Thurman v. Daimlerchrysler, Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 November 2004
• Docket Number: No. 02-2474.,02-2474.
• Parties: Connie THURMAN; John Thurman, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER, INC., James Stanford Pittman, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

397 F.3d 352

Connie THURMAN; John Thurman, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER, INC., James Stanford Pittman, jointly and severally, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 02-2474.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued April 27, 2004.

Decided and Filed November 19, 2004.^*

ARGUED: H. Wallace Parker, Bloomfield Law Center, Bloomfield Hills, MI, for Appellants. Joseph J. Vogan, Varnum, Riddering, Schmidt & Howlett, Grand Rapids, MI, William McCandless, DeNardis, McCandless & Miller, Mt. Clemens, MI, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: H. Wallace Parker, Bloomfield Law Center, Bloomfield Hills, MI, for Appellants. Joseph J. Vogan, Jennifer J. Stocker, Varnum, Riddering, Schmidt & Howlett, Grand Rapids, MI, William McCandless, Denardis, McCandless & Miller, Mt. Clemens, MI, for Appellees.

Before MARTIN, and ROGERS, Circuit Judges; BELL, District Judge.^**

BELL, District Judge.

The issue before the Court is whether an employee effectively waived the statutory limitations period for a civil lawsuit by signing an employment application that provided for an abbreviated period of limitations. This action arises from the employment relationship between Plaintiff-Appellant Connie Thurman and Defendant-Appellee DaimlerChrysler, Inc. ("DaimlerChrysler"). Connie and John Thurman (collectively "the Thurmans") assert claims of sex discrimination under Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.2101, et seq., race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and negligent hiring/retention, negligent supervision, assault and battery, negligence and gross negligence, as well as loss of consortium. The claims arise from two separate incidents in which Defendant James Stanford Pittman ("Pittman") sexually harassed Ms. Thurman while in the workplace. The Thurmans appeal the district court's order granting DaimlerChrysler's motion for summary judgment. The Thurmans contend that the district court erred in holding that their claims were time barred by the abbreviated statute of limitations contained in the DaimlerChrysler employment application.

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court's order granting DaimlerChrysler's motion for summary judgment on all claims against DaimlerChrysler and we remand the remaining claims against Defendant Pittman to the district court with instructions to remand the case to the Circuit Court for the County of Oakland, State of Michigan.

I.

Ms. Thurman is an employee of DaimlerChrysler and a former co-worker of Pittman. Prior to beginning her employment with DaimlerChrysler, Ms. Thurman completed an employment application for DaimlerChrysler (then Chrysler Corporation). Among other provisions, the application contained a clause waiving any statute of limitation and agreeing to an abbreviated limitations period in which to file suit against the employer. Specifically, the clause stated:

(8) I agree that any claim or lawsuit relating to my service with Chrysler Corporation or any of its subsidiaries must be filed no more than six (6) months after the date of the employment action that is the subject of the claim or lawsuit. I waive any statute of limitations to the contrary.

(J.A. 212-13). This clause was printed in the same size font as all other printed portions of the application. In addition, the clause was preceded by the statement, "READ CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING," in bold and capitalized letters. (J.A. 212). The application also contained a clause stating: "This application will be considered active for twelve (12) months from the date filed. If you are hired, it becomes part of your official employment record." Id. Ms. Thurman signed the application, acknowledging that she read and understood the application. Id. Upon her hiring, Ms. Thurman was covered by the collective bargaining agreement between DaimlerChrysler and UAW Local 1264.

Ms. Thurman began working for DaimlerChrysler in November 1994. On September 9, 1999, Ms. Thurman and Pittman were engaged in a conversation in the plant cafeteria. When Ms. Thurman excused herself to attend a meeting, she bent over to pat Pittman's shoulder. Pittman misunderstood the gesture and grabbed her left breast. After conducting an investigation of the incident, the DaimlerChrysler Labor Relations Staff concluded that there was insufficient evidence to punish Pittman. On September 29, 1999, Plaintiff filed a statement of concern with the Michigan Department of Civil Rights claiming harassment owing to the conduct of Pittman on September 9, 1999.

