Thurmond v. Block
| Decision Date | 13 June 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. 85-1172.,85-1172. |
| Citation | 640 F. Supp. 588 |
| Parties | Emily R. THURMOND, Individually and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. John R. BLOCK, Secretary of Agriculture for the United States of America; and Marguerite Sallee, Commissioner of the Tennessee Department of Human Services; Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Tennessee |
Leland Dale Wilson, West Tenn. Legal Services, Dyersburg, Tenn., for plaintiff.
Richard Willard, Asst. Atty. Gen., W. Hickman Ewing, Jr., U.S. Atty., Alice Howze, Asst. U.S. Atty., Memphis, Tenn., Sheila Lieber and Don J. Moss, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Civ. Div., Washington, D.C., for Mr. Block.
W.J. Michael Cody, Atty. Gen., Jim G. Creecy, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Dianne Stamey, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, Tenn., for Ms. Sallee.
Plaintiff Emily R. Thurmond filed this action on August 19, 1985, alleging that the Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq., as it applies to her, is unconstitutional. Purporting to represent a class of persons similarly affected by the allegedly unconstitutional provision of the act, plaintiff named as defendants the Secretary of Agriculture for the United States and the Commissioner of Tennessee's Department of Human Services, the agency responsible for implementing the act in Tennessee. The federal defendant has moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted. For the reasons set forth herein, that motion is granted.
In consideration of this motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, all well plead allegations of the complaint must be assumed to be true and construed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the non-moving party. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974); L'Orange v. Medical Protective Co., 394 F.2d 57, 59 (6th Cir.1968).
Plaintiff is a resident of the McKinney-Baker Home, a group home in Union City, Tennessee, licensed by the state as a supportive living facility for persons with mental disabilities. The home has ten residents, all of whom suffer some degree of mental disability and are recipients of benefits under either Title II or Title XVI of the Social Security Act. According to plaintiff, the McKinney-Baker Home is the only such home in the county in which she lives and one of only five in the entire northwest portion of Tennessee.
The McKinney-Baker Home began operation in July 1984 in the form of a proprietorship owned by Peggy McKinney. Plaintiff became a resident of the home in August 1984. Each resident, including plaintiff, pays the home $290 per month for room and board and other services. In plaintiff's case, this amount is supplied by her sole source of income, her monthly Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits. The home receives an additional $150 per resident each month pursuant to a contract with the Northwest Tennessee Mental Health Center.
In April 1985 the home was incorporated as McKinney-Baker, Inc., a private, for profit Tennessee corporation. According to plaintiff, the home's incorporation had no effect on the daily operations of the home, the services received by its residents, or the amount charged the residents for those services. The complaint does not state why the home was incorporated, although an amendment to the complaint alleges that most group homes in Tennessee that "incorporated for profit did so because of misunderstandings over the nature of non-profit corporations and a fear by the individual sponsors that they would lose ownership of their homes." Amended Complaint, ¶ 39A.
The home's residents began to receive food stamp assistance when the home opened in July 1984. Each resident's food stamps were received by Pansy Baker, the home's "sponsor," who would then purchase food supplies and prepare meals for the residents. On June 17, 1985, the Tennessee Department of Human Services sent notices to the residents that they were no longer eligible for food stamps due to the home's inability to produce evidence that it was a nonprofit institution. None of the residents received food stamps after June 30, 1985.
According to the complaint, "loss of the food stamps has created a crisis at the McKinney-Baker Home." Complaint, ¶ 30. The funds received from the residents and the mental health center are alleged by plaintiff to be insufficient to cover all costs of maintaining the home. Because the residents are on fixed incomes, the monthly rate the home charges them allegedly cannot be raised. Plaintiff alleges that no federal or state assistance is available for the home and, unless the residents are again given food stamps, the home may be forced to close.
Plaintiff brought this action on behalf of herself and other residents of group homes in Tennessee she alleges to be similarly situated. In support of that allegation, plaintiff alleges that there are approximately 1,500 persons such as herself in Tennessee who live in about 190 group homes similar in operation to the McKinney-Baker Home. Each home allegedly houses fewer than sixteen residents, with an average of less than eight. Of these 190 homes, plaintiff alleges that less than 10% are operated by for profit corporations. She further alleges that more than 60% are operated by individual sponsors who do not qualify as nonprofit organizations and that the remainder, approximately 30%, are operated by nonprofit corporations.
