Thurston County v. Tenino Stone Quarries, Inc.

Citation44 Wash. 351,87 P. 634
PartiesTHURSTON COUNTY v. TENINO STONE QUARRIES, INC.
Decision Date10 November 1906
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Washington

Appeal from Superior Court, Thurston County; O. V. Linn, Judge.

Action by the county of Thurston by and through its board of county commissioners, to wit, W. H. Mitchell and others, against the Tenino Stone Quarries, Incorporated. From a judgment for defendant, plaintiffs appeal. Reversed.

P. M. Troy, for appellants.

Vance &amp Mitchell, for respondent.

ROOT J.

This action was commenced by appellants for the collection of road poll taxes under the provisions of the statutes as found in the Session Laws of 1903, p. 223, c. 119, and as amended in 1905 and appearing at page 297, c. 156 of the published Session Laws of 1905. The poll taxes sought to be collected were those alleged to be due from certain employés of respondent. The trial court held the statute unconstitutional. From a judgment dismissing the action, this appeal is taken.

Section 1 of the act of 1903, as amended in 1905, reads as follows 'Every male inhabitant of this state between the ages of twenty-one and fifty years, outside the limits of an incorporated city or town, shall annually pay a road poll tax of two dollars, which shall be due and payable in money without exemption whatsoever on the first day of March in each year. All poll taxes shall be paid into the district road and bridge fund of the district in which the same shall be collected.' It is contended by respondent that this section of the statute is invalid as being in conflict with sections 3 and 12 of article 1 of the state Constitution, and contrary to the fourteenth amendment of the federal Constitution. The sections of the state Constitution referred to are as follows:

'Sec. 3. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.'

'Sec. 12. No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation, other than municipal, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not legally belong to all citizens or corporations.'

In the able briefs presented by each side, the case of State v. Ide, 35 Wash. 576, 77 P. 961, 67 L. R. A. 280, 102 Am. St. Rep. 914, is cited and relied upon. That was a case involving the validity of an ordinance, of a city of the third class, which provided for the collection of a poll tax from every male inhabitant of the city between the ages of 21 and 50 years, and not a member of any volunteer fire company of the city. Said ordinance was enacted pursuant to the provisions of section 938, Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. Said statute was necessarily limited by section 9 of article 7, of the state Constitution, which provides that 'for all corporate purposes, all municipal corporations may be vested with authority to assess and collect taxes, and such taxes shall be uniform in respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body levying the same.' It was urged by the appellant in that case, and the contention was upheld by this court, that the Legislature, under the constitutional provision just quoted, had no power to authorize a municipality to enact an ordinance for the levying and enforcement of a poll tax that was not uniform as to persons; that the provision in the ordinance excepting females, firemen, and males over 50 and under 21 years of age rendered said ordinance obnoxious to this section of the Constitution. The following excerpt from the opinion rendered in that case will show what was there involved. 'While it is conceded by counsel for appellant that the Legislature may, in the absence of constitutional restrictions, 'confer upon a city almost supreme power over local taxation,' yet they contend that the tax in question, by reason of its lack of uniformity, is repugnant to section 9 of article 7 of our Constitution, and therefore void. That section of article 7 reads as follows: 'The Legislature may vest the corporate authorities of cities, towns, and villages with power to make local improvements by special assessment, or by special taxation, of property benefited. For all corporate purposes, all municipal corporations may be vested with authority to assess and collect taxes, and such taxes shall be uniform in respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body levying the same.' Section 12 of article 11 of the Constitution provides that 'The Legislature shall have no power to impose taxes upon * * * cities * * * or upon the inhabitants or property thereof, for * * * city * * * purposes, but may, by general laws, vest in the corporate authorities thereof the power to assess and collect taxes for such purposes.' These two provisions are the only ones relating to the vesting of the power of taxation in municipal corporations. And they clearly indicate, especially the latter, that the Legislature may authorize the taxation, by cities, of persons, as well as property, within their limits. Conceding, as we must that the Legislature had the right to delegate to cities of the third class the power to levy poll taxes on the inhabitants thereof, the question naturally arises whether, in this instance, they exercised the power in conformity with the Constitution.'