On October 2, 1999, Ms. Thurman was in the cafeteria eating lunch with her co-workers when Pittman entered the room. As he was leaving the cafeteria, Pittman walked by Ms. Thurman and grabbed his crotch, shaking his genitals at her. Ms. Thurman reported this incident to her superiors. DaimlerChrysler did take action against Pittman after the October 2, 1999, incident. Pittman was given a 10-day suspension for violating the DaimlerChrysler Standards of Conduct. In response to the two harassment incidents, Ms. Thurman filed a criminal complaint with the Sterling Heights Police Department on October 19, 1999. Pittman pled guilty to fourth degree criminal sexual conduct and aggravated assault. (J.A. 482).

After being transferred to another shift in January 2000, Ms. Thurman was given a leave of absence from work on February 26, 2000, and has not returned to active duty with DaimlerChrysler.

On June 1, 2000, the Thurmans filed a lawsuit in federal district court, naming DaimlerChrysler and Pittman as defendants, alleging violations of the Michigan Elliot Larsen Civil Rights Act, Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and various state law tort claims. On December 15, 2000, the suit was dismissed by the district court due to the repeated failure of the Thurmans' counsel to appear and participate in court ordered conferences. (J.A. 531-53). While the district court permitted reinstatement of the action for good cause within 30 days, the Thurmans did not move to reinstate the action or appeal the dismissal. Instead, the Thurmans filed a second lawsuit in August 2001, the present suit before the Court, in the Oakland County Circuit Court alleging the same claims as the previous suit. The suit was removed to the United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, based on federal question and supplemental jurisdiction. Thereafter, the court below granted summary judgment in favor of DaimlerChrysler and Pittman and dismissed the suit as untimely filed pursuant to the abbreviated limitations agreement in the DaimlerChrysler application.

II.

The Court reviews de novo a district court's grant of a motion for summary judgment. Lewis v. Philip Morris, Inc., 355 F.3d 515, 523 (6th Cir.2004) (citing Williams v. General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 560 (6th Cir.1999)).

The district court below held that the abbreviated six-month statute of limitations in the DaimlerChrysler employment application was reasonable and barred the Thurmans' suit against DaimlerChrysler. (J.A. 517-18). In addition, the district court held that the tort claims against Pittman were also time barred. (J.A. 520-21).

The Thurmans first asserts on appeal that the district court erred in holding that their claims were time barred by the abbreviated statute of limitations because by its terms the application expired before Ms. Thurman was hired by DaimlerChrysler. The Thurmans point to the application language stating: "This application will be considered active for twelve (12) months from the date filed. If you are hired, it becomes part of your official employment record." (J.A. 212). The Thurmans contend that the six-month statute of limitations could not apply to this case because the application expired in October 1994 (twelve months after it was signed), and Ms. Thurman was not hired by DaimlerChrysler until November 1994.

We are unpersuaded by the Thurmans' argument that the employment application was expired and therefore the six-month statute of limitations period is inapplicable. It is uncontested that Ms. Thurman was hired pursuant to the employment application that she filled out. Indeed, because Ms. Thurman was hired based upon the information contained in the application, it became part of her employment record. (J.A. 212) ("If you are hired, it becomes part of your official employment record."). Moreover, Michigan courts have held that terms in an employment application constitute part of an employee's contract of employment. See e.g., Timko v. Oakwood Custom Coating, Inc., 244 Mich.App. 234, 625 N.W.2d 101, 106 (2001) (holding that terms of an employment application are part of an employment contract); Butzer v. Camelot Hall Convalescent Centre, Inc., 183 Mich.App. 194, 454 N.W.2d 122, 124 (1989) (concluding that an at will termination provision in an employment application was part of an employment contract). Given the fact that DaimlerChrysler hired Ms. Thurman based upon the application she filled out and that the application became part of her employment record, it cannot be argued that the application expired prior to her hiring.

The Thurmans next argue that the provisions of the employment application were superseded by the collective bargaining agreement entered into between DaimlerChrysler and UAW Local 1264. The Thurmans contend that an employee's waiver of a statute of limitations is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining that must be included in the collective bargaining agreement in order to protect the employer. Further, the Thurmans argue that because the collective bargaining agreement is the only agreement governing the terms and conditions of the relationship between DaimlerChrysler and UAW, and it did not include a six-month statute of limitation for lawsuits arising out of employment, it nullifies the employment application's abbreviated limitations period.

In response, DaimlerChrysler contends that there is no express restriction in the collective bargaining agreement...