Tibbels v. People
Decision Date | 10 January 2022 |
Docket Number | 20SC22 |
Citation | 2022 CO 1 |
Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Parties | Ernest Joseph Tibbels, Petitioner/Cross-Respondent v. The People of the State of Colorado, Respondent/Cross-Petitioner |
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals Court of Appeals Case No. 17CA620
Attorneys for Petitioner/Cross-Respondent: Megan A. Ring Public Defender Meredith K. Rose, Deputy Public Defender Denver, Colorado
Attorneys for Respondent/Cross-Petitioner: Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General Jacob R. Lofgren, Assistant Attorney General Denver, Colorado
OPINION
¶1 This case, a companion case to Pettigrew v. People, 2022 CO 2, __P.3d__, which we also decide today, requires us to consider again whether a trial court's comments to a jury venire attempting to explain the concept of reasonable doubt effectively lowered the prosecution's burden of proof. Although we granted certiorari to consider three questions, [1] these questions really present two issues for our determination. First, we must decide the proper test for determining whether a trial court's comments to prospective jurors lowered the prosecution's burden of proof. Second, we must consider whether the example that the trial court used here to explain the concept of reasonable doubt lowered the prosecution's burden of proof.
¶2 We now conclude that the proper test for determining whether a trial court's statements to the jury lowered the prosecution's burden of proof is a functional one. Specifically, an appellate court must ask whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the court's statements, in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record, to allow a conviction based on a standard lower than beyond a reasonable doubt. In this way, statements made to the venire during voir dire can, in context, have the effect of instructing the jury on the law to be applied, whether or not such statements can be characterized as formal "instructions," and other facts and circumstances of the trial may well inform the question of how the jury would reasonably have understood such statements.
¶3 Applying the foregoing standard to the specific facts presented here, in which the court equated the concept of reasonable doubt to the doubt that a prospective homebuyer would have upon observing a structurally significant, floor-to-ceiling crack in the home's foundation, we further conclude that it is reasonably likely that the jury understood the court's statements to allow a conviction on a standard lower than beyond a reasonable doubt, which constitutes structural error.
¶4 Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the division below.
¶5 On March 4, 2016, Ernest Tibbels called 911 while experiencing a mental health crisis. Commerce City police officers responded to the call and, rather than taking Tibbels to a hospital as he had requested, arrested him under the mistaken belief that he was violating the terms of a protection order.
¶6 The officers transported Tibbels to the Adams County Detention Facility, where he resisted the officers' attempts to complete the booking process. Because he was agitated and combative, the officers did not remove his handcuffs or take him through the body scanner, which would have required removing the handcuffs. Instead, they took him to the so-called "booking quiet room," where they could pat him down, remove his handcuffs, and let him sit and cool down.
¶7 Approximately one hour later, an officer walked by the quiet room and noticed that Tibbels had torn pieces from his shirt and placed the pieces around his neck. Tibbels threatened to kill himself and anyone else who entered the quiet room and then hit the window of that room with a sharpened metal spike. Officers called for lethal cover, locked down the jail, and repeatedly ordered Tibbels to set the spike down. Although Tibbels did not initially comply, he eventually dropped the spike and complied with requests to lie down with his hands behind his back, at which point officers entered the room, re-handcuffed him, placed him in a restraint chair, and confiscated the three-inch long spike.
¶8 The prosecution subsequently charged Tibbels with first degree introduction of contraband, felony menacing, and first degree possession of contraband, and the case proceeded to trial.
¶9 During voir dire of the prospective jurors, the trial court read a portion of the pattern instruction defining "reasonable doubt." The court, however, then immediately undermined that definition, stating,
¶10 The trial court then offered the following as an illustration of reasonable doubt:
¶11 A prospective juror answered that she would not buy the house because she would not want a house with a bad foundation.
