acted with purpose in causing the death of the victim, and found Thornton guilty of first-degree murder. The circuit court sentenced Thornton, as a habitual offender, to forty years' imprisonment for first-degree murder, enhanced by ten years for its commission with a firearm. After noting that Thornton's other convictions and sentences had not been affected by this court's reversal and dismissal in Thornton I, the circuit court entered an amended sentencing order on December 16, 2014. The amended sentencing order reflected that Thornton was sentenced to an aggregate term of seventy years' imprisonment for his four convictions.
Thornton appealed and challenged only his conviction and sentence for first-degree murder. See Thornton v. State, 2015 Ark. 438, at 4, n.3, 475 S.W.3d 544, 546 n.3 (Thornton II). We reversed and dismissed, holding that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to hear the State's "Motion for Court to Consider Lesser-Included Offenses." Id. at 5, 475 S.W.3d at 547. Our mandate issued on January 14, 2016, and stated, in pertinent part, "After due consideration, it is the decision of the court that the conviction is reversed and dismissed for the reasons set out in the attached opinion."
Thornton requested that the circuit court declare his sentence illegal, correct his sentence, and order his release. The State responded that the only issue raised and considered on appeal in Thornton I was the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction for capital murder. The State asserted that the convictions for the firearm charge and abuse of a corpse were never appealed, never considered, and therefore stood intact. After reviewing this court's mandate and opinion in Thornton I, the circuit court ruled that Thornton was not entitled to relief because only the conviction for capital murder had been reversed and dismissed and not the convictions for felon in possession of a firearm by certain persons and abuse of a corpse. Accordingly, the circuit court dismissed the petition. We review the circuit court's dismissal ofThornton's petition for clear error. E.g., Williams v. State, 2016 Ark. 16, 479 S.W.3d 544 (per curiam).
On appeal, Thornton maintains that his convictions and sentences are illegal because this court reversed and dismissed all his convictions and sentences in Thornton I. The State contends that this court's mandate in Thornton I reversing and dismissing "the conviction . . . for the reasons set out in the attached opinion" reversed only his capital-murder conviction and not his other convictions.
An appellate-court mandate3 should be construed in accordance with both its "letter and spirit . . . taking into account the appellate court's opinion and the circumstances it embraces." Dolphin v. Wilson, 335 Ark. 113, 118, 983 S.W.2d 113, 115 (1998). In construing our mandate, we must identify the issue raised and decided in Thornton I. In his brief for that case, Thornton's sole point on appeal was that the circuit court erred in denying his motions for directed verdict "due to insufficiency of the evidence as to the offense of capital murder."See Abstract, Addendum, and Brief for Appellant, at Arg. 1, Thornton I (No. CR-13-807). He asserted that there was "insufficient evidence as to whether [he] acted with premeditation and deliberation," that the circuit court should have granted his motion for directed verdict on the capital-murder charge, and that his conviction for capital murder should be reversed and dismissed. Id. at Arg. 5, 16. Moreover, Thornton expressly conceded in his brief that there was sufficient evidence to support his remaining convictions. Id. at Arg. 5-6. Thus, the only issue presented for our consideration was whether there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for capital murder.4 We concluded that the evidence was insufficient, and we reversed and dismissed. Thornton I, 2014 Ark. 157, at 1, 15, 433 S.W.3d at 217, 224.
Our mandate in Thornton I specifically stated that Thornton's "conviction" was "reversed and dismissed for the reasons set out in the attached opinion." The opinion and the mandate did not state that Thornton's "convictions"--plural--were set aside or that the "judgment" was reversed and dismissed. In Thornton I, we did not reverse and dismiss Thornton's convictions for felon in possession of a firearm and abuse of a corpse. As such, we will not read our mandate as having done so.
Finally, we are not persuaded by Thornton's contention that, because we did not "sever the convictions," his "entire conviction" was reversed and dismissed, including his convictionsfor felon in possession of a firearm and abuse of a corpse. In making this argument, Thornton relies on this court's decision in Martin v. State, 290 Ark. 293, 718 S.W.2d 938 (1986). In that case, we recognized that "[w]hen a judgment in a criminal case is correct as to one count, but erroneous as to another, . . . we have the power to sever the judgment, affirm the count on which the appellant was properly convicted, and reverse and grant a new trial as to the other." Id. at 297, 718 S.W.2d at 940. But Martin does not purport to hold that there is only one way to sever a judgment, nor does it contain the actual language from a mandate or explain how to construe a mandate that the court has already issued.
Furthermore, Martin is factually inapposite to the case at bar. In Martin, the appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and first-degree battery. He challenged both convictions on appeal, contending that the trial court erred in refusing to give self-defense instructions on both charges. We held that the appellant was not entitled to the instruction for the murder charge but that he was entitled to the instruction on the battery charge. Id. at 296-97, 718 S.W.2d at 939. Therefore, we severed the...
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