Thurman v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.

• Decision Date: 29 November 1989
• Docket Number: No. 89-1170,89-1170
• Citation: 889 F.2d 1441
• Parties: Will THURMAN, Jr., and Will Thurman Enterprises, Inc., Plaintiff-Appellee, Appellant, v. The FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, as successor to the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation, acting in its limited capacity as Receiver for Continental Savings Association, Defendant-Appellant, Appellee, and The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as successor of the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation, in its corporate capacity, Movant-Appellant, Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 1441

889 F.2d 1441

15 Fed.R.Serv.3d 546

Will THURMAN, Jr., and Will Thurman Enterprises, Inc. Plaintiff-Appellee, Appellant, v. The FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, as successor to the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation, acting in its limited capacity as Receiver for Continental Savings Association, Defendant-Appellant, Appellee and The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as successor of the Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corporation in its corporate capacity Movant-Appellant, Appellee.

No. 89-1170.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Nov. 29, 1989.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Jan. 22, 1990.

Lee R. Larkin, Andrews & Kurth, Houston, Tex., for FDIC Receiver.

Charles McDonald, Washington, D.C. and Robert I. Howell, Austin, Tex., for FDIC Corporate.

Robert J. Kuhn and James D. Doyle, III, Austin, Tex., for plaintiff-appellee, appellant.

Appeals From the United States District Court Western District of Texas.

Before WISDOM, JOHNSON and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

I

This appeal presented issues regarding intervention of right and of federal jurisdiction over suits removed from state court by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation acting as the federally appointed receiver for state-chartered savings and loan associations. Before its submission, the Supreme Court, Congress, and another panel of this circuit eliminated any jurisdictional problems, leaving for our review only issues relating to the district court's denial of a motion to intervene by FSLIC in its corporate capacity. We reverse the district court's decision denying intervention and remand this case to the district court to allow FSLIC Corporate to continue the defense of the case by the proper post-trial motions and appeal. However, as a post-judgment intervenor, FSLIC will not be allowed to assert any federal defenses unique to its federal status.

II

Continental Savings Association extended two loans to Will Thurman, Jr., and Thurman Enterprises, Inc. The loans were evidenced by two promissory notes, the first dated July 19, 1985, payable to CSA in the original principal amount of $8,243,800.00, and the second dated April 18, 1986, payable to CSA in the original principal amount of $575,160.80. These notes were secured by deeds of trust on real property and other security agreements in favor of CSA. Thurman and TEI filed Chapter 11 petitions in bankruptcy on July 1, 1986, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Texas. After CSA obtained permission from the bankruptcy court to foreclose, Thurman and TEI sued in state court seeking to enjoin Continental Savings Association from foreclosing and seeking actual and punitive damages for usury, breach of confidential relationship, duress, and fraud. Thurman and TEI also sought cancellation of the notes because the charge of interest was twice the maximum legal rate.

The case went to trial on September 12, 1988. On September 21, 1988, the state court entered a final judgment awarding Thurman and TEI the following:

(1) $7,493,518.86, three times the interest charged in excess of the maximum rate;

(2) $3,750,000.00, based on the jury's fraud findings ($750,000 actual and $3,000,000 punitive);

(3) forfeiture of all principal and interest due on the Thurman and TEI notes, and $552,405.89, which represented principal and interest previously paid by Thurman and TEI, based upon interest rate charged being twice the maximum rate; and

(4) $150,000.00 in attorneys' fees through the trial of the case.

On September 26, 1988, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board appointed FSLIC as receiver for CSA. At the same time, the FHLBB authorized the transfer of substantially all of the assets of CSA including the Thurman and TEI notes to a newly created federal savings institution, Continental Federal, in consideration of the assumption by Continental Federal of certain existing liabilities. This transaction was pursuant to an acquisition agreement between FSLIC Receiver and Continental Federal. The remaining assets of CSA were transferred to FSLIC Corporate.

On September 29, 1988, FSLIC Receiver removed the case to federal court. On October 5, 1988, Continental Federal assigned to FSLIC Corporate its interest in the Thurman and TEI notes, deeds of trust, and other security interests. That same day FSLIC Corporate filed a motion to intervene together with a proposed motion for new trial. No motion for new trial was filed by CSA or FSLIC Receiver.

Thurman and TEI filed a motion to remand on October 28, 1988. On November 4, 1988, FSLIC Receiver moved to dismiss the claims of Thurman and TEI based on North Mississippi Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Hudspeth, 756 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1054, 106 S.Ct. 790, 88 L.Ed.2d 768 (1986).

