Thurnwald v. A.E.

Decision Date08 May 2007
Docket NumberNo. 20050721.,20050721.
Citation2007 UT 38,163 P.3d 623
PartiesNikolas L. THURNWALD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. A.E., Defendant and Appellee.
CourtUtah Supreme Court

Michael J. Boyle, Daniel S. Drage, Ogden, for plaintiff.

David M. McConkie, David J. Hardy, Salt Lake City, for defendant.

On Certification from the Utah Court of Appeals.

DURRANT, Justice:

INTRODUCTION

¶ 1 By statute, an unwed father must, in order to preserve his paternal rights, file a paternity petition in court and register a notice of that petition with the Department of Health.1 These documents may be filed before the child's birth, but must be filed before the mother consents to adoption or relinquishes the child to an adoption agency.2 The mother is required to wait twenty-four hours after the child's birth before consenting to adoption or relinquishing the child.3 Thus, the typical unwed father is allowed a period that extends until twenty-four hours following the child's birth to file the requisite petition and to register a notice — or risk losing all rights to the child.

¶ 2 The question posed in this case is whether the period provided by statute in which unwed fathers may preserve their rights by filing a paternity action and registering notice should be enlarged when it expires on a weekend or holiday. More specifically, the question is whether rule 6 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure applies to enlarge these statutory deadlines. In this case, Nikolas Thurnwald did not file his paternity petition and register notice prior to his child's premature birth on Saturday morning of Labor Day weekend, and he was thereafter unable to file until the next Tuesday because the courts and state offices were closed. Meanwhile, the mother, A.E., relinquished their child to L.D.S. Family Services for adoption on Sunday morning, at the expiration of the twenty-four-hour waiting period. Thurnwald's paternity petition was dismissed by the district court because he had not filed his petition and registered with the state prior to A.E.'s relinquishment. Thurnwald argues on appeal that we should apply rule 6 and deem his petition timely.

¶ 3 This case presents us with two alternatives for interpreting the statutes: (1) we could conclude, as did the district court, that the twenty-four-hour postbirth period is designed solely for the benefit of the mother and that the unwed father's obligation is tied in all instances to the mother's relinquishment — not to any time period to which rule 6 applies; or (2) we could conclude that the effect of the statutes is to create a minimum filing period extending to twenty-four hours after the child's birth in which the unwed father has a right to file and register, and that this period is subject to extension under rule 6.

¶ 4 We hold that the first of these two alternatives, the one selected by the district court, is unconstitutional because it denies unwed fathers a postbirth time period in which to file and register if the birth falls on a weekend or holiday. When faced with two plausible interpretations of a statute, one constitutional and the other not, we are obligated to select the constitutional interpretation. Accordingly, we hold that rule 6 applies to enlarge the filing period until the end of the next business day in cases where the unwed father would not otherwise receive a full business day to file postbirth because part or all of the twenty-four-hour period falls on a holiday or weekend.

BACKGROUND

¶ 5 The district court dismissed Thurnwald's petition after granting summary judgment against him; so we recite the facts in the light most favorable to Thurnwald.4

¶ 6 Thurnwald and A.E. were involved in a romantic relationship for more than three years, and they lived together from August 2003 to April 2004. They were living together in Davis County in early 2004 when A.E. became pregnant with their child. Thurnwald and A.E. initially discussed marriage and continued to live together. But in April 2004, A.E. moved out and went to live with her grandparents. During most of the pregnancy, A.E. was covered by her grandmother's health insurance.

¶ 7 After A.E. moved out, she and Thurnwald continued to date. They also had discussions about how to best prepare for the birth of their child. About a month after A.E. went to live with her grandmother, Thurnwald and A.E. agreed that Thurnwald should move to Fruitland to work with his grandfather's company so he would have better working hours and be better able to afford to buy a house and support the child. In accordance with this plan, Thurnwald moved to Fruitland to start working and find a place to live. While there, he talked with A.E. on the phone daily and visited on the weekends. Approximately three weeks later, A.E. decided that she did not want to move to Fruitland; so Thurnwald moved back to Davis County.