In spite of the differing business structures, plaintiff alleges that no significant differences exist among the 190 homes. Alleging that all of the homes, regardless of business structure, have similar revenues, assets, and operating expenses, plaintiff contends that "very little, if any, profit" is made by any of the homes. Amended Complaint, ¶ 45. Plaintiff also alleges that there are no significant differences in the incomes and assets of the residents of the different organizational types of homes. Finally, plaintiff alleges that the residents of for profit group homes in Tennessee have the same need for food stamps as residents of nonprofit group homes. Because the latter group is permitted to receive food stamps and the former is not, plaintiff alleges that she and the class she purports to represent are denied equal protection of the law.
On November 4, 1985, the federal defendant filed the present motion to dismiss, alleging that Congress' failure to include for profit institutions in the challenged provision of 7 U.S.C.A. § 2012(i) (West Supp. 1986) is rationally related to legitimate legislative goals of (1) benefiting institutions that serve a purely public purpose, (2) providing food stamps to the neediest individuals, and (3) lessening the risk that for profit institutions would be paid twice for meals provided to their residents. In response to the motion, plaintiff argues that the federal defendant's position is dependent upon a finding that it was reasonable for Congress to presume that residents of nonprofit group homes for the mentally ill are needier than residents of for profit group homes and that nonprofit group homes charge less than all other group homes. Relying upon allegations in her amended complaint that refute these presumptions, plaintiff asserts that no rational basis exists for the presumptions.
Plaintiff also contends that the legislative history of § 2012(i) contains no evidence of an identifiable purpose for requiring group homes for the mentally ill to be nonprofit institutions. That absence, according to plaintiff, shows that the requirement was not the result of a deliberate and considered choice by Congress. In light of the legislative history of the challenged provision and the allegations of her complaint, plaintiff alleges that the complaint does state a claim upon which relief may be granted and that the motion to dismiss should be denied.
The "threshold question" in a case attacking a statute on equal protection grounds is to determine "the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny of the statute's distinguishing characteristics." Dillinger v. Schweiker, 762 F.2d 506, 508 (6th Cir. 1985). Because this case does not involve a suspect class or fundamental right, this Court's review of the challenged legislation is limited to assuring that it "classifies the persons it affects in a manner rationally related to legitimate government objectives." Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 230, 101 S.Ct. 1074, 1080, 67 L.Ed.2d 186 (1981). If the legislation is rationally related to such objectives, this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of Congress, the political body elected by the people to make "democratic choices among alternative solutions to social and economic problems." Id. 450 U.S. at 230, 234, 101 S.Ct. at 1080, 1082. See also Dillinger, supra.
The Food Stamp Act was passed in 1964 "to safeguard the health and well-being of the Nation's population and raise levels of nutrition among low-income households." Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub.L. No. 88-525, § 2, 78 Stat. 703 (1964) (). Participation in the food stamp program is limited by 7 U.S.C.A. § 2014 (West Supp.1986), to "households." That term is defined by the act as "(1) an individual who lives alone or who, while living with others, customarily purchases food and prepared meals for home consumption separate and apart from the others, or (2) a group of individuals who live together and customarily purchase food and prepare meals together for home consumption...." 7 U.S.C.A. § 2012(i) (West Supp.1986).
When it was first passed in 1964, the definition of "household" in the Food Stamp Act specifically excluded "residents of an institution or boarding house." Food Stamp Act of 1964, Pub.L. No. 88-525, § 3, 78 Stat. 703, 703 (1964).1 In 1973, Congress passed the first exceptions to this institutional exclusion,...
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...2002 WL 32783973, at *5 (D.0r.2002) (legislative classification based on non-profit/for-profit entity upheld); Thurmond v. Block, 640 F.Supp. 588, 594 (W.D.Tenn.1986) Cultural and religious non-profits are not targeted by IMBRA for regulation because, like non-profits, such entities lack th......
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