On November 29, 1988, the district court denied FSLIC Corporate's motion to intervene and denied its proposed motion for a new trial as moot. On December 8, 1988, FSLIC Corporate filed a motion to reconsider the November 29 order.

To avoid losing its right to appeal the denial of intervention because of the expiration of the 60-day appeal period after the denial of its motion for new trial, ¹ FSLIC Corporate filed an emergency motion to vacate the November 29 order or, in the alternative, for an extension of time pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(5). By an order dated January 25, 1989, the district court granted FSLIC Corporate an extension to February 13, 1989, for filing a notice of appeal.

On January 31, 1989, the district court entered an order staying FSLIC Receiver's motion to dismiss pending the resolution of Coit Independent Joint Venture v. Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp. in the Supreme Court, denying FSLIC Corporate's motion to reconsider, and denying the motion to remand filed by Thurman and TEI. FSLIC Corporate filed its notice of appeal on February 10, 1989; FSLIC Receiver filed its notice of appeal on February 13, 1989; and Thurman and TEI filed their joint notice of appeal on February 21, 1989.

After the district court's stay order of January 31, 1989, the Supreme Court decided Coit, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1361, 103 L.Ed.2d 602 (1989), the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub.L. No. 101-73, Sec. 209, 103 Stat. 183, 216 (1989) (FIRREA) became law, and this court decided Triland Holdings & Co. v. Sunbelt Service Corp., 884 F.2d 205 (5th Cir.1989). In Triland Holdings we recognized that Coit and FIRREA give federal district courts jurisdiction over removed claims in cases when, as here, FSLIC is the federally appointed receiver of a state-chartered savings and loan. Id. at 207-08. We therefore limit our discussion to the two remaining issues which relate to the district court's denial of FSLIC Corporate's motion to intervene.

III

FSLIC Corporate seeks to intervene solely to defend in a new trial the notes, and the liens securing the notes, against allegations by Thurman and TEI of fraud and usury. FSLIC Corporate does not seek to state a claim for payment of the notes, but requests that it be allowed to pursue non-judicial foreclosure. The district court denied intervention, a decision we review by an abuse of discretion standard. Lelsz v. Kavanaugh, 710 F.2d 1040, 1043 (5th Cir.1983).

A proposed intervenor under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a) must show that his application is timely, that he has an interest relating to the subject matter of the suit, that the disposition of the action may impair or impede his ability to protect that interest, and that his interest is inadequately represented by the parties. International Tank Terminals, Ltd. v. M/V Acadia Forest, 579 F.2d 964, 967 (5th Cir.1978).

The primary dispute is over FSLIC Corporate's interest in the notes, the subject matter of the suit. In its November 29, 1988, order the district court denied the motion to intervene, concluding that the claims on the notes had been waived by CSA, FSLIC Corporate's predecessor-in-interest, persuaded that CSA was required to counterclaim for enforcement of the notes by Tex.R.Civ.P. 97(a). In denying FSLIC Corporate's motion to reconsider the district court reaffirmed its earlier holding and added that the relief requested by FSLIC Corporate was barred because the grounds for relief were affirmative defenses or matters of avoidance required to be affirmatively pleaded by CSA under Tex.R.Civ.P. 94.

We disagree with the district court's ruling that CSA lost its right to collect on the notes by failing to counterclaim to collect the amounts due under the notes. Under Texas law when a borrower files an action attacking the collectibility of a secured debt the compulsory counterclaim rule does not require the secured party to counterclaim to collect on the debt if he has chosen to exercise his bargained for right to pursue extra-judicial foreclosure. This principle was first articulated in Kaspar v. Keller, 466 S.W.2d 326 (Tex.Civ.App.--Waco 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Kaspar executed an installment deed of trust note to Keller as part consideration for the purchase of realty. Kaspar later sued Keller, alleging the purchase had been induced by fraud and requesting recision of the purchase transaction, recovery of a $75,000.00 down payment, and cancellation of the note. When Keller indicated his intention to foreclose under the power of sale in the deed of trust, Kaspar sought and obtained a temporary injunction. Keller answered but filed no counterclaim on the note. The case was tried to a jury which found that the sale had not been induced by fraud. With Kaspar's suit out of the way, Keller foreclosed on his collateral and credited the purchase price against the outstanding balance of Kaspar's note. Keller then sued Kaspar for the deficiency.

As a defense to the collection action, Kaspar asserted that Keller's claim under the note was barred by Tex.R.Civ.P. 97(a) because it was a compulsory counterclaim which...