Thornton v. State, 51
| Decision Date | 06 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 51,51 |
| Parties | TAMERE THORNTON v. STATE OF MARYLAND |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
CRIMINAL JUSTICE — FOURTH AMENDMENT — SEARCH AND SEIZURE — TRAFFIC STOPS — REASONABLE SUSPICION
The Court of Appeals held that law enforcement officers lacked reasonable suspicion to frisk Petitioner for weapons. The officers involved testified that they observed Petitioner make furtive gestures while he was sitting in his parked vehicle, which indicated to the officers that Petitioner was armed and dangerous. According to the two officers, they saw Petitioner "raise his right shoulder and . . . bring his elbows together." In addition, Petitioner, while sitting in his vehicle and being questioned by the officers, kept his hands in front of his lap, adjusted his waistband, and would "lean over" to address the officers. The officers' testimony amounted to little more than an inchoate and unparticularized hunch that Petitioner was armed and dangerous. Under the circumstances, the officers failed to particularize an objectively reasonable basis for believing that Petitioner was armed and dangerous. Therefore, the frisk of Petitioner was unlawful pursuant to the Fourth Amendment.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE — FOURTH AMENDMENT — SEARCH AND SEIZURE — ATTENUATION DOCTRINE
The Court of Appeals held that the attenuation doctrine did not apply to render admissible the fruits of the unlawful frisk. Mere moments passed between the unlawful frisk and discovery of the handgun. Petitioner, without legal justification, attempted to flee from the unlawful frisk. The officers, however, discovered the gun by exploiting the illegal frisk and not by reason of Petitioner's reactive flight. In addition, the officers' conduct was purposeful and calculated for investigatory purposes unrelated to the stop and was, thus, otherwise flagrant. Furthermore, the exclusionary rule's deterrent purpose is served by applying the rule to the present case. Therefore, Petitioner's gun should have been excluded as evidence.
Circuit Court for Baltimore City
Case No. 116027021
Barbera, C.J. *Greene McDonald Watts Hotten Getty Adkins, Sally D., (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.
Opinion by Greene, J.
*Greene, J., now retired, participated in the hearing and conference of this case while an active member of this Court; after being recalled pursuant to the MD. Constitution, Article IV, Section 3A, he also participated in the decision and adoption of this opinion.
In the present case, we are asked to review the constitutionality of the means by which police officers discovered a gun in the possession of Petitioner Tamere Thornton ("Petitioner" or "Mr. Thornton"). On the afternoon of January 1, 2016, three police officers were on patrol looking to discover guns, drugs, or other contraband when they observed Petitioner sitting in the driver's seat of a vehicle that was illegally parked outside of Petitioner's home. The officers appoached the parked vehicle and ultimately began to frisk Mr. Thornton, which culminated in Mr. Thornton's arrest after officers confirmed that he possessed a handgun. We hold that the gun should have been excluded as evidence against Petitioner because the State failed to establish that the frisk of Petitioner was reasonable under the circumstances. Moreover, the attenuation doctrine does not serve to render the evidence admissible because the officers discovered the handgun by exploitation of the unlawful frisk, and the officers' misconduct was flagrant.
Mr. Thornton was charged and convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City with possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a disqualifying crime.1 The charge and conviction followed an incident, which culminated in Mr. Thornton's arrest after officers removed a handgun from Mr. Thornton. Mr. Thornton filed a motion tosuppress, seeking to exclude the gun as evidence against him at trial. On August 29, 2016, the trial court held a suppression hearing on Mr. Thornton's motion.
The State called Officers Kenneth Scott ("Officer Scott") and Jeffrey Zimmerman ("Officer Zimmerman") to testify as witnesses during the suppression hearing. Mr. Thornton's counsel cross-examined the officers, but Mr. Thornton did not testify or otherwise call any witnesses at the hearing. To summarize the facts of this case, we look to testimony from both officers.
On January 1, 2016 at approximately 2:00 p.m., Officers Scott and Zimmerman were on patrol in an unmarked police car. They were accompanied by a third officer, who was identified as Officer Gruver. The officers were driving on Midwood Avenue, intending to turn left onto McCabe Avenue. According to Officer Scott, McCabe Avenue is "a high drug area[.]" The officers were in the area looking for drugs, weapons, and other contraband.