It is suggested by appellants, and conceded by respondent that section 9 of article 7 does not apply to the facts of the case at bar, and further that there is no provision in the state Constitution requiring a poll tax to be uniform as to persons unless sections 3 and 12 of article 1 have that effect. The power to levy and enforce the payment of taxes is an incident of sovereignty and, under a state Constitution like ours, is vested in the lawmaking department of the government. In the absence of any constitutional inhibition, it must be conceded that the Legislature may provide for the levy and enforcement of a poll tax upon any or all of the citizens of the state, regardless of the question of uniformity. We are, therefore, brought to the question of whether said sections 3 and 12 of article 1 are infringed by the statute now before us. Respondent urges that the statute, by limiting the tax to male inhabitants between the ages of 21 and 50, discriminates in favor of, and extends a special privilege and immunity to, all other inhabitants, within the meaning of the constitutional provision above cited, and that the enforcement of such a statute would in effect amount to the taking of property without due process of law. Appellants maintain that the nature and purpose of a poll tax is such that its application should not be universal, but by means of appropriate classifications, and that this requirement is fittingly and legally observed in the statute in question. We think this contention is sound, and should be upheld. The propriety of the enactment and enforcement of statutes providing for a poll tax has been recognized ever since, and prior to, the foundation of our government. In our own commonwealth the first statute of this character was enacted in 1854, Laws 1854, p. 331. In this and many other states, classifications similar to that here found have been provided. The reason for such classifications is found in the nature of the subject-matter itself. It was formerly the common practice and is yet, if we are not incorrectly informed, for persons subject to poll tax to 'work out' said tax upon the public highways. The inappropriateness of women being called upon to render such a service to the state is readily apparent. Other reasons for the exemption of females may be found in the fact that by law they are denied various privileges held and exercised by males upon whom this tax may be levied, and it has always been the policy of the law to show some deference to women by reason of the physical limitations imposed by nature. That there is an age when, by reason of immaturity, the imposition of this public service or tax should not be made is evident, as is likewise the proposition that an age may be reached when a man should not be called upon to render this character of service or pay a per capita tax. It is contended that the fixing of the ages at 21 and 50 is arbitrary. This is true; but the nature of the subject-matter makes it essential that arbitrary limits should be established. The same contention might be made with reference to the statute which fixes the completion of 21 years as a prerequisite to the privileges and obligations of legal manhood. Similar statutes limit the years during which one may become, or may be required to become, a member of the militia or to serve upon a jury. It is doubtless true that people between the ages of 21 and 50 years, as a class, use the highways much more than those below the one or above the other of the limits mentioned.

Anent the arbitrariness of this law, respondent suggests this question: 'Why should a man 49 years of age, living upon his farm by the side of a certain road, be compelled to pay a poll tax, while his brother, 51 years of age, with equally good health and strength, living upon an adjoining farm of like character and equal value, by the side of the same highway, is not subjected to such exactment?' The answer is simply this: Under such a law the older brother would have been subject to such tax for two years before the younger became of age. The latter will be exempt when he shall have completed the period through which the other has passed. The character and value of the property of each has no bearing upon the question. The underlying nature and purpose of a poll tax are disassociated entirely from any consideration of property. The state accords to every inhabitant, regardless of his property possessions, the protection and advantages of its laws and public institutions. By reason of these personal guaranties...

To continue reading

Request your trial
12 cases
  • Sifferman v. Chelan Cnty.
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • September 28, 2021
    ...party can test the validity of the tax, or the truthfulness of the record." Id. at 174, 34 P. 461. In Thurston County v. Tenino Stone Quarries, Inc. , 44 Wash. 351, 359, 87 P. 634 (1906), the court declined to extend the holding in Baldwin where there existed "an opportunity to test the leg......
  • Moody v. Hagen
    • United States
    • North Dakota Supreme Court
    • April 4, 1917
    ... ... County reversing an order of the County Court and fixing ... service, militia, etc., is valid. Thurston County v ... Tenino Stone Quarries, 44 Wash ... ...
  • Breedlove v. Suttles, 9
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • December 6, 1937
    ...of the tax as harsh and unjust. See Faribault v. Misener, 20 Minn. 396, 398 (Gil. 347); Thurston County v. Tenino Stone Quarries, 44 Wash. 351, 355, 87 P. 634, 9 L.R.A.(N.S.) 306, 12 Ann.Cas. 314; Salt Lake City v. Wilson, 46 Utah 60, 66 et seq., 148 P. 1104. Collection from minors would be......
  • City of Spokane v. Horton
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • December 7, 2017
    ...135 Wash. 517, 520, 238 P. 579 (1925) ; Nipges v. Thornton, 119 Wash. 464, 470, 206 P. 17 (1922) ; Thurston County v. Tenino Stone Quarries, Inc., 44 Wash. 351, 354-56, 87 P. 634 (1906).6 The City argues that respondents had no authority to consider the legality of the ordinance and that we......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT