Tibes v. Hanseatic Moving Servs.

Decision Date02 May 2022
Docket Number21-CV-3293 (RPK) (TAM)
PartiesSARAH TIBES and RAOUL TIBES, Plaintiffs, v. HANSEATIC MOVING SERVICES, LLC, Defendant. HANSEATIC MOVING SERVICES, LLC, Third-Party Plaintiff, v. AG MOVING SERVICES, LLC, Third-Party Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

TARYN A. MERKL UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

On October 5, 2020, Plaintiffs Sarah Tibes and Raoul Tibes (Plaintiffs) filed a complaint in New York State Supreme Court to recover damages for injuries Sarah Tibes suffered on or about October 31, 2017, from a slip and fall due to allegedly defective or unsecured cardboard placed on the floor by Defendant Hanseatic Moving Services, LLC (Hanseatic) and Third-Party Defendant AG Moving Services, LLC (AG). (See State Court Complaint (“Compl.”), ECF No. 1-2 & ECF No 19-3, ¶¶ 14-20; Pls.' Mem. in Support (“Pls.' Mem.”), ECF No. 19-1, at 4.) After impleading Third-Party Defendant AG on January 29, 2021 Defendant Hanseatic removed the case to federal court on June 11, 2021. (Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1; Third-Party Summons and Complaint, ECF No. 19-6.) Plaintiffs now move for leave to amend the complaint to add direct claims against Third-Party Defendant AG. (See Pls.' Mot. to Amend (“Mot.”), ECF No. 19.) For the reasons discussed herein, Plaintiffs' motion is granted.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY[1]

As noted above, this case concerns injuries Plaintiff Sarah Tibes suffered due to a slip and fall. A key question in this case is which moving company had control over the premises where she was injured. In their original state court complaint filed on or about October 5, 2020, Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant Hanseatic maintained the premises where Plaintiff Sarah Tibes was injured at the time of her fall. (See Compl., ECF No. 19-3, ¶¶ 11-14.) However, around November 24, 2020, Defendant Hanseatic sent a tender letter to AG outlining Plaintiffs' claims and explaining that AG was subcontracted to perform all moving services for Plaintiffs' move. (See Pls.' Mem., ECF No 19-1, at 4 (citing Tender Letter, ECF No. 19-5).) On January 29, 2021, Defendant Hanseatic impleaded AG as a third-party defendant in the state court action. (Id. (citing Third-Party Summons and Complaint, ECF No. 19-6).) Thereafter, on May 18, 2021, Plaintiffs filed an additional complaint in New York State Supreme Court asserting direct claims against AG, as to which Plaintiffs claim AG refused to accept service. (Id. at 3 (citing Additional Third-Party Summons and Complaint, ECF No. 19-9; Email Refusing Service, ECF No. 19-11); see also Aff. of Service as to AG, ECF No. 19-10.) AG has yet to appear or otherwise answer in the state court action. (Id.) On June 11, 2021, Defendant Hanseatic removed the case to this Court. (Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1.)

On October 4, 2021, the Court held an initial conference. (Oct. 4, 2021 ECF Minute Entry and Order.) The Court adopted the parties' proposed discovery schedule and set a deadline of February 18, 2022, to join new parties or amend the pleadings. (Id.) On February 18, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental summons and amended complaint seeking to add AG, currently in the case as a third-party defendant, as a direct defendant in the action. (See Mot., ECF No. 19; Pls.' Mem., ECF No. 19-1, at 1.) The Honorable Rachel P. Kovner referred this motion to the undersigned Magistrate Judge. (Feb. 22, 2022 ECF Referral Order.) This Court then directed Plaintiffs to file (1) a letter brief explaining why the Court should grant leave to file an amended complaint, (2) the proposed amended complaint, and (3) a redline comparison of the original and proposed amended complaints. (Feb. 22, 2022 ECF Order.)

On March 1, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in support of their motion to amend, to which Third-Party Defendant AG responded on March 15, 2022. (Pls.' Reply in Support (“Pls.' Reply”), ECF No. 20; AG Resp., ECF No. 21.) AG argues that they should not be added as a direct defendant because the proposed amended complaint does not relate back to the original complaint. (See AG Resp., ECF No. 21, at 3.) On March 24, 2022, the Court held a status conference, which included oral argument on the motion to amend. (Mar. 24, 2022 ECF Minute Entry and Order.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiffs' motion to amend.[2]