Meanwhile, Mr. Thornton was on the 5200 block of Midwood Avenue, sitting in the driver's seat of a silver Cadillac. The vehicle's lights and engine were off, and Mr. Thornton was the only occupant. The vehicle was parked along the curb across the street from Mr. Thornton's home, but it was facing the wrong direction.2 As the suppressioncourt found, there was construction work being done on the street that interfered with ordinary parking.
Officer Scott noticed the improperly parked vehicle. At Officer Scott's direction, Officer Zimmerman, who was driving the police car, pulled behind Mr. Thornton's vehicle and activated the emergency lights on the police car. The officers intended to inform the vehicle's driver that the car was illegally parked. Officers Scott and Zimmerman exited the police car and approached the parked vehicle. Officer Zimmerman approached on the driver's side, and Officer Scott approached on the passenger's side.
When the officers reached the car, they questioned Mr. Thornton for approximately 30-40 seconds. There is no indication that the officers informed Mr. Thornton that his vehicle was illegally parked. In addition, the officers never issued Mr. Thornton a parking citation. Neither officer could affirm that they investigated the license plate on Mr. Thornton's vehicle or asked Mr. Thornton for his license and registration, although both officers testified that running a vehicle's tags and asking for a driver's license and registration is standard procedure for issuing a parking citation to the operator of an illegally parked vehicle.
By all accounts, Mr. Thornton's demeanor while he was being questioned was "laid back." The suppression court found that there was "no indication of verbal aggressiveness, disobedience, [or] false identification." There was Nonetheless, both officers testified that Mr. Thornton showed characteristics of an armed individual. According to the trial court's factual findings, to support their notion that Mr. Thornton was armed, "[a]ll [the officers] ha[d] [wa]s . . . conduct with [Mr. Thornton's] hands [that the officers observed] while [Mr. Thornton was] being approached by the police officers."
At the suppression hearing, the officers described the conduct they observed that led them to believe that Mr. Thornton was armed. Even though Mr. Thornton was observed seated in a vehicle, Officer Scott testified that when a person is armed, "they walk . . . with their arm[s] straight, sometimes they don't like swing their arms a lot or they check[] . . . their . . . front waistband area." Officer Scott explained that, as he was approaching Mr. Thornton's car, he saw Mr. Thornton looking out of his mirror. He also saw Mr. Thornton "numerous times like start making movements to his front area[.]" He did not describe the specific movements that he saw. Officer Scott explained that, while Mr. Thornton was being questioned, Mr. Thornton had his hands down by his side near his waist. According to Officer Scott, "[Mr. Thornton] just kept like doing like a check, like just trying to, I don't know, like push it down or . . . I don't know . . . just to make sure it's secured." Mr. Thornton made such movements "[n]umerous, numerous times." Officer Scott inferred that Mr. Thornton was doing "a weapons check . . . like he had something he was trying to hide."
Officer Zimmerman testified that an armed individual may have "a bladed stance away from you, [do] security checks, maybe favor[] one side of [his or her] body but a big one is . . . hold[] the area where the weapon is concealed." Officer Zimmerman indicated that, when seated in a vehicle, the individual may move his or her shoulders "up or down drastically and that would show that [the individual is] maybe trying to reach under [his or her] seat or to, you know, further conceal something in [his or her] front waistband." In addition, Officer Zimmerman noted that the suspect may make "quick movements that are kind of uncharacteristic with just being seated in a vehicle."
Officer Zimmerman testified further that, as he was approaching Mr. Thornton's vehicle, he saw Mr. Thornton "raise his right shoulder and kind of bring his elbows together[.]" Officer Zimmerman said that Mr. Thornton appeared "uncomfortable with whatever was in his lap . . . he kept trying . . . [to] mak[e] adjustments, kept his hands in front of his lap." When speaking with the officers, "Mr. Thornton would lean over to the right to address . . . Officer Scott and then again would sit back down and attempt to adjust something in his waistband." Mr. Thornton appeared to be "manipulating something, that he was obviously uncomfortable with, didn't like the position or . . . the size, the shape, but there was something that he was manipulating." At first, Officer Zimmerman said that Mr. Thornton made such movements two or...
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