GRAVES, J.
Action for personal injuries received whilst riding in an automobile, which ran into a street car operated by the defendant. The petition charges both common-law and ordinance negligence. Several ordinances are pleaded, and the violation thereof assigned as negligence. A recitation of all the alleged negligence will serve no good purpose, as the plaintiff saw fit to abandon all except two theories of recovery, as shown by her requested instructions. No:: under the assignments of error here is it necessary to set out in detail the divers defenses urged in the answer. Plaintiff's theories of a recovery are found in her requested instructions Nos. 1 and 2, which read:
"No. 1. The court instructs the jury that it is admitted that on or about the 10th day of January, 1915, there was in full force and effect in the city of St. Louis the following ordinance: `(3) Whenever any car is about to pass another car going in the opposite direction near a point where it is permissible to passengers to alight from or to board a car, said car shall proceed at a rate of speed not over three miles an hour, and the motorman, driver, or person in control shall ring a warning gong or bell.' Now, if you believe and find from the evidence that at and prior to the time of the collision in question the driver of the automobile in question knew of the existence of said ordinance and the provisions thereof, and if the jury further believe and find from the evidence that on the said 10th day of January, 1915, the automobile in which plaintiff was riding was approaching or about to approach the crossing at Union and Vernon avenues going east with the intention of passing over defendant's double tracks and proceeding into Vernon avenue, and that while said automobile was so approaching or about to approach said crossing, and before the same had proceeded to a place of danger at said crossing, if you so find, defendant's said street car in charge of its motorman was also approaching said crossing going north on Union avenue near Vernon avenue, and at such time said street car was about to pass or was proceeding in passing another street car going in the opposite direction on the said Union avenue and near said Vernon avenue and near a point where it is permissible to passengers to alight from or board a street car, if you so find, then it became and was the duty of the motorman in charge of defendant's said car going north on said Union avenue to proceed in passing said street car going in the opposite direction at a rate of speed of not over three miles an hour, and to ring a warning gong or bell, and if you believe and find from tie evidence that at such time and place said motorman in charge of said north-bound street car ran said car at a rate of speed over three miles an hour, and at such time and place failed to ring a warning gong or bell, then the said motorman was guilty of negligence, and if you so believe and further believe from the evidence that, had said motorman at said time and place run his car at a rate of speed of not over three miles an hour, or that said motorman at said time and place had rung a warning gong or bell, said collision would have been averted, and if you further believe and find from the evidence that such negligence, if any, was the direct cause of the said collision and injury, if any, to plaintiff, then your verdict must be for the plaintiff, provided you further believe and find from the evidence that before and at the time of said collision plaintiff exercised care and caution for her own safety.
"No. 2. The court instructs the jury that, if you believe and find from the evidence that on or about the 10th day of January, 1915, Union avenue in the city of St. Louis at its intersection with Vernon avenue was a public crossing and a place much used for travel by automobiles and other vehicles, and that on said date one of defendant's street cars going north on Union avenue collided with an automobile in which plaintiff was riding while said automobile was being driven across the double tracks of defendant on Union avenue to enter Vernon avenue going east, and that plaintiff was injured in said collision, and if the jury further believe and find from the evidence that while the machine in which plaintiff was riding was approaching the said crossing at Union and Vernon avenues, and before said machine had reached a place of danger at said crossing, if you so find, the defendant's said street car in charge of its motorman was also approaching said crossing going north, and if you further believe and find from the evidence that the said motorman at the said time in so approaching said corner failed to ring any warning gong or bell and failed to exercise ordinary care to have his said car under control so that the same could be stopped on the first appearance of danger to vehicles Passing over said crossing, and that such failure so to do under the circumstances, if you so find, was negligence, and that such negligence, if any, was the direct cause of the said collision and injury, if any, to plaintiff, then your verdict must be for the plaintiff, provided you believe and find from the evidence that before and at the time of said collision plaintiff was in the exercise of ordinary care and caution for her own safety."
The court refused both these instructions as asked, and modified both of them by adding to the end of each some additional matter. To the end of instruction No. 1, supra, the court added the following:
"And provided further you find and believe from the evidence that plaintiff's son, in driving said automobile, was acting for plaintiff and under her direction and control, that then, before you find your verdict in her favor, you further find and believe from the evidence that her said son, in driving said automobile over and upon the public streets at the places mentioned in the evidence, was exercising the highest degree of care which a very careful person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances."
There was also a slight interlineation in this instruction No. 1 made by the court, but no point is made thereon in the assignment of error, and this interlineation thereby becomes immaterial. To instruction No. 2, supra, the court added the following:
"And provided further you find and believe from the evidence that plaintiff's son, in driving said automobile, was acting for plaintiff and under her direction and control, that then, before you find your verdict in her favor, you further find and believe from the evidence that her said son, in driving said automobile over and upon the public streets at the places mentioned in the evidence, was exercising the highest degree of care which a very careful person would exercise under the same or similar circumstances."
The court gave the instructions as thus modified. Upon a trial before the jury the verdict and judgment were for defendant, and the plaintiff has appealed.
There are but three assignments of error. From the brief we quote thus:
"Now comes the appellant and assigns the following errors:
"(1) The trial court erred in instructing the jury that the plaintiff could not recover unless the driver of said machine, at the time of the injury, exercised the highest degree of care.
"(2) The court erred in permitting the witness B. P. Williams (page 20 of the record) to give his opinion and conclusion that the machine could not help but get hit when he saw the driver turn across the street.
"(3) The court erred in permitting the witness Lehmann (page 23 of the record) to testify what the duty of the driver of the machine was at the time of and before the injury, and to testify what things the said driver was required to do in order to make himself a careful chauffeur."
Further details of facts, as the same may become necessary, are left to the opinion.
I. Leaving the worst for the last, we shall take the assignments of error in inverse order. The respondent has printed, in on additional abstract of the record, the evidence in full. The third assignment of error goes to the following state of facts in the record: Whilst the witness Lehmann was on the witness stand the following occurred:
"Q. You were in the courtroom, I believe, when young Threadgill testified? A. Sir?
"Q. You have been a chauffeur, haven't you? A. Yes, sir.
"Q. I will ask you if, from the way he testified that he approached that track, if that is according to the way a careful chauffeur would approach a track under those conditions.
"Mr. Peery: I object to that.
"The Court: Objection sustained.
"Mr. McChesney: I will ask you, Mr. Lehmann, as a chauffeur, when you drive an automobile, how would you approach a crossing there, assuming that there was a car there, for the sake of argument.
"Mr. Hamilton: I object to the question; be has not qualified as an expert on that.
"The Court: He said he was a chauffeur.
"Mr. Hamilton: I object to it for the reason that it is not competent unless he takes into consideration all the facts connected with this accident. The question now is simply: How would a careful chauffeur cross the track in front of this car? (To which ruling of the court the plaintiff, by counsel, then and there duly excepted.)
"Mr. McChesney: Read the question to him, Mr. Buck.
"The Court: You may state what a careful chauffeur would do in making the crossing there. A. Like this case?
"Q. Under these circumstances, under the same circumstances? A. A...
