Thrift v. State

• Decision Date: 07 December 2020
• Docket Number: S20A1182
• Citation: 852 S.E.2d 560,310 Ga. 499
• Parties: THRIFT v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

310 Ga. 499

852 S.E.2d 560

THRIFT

v.The STATE.

S20A1182

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: December 7, 2020

Timothy C. C. Head, Jr., for appellant.

George E. Barnhill, District Attorney, Michelle C. McIntire, Assistant District Attorney; Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Elizabeth Rosenwasser, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

McMillian, Justice.

Craig Lester Thrift was convicted of felony murder in connection with the death of Terry Rouse.¹ On appeal, Thrift contests the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction; the denial of his motion for new trial on the general grounds; the denial of five motions for mistrial; the admission of certain evidence presented by the State; the exclusion of certain evidence offered by the defense; and the restriction of his attorney's cross-examination of one of the State's witnesses. Additionally, Thrift asserts that he is entitled to a new trial under a cumulative error analysis. We affirm for the reasons set forth below.

1. Thrift asserts that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for felony murder. In evaluating whether the evidence at trial was sufficient as a matter of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, this Court considers whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B), 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). In performing this evaluation, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, leaving "to the jury the resolution of conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence, credibility of witnesses, and reasonable inferences to be made from the evidence." Rodriguez v. State , 309 Ga. 542, 546 (1), 847 S.E.2d 303 (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted).

Viewed in that light, the evidence at trial showed that Rouse was Thrift's cousin and best friend. In 1991, the two men worked together pouring concrete for Thrift's father's company. Rouse customarily picked Thrift up at Thrift's house, and they rode to work together. In May 1991, Thrift was married to Rhonda Thrift, and Rouse was having an affair with her. On the afternoon of Friday, May 10, 1991, Rouse and Rhonda met up at the home of a friend. That night, Rhonda and the friend went to a party along with Thrift. When they arrived at the party, Rouse was already there. The Thrifts and the friend left the party about 25 to 30 minutes after arriving and headed to the Thrifts’ home, making a couple of stops along the way. The party broke up early on the morning of Saturday, May 11. At around 4:00 that morning, Rouse, who had stayed at the party, was seen sleeping in his car in front of the house where the party took place, but his car was gone by 7:00 a.m.

Thrift, Rouse, and two other men were scheduled to pour concrete at a jobsite at 7:00 a.m. that Saturday morning. After attending a different party, the two other men drove to the Thrifts’ house sometime in the early morning hours and slept in their car in the Thrifts’ front yard so they would not be late to the job site. The Thrifts’ babysitter, who slept on the Thrifts’ couch that night, reported hearing Rhonda and Thrift arguing during the night; being awakened later by a loud noise, perhaps the sound of a horn or a loud muffler; and seeing Rouse there when she woke up between 5:00 and 6:00 a.m. Sometime before 7:00 a.m., the two men who were sleeping in their car were awakened by either Thrift or Rhonda, and they left with Thrift, arriving at the job site by 7:00 a.m. Rouse never showed up to work that day.

At around 2:00 p.m. that day, Rouse's car was discovered outside one of the entrances to the Okefenokee Swamp. The car's windows were rolled down, the ignition switch was in the on position, the battery was dead, and the car was out of gas. Rouse's family never saw or heard from him again. In the 20 years following Rouse's disappearance, Thrift told a number of people on numerous occasions that he had killed Rouse by beating him and/or shooting him because Rouse was having an affair with Rhonda. Thrift said he then disposed of Rouse's body in the swamp, sometimes describing Rouse as "gator bait."

Thrift contends that this and other evidence at trial was insufficient to support the verdict because, although Rouse has not been seen by his family since May 11, 1991, his body has never been found, no crime scene was ever discovered to show that Rouse died as the result of any criminal action, and other evidence showed that Rouse disappeared of his own volition.² Thrift argues that even giving the appropriate deference to the jury, no rational factfinder could find that Rouse was even dead, much less that he died as the result of criminal conduct, or that it was Thrift who killed him.

"It is of course true that the burden was upon the State to prove the corpus delicti, and to show also that the defendant was the perpetrator of the alleged offense. Both of these elements, however, could be shown by circumstantial as well as direct evidence." White v. State , 263 Ga. 94, 96-97 (1), 428 S.E.2d 789 (1993) (citation and punctuation omitted). See also Richardson v. State , 276 Ga. 548, 549 (1), 580 S.E.2d 224 (2003) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the corpus delicti, which means "the body of the crime," may be established by indirect as well as direct evidence). Moreover, "[t]o establish the corpus delicti in a homicide prosecution, the State must prove that a death occurred, but there is no requirement that a dead body be produced." Richardson , 276 Ga. at 549 (1), 580 S.E.2d 224.

Here, Thrift stated on a number of occasions to a number of different witnesses that he killed Rouse by beating him, shooting him, or both, and then disposed of his body in the swamp, because Rouse was having an affair with Rhonda. Each of these statements "made not a mere incriminating admission, but a confession, which is direct evidence of his guilt, and this is not, therefore, a purely circumstantial case." Robinson v. State , 309 Ga. 729, 731 (1) (a), 848 S.E.2d 441 (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted) (defendant's statement to jailhouse informant that he killed the victim was a confession and thus direct evidence). See also Muckle v. State , 302 Ga. 675, 679 (1) (b), 808 S.E.2d 713 (2017) (defendant's admission to victim's brother regarding the main facts of felony murder charge constituted a confession).

Thrift's confessions were also corroborated by evidence that Rouse was having an affair with Rhonda; Rouse and Rhonda met up the day before Rouse's disappearance; Thrift and his wife got into an argument in the early morning hours on the day Rouse disappeared; and Rouse and Thrift did not ride to work together, although this was their usual routine. Evidence at trial also showed that Thrift knew about the affair and even believed that his daughter was actually Rouse's biological child. Rouse was seen at the Thrift house on the morning of his disappearance, and Rouse's car was later discovered abandoned outside the entrance to the swamp where Thrift said he dumped Rouse's body. The State introduced evidence that Rouse had close family connections, yet, uncharacteristically, he had failed to contact his family or appear at any family events for more than 20 years. This and other evidence at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find Thrift guilty of felony murder beyond a reasonable doubt. See Hinton v. State , 280 Ga. 811, 814 (1), 631 S.E.2d 365 (2006) (evidence sufficient to support murder conviction where defendant made various statements implicating himself in victim's murder and the disposal of her body, which was never found, and other evidence corroborated those statements); Richardson , 276 Ga. at 549 (1), 580 S.E.2d 224 (evidence sufficient to support murder conviction in absence of body where defendant confessed to victim's murder and other evidence corroborated that confession); McIlwain v. State , 264 Ga. 382, 382 (1), 445 S.E.2d 261 (1994) (defendant's confession along with other evidence sufficient to support murder conviction although victim's body never found).

2. Thrift further contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial on the general grounds because the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and the principles of equity and was contrary to the evidence. See OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21. However, "the decision to grant or refuse to grant a new trial on the general grounds is vested solely in the trial court." Bundel v. State , 308 Ga. 317, 318 (1), 840 S.E.2d 349 (2020). And "[w]hen a defendant appeals the trial court's denial of a motion for new trial, an appellate court does not review the merits of the general grounds." Id. (emphasis in original). See also Wilcox v. State , 310 Ga. 442, 446 (2), 851 S.E.2d 587 (2020) (declining to review denial of motion for new trial on the general grounds). Instead, this Court's review of a trial court's ruling on the general grounds is limited to sufficiency of the evidence under Jackson v. Virginia. See Lewis v. State , 296 Ga. 259, 261 (3), 765 S.E.2d 911 (2014). Because we have already determined that the evidence was sufficient to support Thrift's felony murder conviction, we conclude that this enumeration is without merit.

3. Thrift also argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for mistrial after the State violated an order by the trial court and improperly placed Thrift's character at issue by introducing testimony from a State's witness that Thrift previously threatened him with a gun.

A trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial based on the improper admission of bad character evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion by examining factors and circumstances, including the nature of the statement, the other evidence in the case, and the...