¶12 The trial court continued:
¶13 The trial court returned to this example later during voir dire, telling the prospective jurors that the prosecution's burden is
¶14 Defense counsel did not object to the court's example. Nor did the trial court ever withdraw its example or instruct the jury to disregard it.
¶15 At the conclusion of the evidence the court instructed the jury on the applicable law and gave the pattern jury instruction on reasonable doubt. The jury ultimately found Tibbels guilty of possession of contraband but acquitted him of the other two charges.
¶16 Tibbels appealed, arguing that the trial court's example lowered the prosecution's burden of proof by setting too high a standard for what qualifies as reasonable doubt and that this was structural error requiring reversal. In a split, published opinion, a division of the court of appeals affirmed Tibbels's conviction. People v. Tibbels, 2019 COA 175, 490 P.3d 517.
¶17 As pertinent here, the majority concluded that the trial court's reasonable doubt illustration did not unconstitutionally lower the prosecution's burden of proof. Id. at ¶ 35, 490 P.3d at 525. The majority reached this conclusion for five reasons: (1) the trial court had characterized its illustration as an "example" and said that the attorneys would do a better job of explaining reasonable doubt; (2) the illustration was given only during the jury selection portion of the trial; (3) the court told the prospective jurors that, at the conclusion of the evidence, it would tell the jurors the rules of law that they were to use in reaching their verdict and would provide copies of those rules to the jury, and the court never provided its illustration in writing; (4) before giving its illustration and again at the close of the evidence, the court properly instructed the jury on the meaning of reasonable doubt; and (5) the jury never indicated any confusion about reasonable doubt, and the majority therefore presumed that the jury understood and followed the trial court's instructions. Id. at ¶¶ 35-39, 490 P.3d at 525.
¶18 The majority nonetheless "strongly discourage[d]" trial courts from using "everyday illustrations" to explain the concept of reasonable doubt, id. at ¶ 40, 490 P.3d at 525, because such illustrations "run the risk of confusing jurors, lowering the prosecution's burden of proof, and diminishing the presumption of innocence," id. at ¶ 23 490 P.3d at 523. Indeed, the majority noted that divisions of the court of appeals had repeatedly discouraged trial courts from using such illustrations to explain reasonable doubt, the presumption of innocence, and other legal...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
People v. Sanders
...the use of a puzzle analogy can be problematic, especially if the speaker quantifies the concept of reasonable doubt); see also Tibbels v. People , 2022 CO 1, ¶ 49, 501 P.3d 792 (concluding that a judge's use of a crack-in-the-foundation illustration to explain reasonable doubt improperly l......
-
People v. Vialpando
...the burden of proof by making it seem easy to ascertain. We recognize that analogies like these are perilous and unhelpful. See Tibbels v. People , 2022 CO 1, ¶ 25, 501 P.3d 792, 797. Nevertheless, the trial court instructed the jury multiple times that they must follow only the instruction......
-
Pettigrew v. People
...statements to the prospective jurors by addressing our standard of review. We then address the applicable law, discussed more fully in Tibbels, ¶¶ 23-43, which we also today, and we apply those principles to the facts before us. 1. Standard of Review ¶31 We review de novo the question of wh......
-
People v. Shockey
... ... True, but ... this is a distinction without a difference because a ... jury's finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the ... prosecution failed to prove an element beyond a reasonable ... doubt holds the prosecution to its burden. See Tibbels v ... People , 2022 CO 1, ¶ 23 ("The Due Process ... Clause of the United States Constitution 'protects the ... accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a ... reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the ... crime with which [they are] charged.'" (quoting ... In re ... ...
-
Summaries of Published Opinions
...of Published Opinions Vol. 51, No. 3 [Page 89] Colorado Lawyer March, 2022 FROM THE COURTS COLORADO SUPREME COURT January 10, 2022 2022 CO 1. No. 20SC22. Tibbels v. People. Jury Instructions—Reasonable Doubt. In this case, the Supreme Court considered whether statements the trial court made......