Thursby v. State

• Decision Date: 27 September 1966
• Citation: 223 A.2d 61
• Parties: Louis P. THURSBY, Jr., v. STATE of Maine.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 61

223 A.2d 61

Louis P. THURSBY, Jr., v. STATE of Maine.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Sept. 27, 1966.

Farris & Foley, by Richard A. Foley, Augusta, for plaintiff.

John W. Benoit, Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for defendant.

Before WEBBER, TAPLEY, MARDEN, and DUFRESNE, JJ.

DUFRESNE, Justice.

In January of 1957 Louis P. Thursby, Jr. was tried before the jury upon an indictment for murder to which he had pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. He was found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment for life at the Maine State Prison. He did not appeal and is presently serving his sentence. On September 18, 1963, Thursby filed in the Superior Court a petition for the issuance of the writ of coram nobis by which he sought to have the judgment of conviction vacated. His petition was dismissed upon motion and he appeals.

Technically, the question before us is the legal sufficiency of the petition. The petitioner seeks relief on the grounds that his trial, conviction and sentence were in violation of his constitutional rights under the federal and state constitutions (1) in that he was legally insane at the time of trial and could not properly prepare and participate in his own defense and (2) in that he was legally insane at the time of the commission of the offense. The Justice presiding at the coram nobis hearing ruled that petitioner's competency to stand trial, supported by the legal presumption of sanity and impliedly adjudicated by the Justice presiding at trial, could not be raised in a collateral proceeding such as coram nobis, and that the issue of insanity at the time of the offense, decided against the petitioner at trial, was a proper issue on appeal but not in post conviction remedies.

Petitioner did not support his alleged right to relief by any affidavit or offer of proof but relied exclusively in the hearing below upon the transcript of the evidence at the trial of the petitioner for murder at the January 1957 term of the Somerset County Superior Court, which was made available for consideration, and upon the admitted facts as alleged in his petition to the effect that 'Dr. Harold A. Pooler, Superintendent of the Bangor State Hospital, testified that the petitioner was insane at the time he committed the act and that he didn't know right from wrong when he committed the act. The testimony of Dr. Harold A. Pooler was unrebutted by the State of Maine and no evidence that petitioner was sane at the time of the commission of the offense was presented by the State of Maine.' And we may add in this connection that the record shows that Dr. Pooler further testified that 'he (Thursby) was mentally ill at this time, or, is mentally ill at this time.' In the light of the transcript of the evidence at the murder trial and the testimony admittedly given by the State psychiatrist, was the petitioner denied due process of law vitiating his conviction of murder? We answer in the negative.

Initially, let us note that the present petition for the writ of coram nobis was brought under the provisions of Public Laws of Maine, 1961, Chapter 131. Three days after the date of the petition, this statutory remedy of coram nobis was expressly repealed and replaced by our present post conviction habeas corpus proceedings provided by Public Laws of Maine, 1963, Chapter 310, now 14 M.R.S.A. § 5502 et seq. The present petition however qualifies within the statutory concept of an action pending at the time of the repeal so as not to be affected thereby. R.S.1954, c. 10, § 21, as amended by P.L.1961, c. 417, § 6, now 1 M.R.S.A. § 302.

From the transcript of the evidence at the murder trial, we find that Thursby at the time of his trial in January 1957, was 22 years of age. His father stated that young Thursby was afflicted from birth to the present time, with recurring spells of headaches which happened 'every two or three months maybe' and which caused him to go to bed for some two, three, four, eight or ten hours and to vomit and sweat. He would feel wobbly the next day. Pills had been prescribed for this condition. His schooling had taken him to the tenth grade. He was in the navy some two years or more. His mother confirmed these periodic headache spells during the two to three years next prior to the time of trial, as she had not had the child to bring up because of their marital separation. She testified that the petitioner had a mean head cold the day before the tragedy, which happened on September 25, 1956. Two officers testified that Thursby orally admitted that he had shot the deceased 5 times but disclosed no motive for the killing, except that prior to his leaving the house with his gun, he had the urge to kill something, a rabbit, squirrel or bird. Sheriff Henderson further stated that Thursby said that 'as he brought the gun up and got Mr. Towle in his sights, he knew it was the wrong thing to do, but that he did it.' From Dr. Harold A. Pooler, the Superintendent of the Bangor State Hospital at the time, called to the stand by the defense, we learn that the petitioner was committed to the hospital for observation on October 3, 1956. According to the doctor, young Thursby seemed rather dull, talked slowly but relevantly and coherently. He was rather vague and related that he did not know just what happened at the time of the accident, but remembered having a severe headache. He further stated that he had no reason to do what he had done and that he was very sorry, but that he did not seem to be himself and that it did not seem as though it was he that did it. The psychologist at the hospital, so Doctor Pooler testified, found that Thursby was a borderline intelligence case, and that he seemed rather dull and indifferent in the mental tests to the extent that the psychologist felt that he was not functioning on a normal level. Dr. Pooler referred to reports of behavior at work which he termed definitely abnormal, but the nature thereof was not disclosed. From these stated reports, the patient's recorded behavior in the hospital and from his personal observation, Dr. Pooler concluded that Louis P. Thursby, Jr., was insane at the time that he committed the act, and that he did not know right from wrong when he committed the act.