¶ 8 The parties also discussed raising the child together and moving in with Thurnwald's parents. About a month before the child's birth, they discussed Thurnwald joining the military to provide a steady job and insurance for the family. And they discussed purchasing family insurance.

¶ 9 During A.E.'s pregnancy, Thurnwald went to all but one of her doctor appointments. He went shopping with A.E., and together they purchased several outfits for the baby. Thurnwald also purchased a car seat, bassinet, crib, diaper bag, diapers, and some blankets.

¶ 10 On approximately August 17, 2004, A.E. told Thurnwald that, with her grandmother's encouragement, she had gone to an appointment at L.D.S. Family Services to talk about adoption. The next day, Thurnwald and A.E. went to the L.D.S. Family Services office along with Thurnwald's mother. Thurnwald was told at that meeting that nothing was finalized but that A.E. had signed papers stating that L.D.S. Family Services would take care of the baby's birth if A.E. decided to give the baby up for adoption. The representative told Thurnwald and his mother to stop pressuring A.E. and let her make her own decision.

¶ 11 After the meeting at L.D.S. Family Services, A.E. told Thurnwald that she did not want to give the baby up for adoption and that he did not have anything to worry about. Nonetheless, between August 18 and the child's birth, Thurnwald's mother made several calls on Thurnwald's behalf to determine his rights regarding the child, including calls to a lawyer and to the Department of Health. The Department of Health told them to get a lawyer if they thought the baby might be placed for adoption. The lawyer told them he would look into it and get back to them.

¶ 12 On August 21, approximately two weeks before the child's birth, Thurnwald and A.E. together attended a baby shower for the child and received gifts to help care for a newborn. Approximately two days before the child's birth, Thurnwald and A.E. talked about selling his car and getting a car more suitable for the child.

¶ 13 On Saturday, September 4, 2004, A.E. went into premature labor. The child was born that day at 9:24 a.m. in Layton, Utah. Neither A.E. nor her family notified Thurnwald.

¶ 14 Thurnwald found out about the birth from one of A.E.'s co-workers at approximately 10:30 a.m. that same day when he called A.E.'s workplace to see if she wanted to go with him to a movie that night. Upon hearing that A.E. had given birth, Thurnwald called A.E. at the hospital. She told him that she was giving their child up for adoption. Thurnwald left work immediately and drove to the hospital. When he got there, A.E. refused to see him. Hospital personnel told Thurnwald that A.E. had registered as a "silent" patient and that he could not visit or speak with her or the child.

¶ 15 That same day, Thurnwald contacted his lawyer. But Thurnwald was unable to file the required paternity petition with the court and register with the Department of Health on Sunday or Monday because it was Labor Day weekend and state offices and courts were closed. Instead, he filed a paternity petition with the court on Tuesday, September 7, at 12:05 p.m., and filed a notice with the registrar of vital statistics on the same day. In conjunction with the petition for paternity, he also filed an Order to Show Cause to stop any adoption proceedings.

¶ 16 In the meantime, A.E. waited twenty-four hours as required by statute and then, on Sunday morning, relinquished custody of the child to L.D.S. Family Services for adoptive placement.

¶ 17 At a hearing on the paternity petition, the parties agreed to continue the matter based on an agreement with L.D.S. Family Services that it would not finalize the adoption until this matter was concluded. Thereafter, on July 22, 2005, the district court granted summary judgment against Thurnwald because he did not file his paternity petition and notice before A.E.'s relinquishment. The district court concluded that, because it was not "impossible for him to comply with the filing requirements of the statute," Thurnwald's right to due process was not violated. The district court then dismissed the paternity petition in an order dated August 17, 2005. Thurnwald originally appealed this case to us, but we transferred it to the court of appeals because we lacked original appellate jurisdiction over the case. After the parties filed their appellate briefs, the court of appeals certified this case back to us. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(b).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 18 Because Thurnwald appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment this case presents only questions of law that we review for correctness, "giv[ing] no deference to the district court's legal decisions."5

ANALYSIS

¶ 19 Utah's adoption statutes6 require unwed fathers who desire to preserve their paternal rights to both file a paternity petition in court and register a notice of that petition with the state registrar of vital statistics in the Department of Health.7 Both of these documents must be filed...

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