DISCUSSION
I. Legal Standards
A. Leave to Amend

“The decision to grant or deny leave to amend is within the trial court's discretion.” Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA v. PVT Ltd., 338 F.R.D. 579, 583 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330 (1971)). Under Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts “should freely give leave” to amend pleadings “when justice so requires.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2); see also Saravia v. Royal Guard Fence Co., No. 19-CV-2086 (DRH) (SIL), 2020 WL 5231696, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2020) (explaining that parties should generally “be allowed to amend their pleadings . . . unless there is evidence of undue delay, bad faith, dilatory tactics, undue prejudice to the party to be served with the proposed pleading, or futility” (quotation marks omitted)). If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by the party seeking leave to amend “may be a proper subject of relief, ” there is a preference that the party “be afforded the opportunity to test the claim on its merits.” United States ex rel. Maritime Admin. v. Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 889 F.2d 1248, 1254 (2d Cir. 1989); see also Loreley Fin. (Jersey) No. 3 Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Sec., LLC, 797 F.3d 160, 190 (2d Cir. 2015) (Loreley Fin.) (explaining that the “permissive standard” of Rule 15 is consistent with the Second Circuit's “strong preference for resolving disputes on the merits”).

B. Relation Back

Where the relevant statute of limitations has run on claims asserted in an original pleading, “an amendment that ‘changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted' must be found to ‘relate[ ] back to the date of the original pleading' in order to be timely.” Girau v. Europower, Inc., 317 F.R.D. 414, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)); see also Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 560 U.S. 538, 547 (2010); Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 517 (2d Cir. 2013). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)(A) and the Advisory Committee's note to the 1991 amendment to the rule, “if the applicable statute of limitations is determined by state law . . . courts should assess both the state and federal relation back doctrines and apply whichever law is more generous.” Anderson v. City of Mount Vernon, No. 09-CV-7082 (ER) (PED), 2014 WL 1877092, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014) (citing Wilson v. City of New York, No. 03-CV-2495 (RLC), 2006 WL 2528468, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2006)).

Under the New York relation-back doctrine, a plaintiff must generally demonstrate that:

(1) both claims arose out of same conduct, transaction or occurrence,
(2) the new party is ‘united in interest' with the original defendant, and by reason of that relationship can be charged with such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits and (3) the new party knew or should have known that, but for [a] mistake by plaintiff as to the identity of the proper parties, the action would have been brought against him as well.

Buran v. Coupal, 87 N.Y.2d 173, 178 (1995); see also Amaya v. Garden City Irrigation, Inc., 645 F.Supp.2d 116, 121-22 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Roseman v. Baranowski, 990 N.Y.S.2d 621, 623 (N.Y. A.D.2d Dep't 2014); Lopez v. Wyckoff Hgts. Med. Ctr., 913 N.Y.S.2d 230, 232 (N.Y. A.D.2d Dep't 2010); Schiavone v. Victory Mem. Hosp., 738 N.Y.S.2d 87, 89 (N.Y. A.D.2d Dep't 2002). It is a plaintiff's burden to establish the applicability of the relation-back doctrine by submitting evidentiary facts. Kaczmarek v. Benedictine Hosp., 575 N.Y.S.2d 617, 619 (N.Y. A.D.3d Dep't 1991) (observing that defendants “are united in interest for purposes of [New York law] only when one defendant is responsible for the acts or omissions of another” (quoting McLaughlin, Practice Commentaries, McKinney's Cons. Laws of NY, Book 7B, CPLR C203:3, at 147)); see also Rivera v. Wyckoff Heights Med. Ctr., 107 N.Y.S.3d 55, 56-58 (N.Y. A.D.2d Dep't 2019); Anderson, 2014 WL 1877092, at *3.

“The question of unity of interest is to be determined from an examination of (1) the jural relationship of the parties whose interests are said to be united and (2) the nature of the claim asserted against them by the plaintiff.” Connell v. Hayden, 443 N.Y.S.2d 383, 393 (N.Y. A.D.2d Dep't 1981).

As the Honorable Frederic Block has observed, [t]he rather lofty phrase ‘jural relationship' simply means a legal relationship giving rise to potential liability.” Amaya, 645 F.Supp.2d at 122; see also Connell, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 393 (“In other words, when because of some legal relationship between the defendants they necessarily have the same defenses to the plaintiff's claim, they will stand or fall together and are therefore united in interest.”).

II. Analysis

In this case, aside from the allegations concerning the identity of the new defendant, Plaintiffs' proposed amended complaint is virtually identical to the original pleadings and alleges the same injuries Plaintiff Sarah Tibes suffered on October 31, 2017, when she slipped and fell due to allegedly defective or unsecured cardboard placed on the floor. (Compare Proposed Amended Complaint (“PAC”), ECF No. 20, with Compl., ECF No. 19-3.)[3] Additionally, Plaintiffs allege the same two causes of action. (Compare PAC, ECF No. 20, at 6-9, w...

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