Thrift v. Bell Lines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 July 1966
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 4998.
• Citation: 256 F. Supp. 475
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
• Parties: Spencer B. THRIFT, Plaintiff, v. BELL LINES, INC., and General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union No. 509, Defendants.

256 F. Supp. 475

Spencer B. THRIFT, Plaintiff, v. BELL LINES, INC., and General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union No. 509, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 4998.

United States District Court D. South Carolina, Greenville Division.

July 27, 1966.

O. Doyle Martin, of Leatherwood, Walker, Todd & Mann, Greenville, S. C., for plaintiff.

P. Bradley Morrah, Jr., and Robert T. Thompson, of Thompson, Ogletree & Haynsworth, Greenville, S. C., for defendant Bell Lines, Inc.

John Bolt Culbertson, Greenville, S. C., for defendant General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union No. 509.

ROBERT W. HEMPHILL, District Judge.

Defendant Bell Lines, Inc., asks dismissal of the Complaint for failure of plaintiff to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.¹ Bell also moved to make more definite, certain Paragraphs XI, XII, and XIV of the Complaint, in conformity with Rule 12(e),² as to allegations of fraud.

The Complaint alleges that Spencer B. Thrift worked as a truck driver for defendant Bell from September 1955 until his discharge in February 1964. At the time of his discharge he held top seniority among the drivers and was a member of Local No. 509, defendant Union. He alleges, and correctly, that a collective bargaining agreement existed between defendants and that the agreement had certain provisions for procedures for discharge, and grievance procedures after discharge, and other actions promulgated in grievance procedures. He alleges his discharge, accuses Bell of effecting the same without proper cause, declares himself physically able to perform the work and that therefore the discharge was wrong and constituted violation of the collective bargaining contract. He alleges the union improperly represented him throughout. He pursued the grievance procedures after his discharge, relates that there was a deadlock which arose from the fact that defendant Union took the position plaintiff was unjustly discharged and that Bell took the position discharge was because plaintiff could not drive a tractor-trailer unit, and because other employees stated they could not get along with plaintiff. After a deadlock, the dispute was submitted to an Arbitrator and plaintiff alleges that at that stage, and thereafter, not only did Bell furnish evidence to Arbitrator which both defendants knew to be false, but the Union representative refused to offer available evidence refuting the company's position. The gravamen of his Complaint is that he was not properly represented in the dispute, that the precipitate manner in which the grievance procedures were scheduled and followed, the failure of the Union to take issue with the employee's position at arbitration stage, demonstrated that the Union, along with employer, colluded to violate their statutory and contractual duty of fair representation, which effectively deprived him of a fair and impartial hearing in accordance with due process of law; he asks damages in the amount of $85,000.00.

At the hearing on the motions counsel appeared for Bell and the Union and were asked to submit supporting authorities. Thereafter counsel for Bell and the Union submitted supporting authorities. Counsel for plaintiff also submitted supporting authorities.

Jurisdiction is conferred on this court by virtue of Section 301, Title III, of the Labor Relations Management Act of 1947.³ Defendant Union did not make a companion motion, but answered pleading a general denial and alleging its good faith in discharging its duties within the framework of the arbitration proceedings. In addition to its motion defendant Bell's answer incorporated therein first the motion to dismiss; a second defense pled res judicata because of a similar action against defendant Bell in the State court, heard and dismissed; the third, fourth, and fifth defenses of defendant Bell allege generally a justification for the discharge of the plaintiff.

This court finds guidance in the lucid opinion in Thompson v. Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters,⁴ where a suit by an employee against the Union as bargaining agent claiming the Union did not represent him fairly and without discrimination was held to be appropriate in the federal courts and plaintiff was held to have recourse there. Among others there was raised the question of whether the district court had authority to review the correctness of seniority rights according to plaintiff.

In passing upon the sufficiency of the Complaint to state a claim in cases of this nature, the Fourth Circuit ruled:

We have been admonished that to `adequately set forth a claim upon which relief could be granted,' it is not necessary that the claim be well developed in the complaint for `a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.' See Conley v. Gibson, supra 355 U.S. 41 at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99 at 101-102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80. It cannot be said that Thompson's complaint is deficient under this test.

It is significant the court injected: "Litigation of this particular claim, merely seeking damages from the Brotherhood, involves only incidentally a consideration of the collective bargaining agreements and Thompson's seniority rights." The parallel is clear.

This court does not have before it the entire proceeding from the state court. Aside from the enabling statute which plaintiff used as entrance to this forum,⁵ the Supreme Court of the United States in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 85 S.Ct. 614, 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965) said "the Court has made it clear that substantive federal law applies to suits on collective bargaining agreements covered by § 204 of the Railway Labor Act * * *. Thus a major underpinning for the continued validity of the Moore case in the field of the Railway Labor Act, and more importantly in the present context, for the extension of its rationale to suits under § 301(a) of the LMRA, has been removed. * * * There are, then, positive reasons why the general federal rule should govern grievances based on severance claims as it does others. * * *" Coincidentally, defendant Bell relies on Maddox to deny plaintiff here. Suffice it to say that the allegations of plaintiff, if only to the effect that the decision reached by virtue of the grievance procedure was erroneous, would not suffice. But plaintiff has proceeded to accuse defendants of using false information and withholding other pertinent information in violation of his rights to have fair and nondiscriminatory treatment when he resorted to grievance procedures. If these rights have been denied him, he has a cause, and this he has alleged.

While this case has no import of racial discrimination, the reasoning in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L. Ed.2d 80 (1957) is apropos. If the Union here, as was alleged in the Conley case, failed to give Thrift the protection he deserved, and which the bargaining agreement required, and if defendant Bell participated, certainly plaintiff has cause to complain and his grievance should have hearing in this court. In Conley the alleged motive was race; here the alleged motive was collusion to get rid of plaintiff.

Perhaps the natural thought which comes to mind is that Thrift has repeatedly fostered a cause which lacks substance and that his efforts in that regard only manifest the persistence of a dissident employee. To accept this thought as controlling, however, would only perpetuate the real basis of Thrift's complaint. He has vigorously pursued his claim that, as alleged in his complaint here, he has never been accorded a fair hearing on the merits of his grievance because of the failure of his union representative to represent him properly in light of the alleged misconduct on the part of the employer. That other persons and other tribunals have turned a deaf ear, whether for compelling legal reasons or by choice, is now offered as the basis for denying a hearing here.

The issue is plainly whether the hearings which resulted from the exercise of the grievance procedures, and which ended unfavorably to Thrift, act as an absolute bar to this action even if Thrift, if given the opportunity, could prove fraud on the part of Bell Lines directly connected with the hearings coupled with a conscious failure of the union to act on his behalf. Stated otherwise, if the handling of Thrift's grievance was devoid of due process, can this court now say that, as a matter of law, he is...