It is conceded that the petitioner had been committed to the Bangor State Hospital by order of the Superior Court for observation under R.S.1954, c. 27, § 118, in order that 'the truth or falsity of the plea (of insanity) may be ascertained.' We must assume that within the first 3 days of the January term of the Superior Court for Somerset County, the superintendent of the hospital reported to the Court that Thursby's detention at the hospital was no longer required for purposes of observation and the Court ordered his return for purposes of trial. The nature of the report made by the superintendent to the Court is not disclosed, but we may suppose that it contained the same conclusions expressed by Dr. Pooler in his testimony. It appears that Thursby was represented by an attorney of his choice at the murder trial. He asserted no claim in the coram nobis proceedings to the effect that he was inadequately or incompetently represented at trial. It is evident that counsel made full use of Dr. Pooler's testimony in support of Thursby's defense of insanity at the time of the offense, but no suggestion was made to the Court so far as the record shows, that Thursby was incompetent to stand trial. Such a claim was made for the first time in these post conviction proceedings.

In Dwyer v. State of Maine, 151 Me. 382, 120 A.2d 276, our Court recognized that the writ of error coram nobis was the proper common law vehicle to establish one's constitutional rights, upon a showing of an unjust deprivation thereof. The due process clause of our Maine Constitution, Article 1, Section 6, which guarantees a person against deprivation of life liberty, property or privileges, except by 'judgment of his peers or the law of the land' secures to the individual the availability of the process and proceedings of the common law. Dwyer, supra, at page 392, 120 A.2d 276. Our coram nobis statute, P.L.1961, c. 131, R.S.1954, c. 126-A, in its remedial provisions against sentences imposed in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of Maine, was merely declaratory of the common law.

The trial, conviction or sentencing of a person charged with a criminal offense, while he is legally incompetent violates his constitutional rights of due process. People v. Anderson, 31 Ill.2d 262, 201 N.E.2d 394 (1964); Brown v. People, 8 Ill.2d 540, 134 N.E.2d 760 (1956); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 86 S.Ct. 836, 15 L.Ed.2d 815 (March 7, 1966); Bishop v. United States, 350 U.S. 961, 76 S.Ct. 440, 100 L.Ed. 835 (1956).

Competence to stand trial sufficient to meet the requirements of due process means that the accused is capable of understanding the nature and object of the charges and proceedings against him, of comprehending his own condition in reference thereto, and of conducting in cooperation with his counsel his defense in a rational and reasonable manner. Glenn v. People, 9 Ill.2d 335, 137 N.E.2d 336 (1956); Withers v. People, 23 Ill.2d 131, 177 N.E.2d 203 (1961); Commonwealth v. Strickland, 375 S.W.2d 701, (Ky.1964).

'(S)anity for the purpose of present triability * * * is determined by appraising the present ability of the accused to so understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings taken against him as to be able to conduct his own defense in a rational manner.' Magenton v. State, 76 S.D. 512, 81 N.W.2d 894 at 897, (1957).

Competence to stand trial as above understood is a necessary ingredient of procedural due process under Article 1, section 6, of the Constitution of Maine, which states that '(i)n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have a right to be heard by himself and his counsel, or either, at his election.' (Emphasis supplied.) Mental...