Thornton v. TRIDENT MEDICAL CENTER
Decision Date | 08 December 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 3706.,3706. |
Citation | 357 S.C. 91,592 S.E.2d 50 |
Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Parties | James C. THORNTON, M.D., Respondent, v. TRIDENT MEDICAL CENTER, L.L.C., d/b/a Trident Medical Center, Appellant. |
Allan Shackelford, of Greensboro; and James L. Gale, of Raleigh, for appellant.
G. Dana Sinkler, of Charleston, for respondent.
Trident Medical Center (Trident) appeals the circuit court's finding that the agreement between Trident and James C. Thornton does not involve interstate commerce and, therefore, is not subject to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1999). We reverse.
In 1999, Trident was suffering from a shortage of qualified physicians in its cardiovascular surgery group, South Carolina Cardiovascular Associates ("SCCA"). To alleviate this shortage, Trident began an effort to recruit physicians from other parts of the country to join SCCA. To entice physicians to move to Charleston, Trident offered substantial financial incentives that would not only cover the expenses of relocation but would provide bonuses and a guaranteed income stream for a period of time after their arrival.
Dr. James Thornton (Thornton) was one of the physicians Trident was able to attract to Charleston. In May 1999, Thornton and Trident entered into a "recruiting agreement" in which Thornton agreed to relocate his medical practice as a cardiovascular surgeon from Grand Rapids, Michigan to Charleston. In addition to the principal agreement under which Thornton agreed to relocate to Charleston and maintain his practice there for at least four years, the recruiting agreement contained four addenda: (1) a net collectable revenue guarantee which provided Thornton with a guaranteed income for twenty-four months; (2) a signing bonus; (3) a relocation agreement for payment of moving expenses; and (4) an agreement providing that Thornton was being recruited into the existing practice of SCCA.
Payment of all the financial incentives to Thornton under this agreement was contingent upon Thornton maintaining his practice in Charleston for at least four years. If he failed to do so, the payments made to Thornton under the agreement had to be repaid to Trident. Further, the agreement read: "In the event any dispute shall arise concerning any aspect of this Agreement, such dispute shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration in accordance with rules established by the American Arbitration Association." Thornton moved to Charleston and joined SCCA in August 1999. However, he left the practice and relocated to Pennsylvania before the end of his four-year commitment. Thornton claimed he was excused from his obligations under the recruiting agreement and refused to repay any of the financial incentives he had received from Trident.
Thornton brought the present declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that the arbitration provision contained in the recruiting agreement was unenforceable. The trial court found the provision (1) did not satisfy the requirements set out in § 15-48-10 of the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act, and (2) was not enforceable under § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), because the transaction between the parties did not involve interstate commerce.
Determinations of arbitrability are subject to de novo review. Stokes v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 351 S.C. 606, 571 S.E.2d 711 (Ct.App.2002). Nevertheless, a circuit court's factual findings will not be reversed on appeal if there is any evidence reasonably supporting the findings. McMillan v. Gold Kist, Inc., 353 S.C. 353, 577 S.E.2d 482 (Ct.App. 2003); Evans v. Accent Manufactured Homes, Inc., 352 S.C. 544, 575 S.E.2d 74 (Ct.App.2003); Liberty Builders, Inc. v. Horton, 336 S.C. 658, 521 S.E.2d 749 (Ct.App.1999). The question of the arbitrability of a claim is an issue for judicial determination, unless the parties provide otherwise. Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C. 580, 553 S.E.2d 110 (2001); Evans, 352 S.C. at 549, 575 S.E.2d at 76; see also Vestry and Church Wardens v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 356 S.C. 202, 588 S.E.2d 136 (2003) ( ).
The parties do not dispute the trial court's finding that the arbitration clause contained in the recruiting agreement is unenforceable under the South Carolina Uniform Arbitration Act, S.C.Code Ann. §§ 15-48-10 to -240 (Supp.2002). If, however, the agreement involves interstate commerce, the FAA applies and trumps the state arbitration laws. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 116 S.Ct. 1652, 134 L.Ed.2d 902 (1996); Soil Remediation Co. v. Nu-Way Envtl., Inc., 323 S.C. 454, 476 S.E.2d 149 (1996).
The FAA provides: "A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract ... shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." 9 U.S.C. § 2. The words "involving commerce" have been interpreted by the United States Supreme Court as being the functional equivalent of "affecting commerce"—words signaling "an intent to exercise Congress' commerce power to the full." Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277, 115 S.Ct. 834, 130 L.Ed.2d 753 (1995); see also Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56, 123 S.Ct. 2037, 2040, 156 L.Ed.2d 46 (2003) (); Blanton v. Stathos, 351 S.C. 534, 540, 570 S.E.2d 565, 568 (Ct.App.2002) (). "Because the statute provides for the enforcement of arbitration agreements within the full reach of the Commerce Clause, it is perfectly clear that the FAA encompasses a wider range of transactions than those actually in commerce—that is, within the flow of interstate commerce." Citizens Bank, 539 U.S. at 56, 123 S.Ct. at 2040 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Thornton claims the recruiting agreement does not evidence interstate commerce and, consequently, the FAA does not apply. We disagree.
In all cases, determination of whether a transaction involves interstate commerce depends on the facts of the case. Zabinski v. Bright Acres Assocs., 346 S.C. 580, 594, 553 S.E.2d 110, 117 (2001) (). Thornton argues the recruiting agreement did not involve interstate commerce because it only concerned the performance of his duties as a physician providing medical services within South Carolina.
Thornton is correct in urging this Court to focus upon what the terms of the contract specifically require for performance in determining whether interstate commerce is involved. Our courts consistently look to the essential character of the contract when applying the FAA.
In Mathews v. Fluor Corp., our Supreme Court found interstate commerce was not involved in a contract for the sale of land in South Carolina to out-of-state parties—even though, incident to the sale, the parties obtained the services of a North Carolina engineer and financing from a Pennsylvania lender. Mathews v. Fluor Corp., 312 S.C. 404, 440 S.E.2d 880 (1994),overruled by Munoz v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 343 S.C. 531, 542 S.E.2d 360 (2001) ( ). The Court held the transaction was outside the scope of the FAA because it was "unable to discern from the evidence presented whether the contract required respondent to administer anything related to interstate commerce." Mathews, 312 S.C. at 407,440 S.E.2d at 882 (emphasis in original). See also Munoz v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 343 S.C. 531, 542 S.E.2d 360 (2001) ( ); Soil Remediation Co. v. Nu-Way Envtl., Inc., 323 S.C. 454, 476 S.E.2d 149 (1996) ( ); Timms v. Greene, 310 S.C. 469, 427 S.E.2d 642 (1993) ( ); Episcopal Hous. Corp. v. Federal Ins. Co., 269 S.C. 631, 640, 239 S.E.2d 647, 652 (1977) ( ); Blanton v. Stathos, 351 S.C. 534, 541, 570 S.E.2d 565, 569 (...
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