Tice's Estate v. Tice

Decision Date05 January 1962
Docket NumberNo. 10341,10341
PartiesIn the Matter of the ESTATE of Alfred Herbert TICE, Deceased, Edna Josie Peterson, Petitioner for Removal of Administratrix with Will Annexed, Appellant, v. Jennie TICE, Administratrix with Will Annexed, Respondent.
CourtMontana Supreme Court

Wm. R. Taylor (argued orally), Deer Lodge, Malcolm MacCalman, Deer Lodge, Robert J. Boyd (argued orally), Anaconda, for appellant.

Harold L. McChesney (argued orally), Philipsburg, Wade J. Dahood (argued orally), Anaconda, for respondent.

CASTLES, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order refusing to remove an administratrix with will annexed.

The petition for revocation of letters testamentary was by a legatee under the will of Alfred Herbert Tice, who died January 10, 1959. The administratrix with will annexed hereinafter will be referred to as the administratrix. The administratrix is the widow of the deceased testator. Deceased left a will which named the Flint Creek Valley Bank as executor. The Bank declined to act. On the same day, the widow filed her petition for probate of the will. Under its terms she was to receive one-third of the estate with the balance to go to other named legatees. The widow was appointed administratrix on February 24, 1959. She filed an approved surety bond in the amount of $34,000.00.

On March 24, 1959, and before the filing of the inventory and appraisement, the administratrix, after petition and hearing, was awarded $250 per month for a widow's allowance until further order of the court. The petition for widow's allowance was filed asserting that the estate had a probable value of $65,000 and an annual income of $4,000.

On May 5, 1959, inventory and appraisement was filed listing assets in the amount of $49,420.23, which included real estate valued at $24,050.00 and personal property valued at $25,370.23. By the terms of the will, the widow was to receive one-third of the net estate. The specific legacies total $32.500. On December 28, 1959, the widow renounced the will and elected to take her dower and/or legal share of the estate.

On October 1, 1959, the administratrix petitioned for approval of certain necessary repairs made to a dwelling house, as estate property, in the month of July, 1959. Notice of hearing was given, no objections were filed, and the court confirmed the expenditure of $2,343.10 for repairs to the dwelling house.

On April 25, 1960, the administratrix filed a second petition requesting confirmation of repairs made to the same dwelling between August and December, 1959. Objections were filed and after hearing the court allowed certain costs in the amount of $980.15, disallowing $1,099.18. This order was made on January 13, 1961. On January 24, 1961, one of counsel for appellant, a legatee, filed written objections to the court's order of January 13, 1961, which had allowed part of the costs of repairs. These objections were never passed upon by the probate court. Then, on March 14, 1961, appellant petitioned for removal of the administratrix. Hearing was had on this petition for removal on April 4, 1961, at which time counsel for the administratrix filed objections to the petition for removal and stated that all final reports in the estate were prepared and ready for filing.

The administratrix, during all the time of the administration, was attempting to collect debts due the estate and was attempting to find buyers for certain portions of real property so that the payment of legacies under terms of the will could be made.

In July of 1960 she filed a petition for an order to sell part of the real property. On August 2, 1960, objections to the petition for sale of real property were filed on behalf of one legatee. After stipulation of respective counsel, sales were made and confirmed on the basis that the change in character from real property to personal property would not effect a change in the distribution of the estate.

Finally, on April 21, 1961, the court entered its order denying the petition for removal of the administratrix and ordered the filing of final accounting and other matters to place the estate in a condition to be closed.

It is from this order denying the petition for removal of the administratrix that the appeal is taken, and the single specification of error goes to that order.

The petition for removal alleges that [the administratrix] 'has purposely delayed terminating the administration of said estate in order that she may consume and have for her sole use and benefit the whole of the estate and thus deprive the legatees and distributees named in the Last Will and Testament of the decedent of their interests therein, and to exclude them from any share therein.'

At the hearing the only evidence adduced bearing on the issue was from the administratrix who testified generally that she had done everything she could to properly conserve the estate and pay the legacies. But, appellant assets that the probate file, without more, reveals sufficient proof to cause the removal of the administratrix.

In the probate file, it is averred in counsels' petition in opposition to the removal:

'That as to the automobile made the basis of opposition in the Petition for Removal the said Administratrix can prove by clear and convincing evidence that said automobile was purchased by the decedent for her as a gift and this gift is subject to proof by independent testimony and as a consequence the said automobile is not an asset of the said estate.'

The petition for removal had alleged that there was a failure to dispose of depreciating property consisting of an automobile. In the inventory and appraisement the automobile was referred to as follows:

'One (1) new 1959 * * * sedan * * * purchase price $2,355.00 (Deceased entered into a contract for purchase of the above-described automobile prior to date of death. Vehicle purchased with monies from the estate account. Cash inventoried as of date of death.) Therefore, value of automobile is not included in appraisement of estate.'

Of course, it immediately appears from this and from the creditor's claim, showing the automobile purchase, that there is a question as to accountability and ownership of the auto. However, opportunity for questioning the final accounting remains. It should be noted that no attempt to conceal is either charged or apparent.

The appellant asserts such a conflict of interest appears, yes, even more an adverse and hostile position to the legatees, that she should be removed. For this assertion, in addition to the claim to the auto, appellant also groups the matter of claiming repairs to the dwelling and the disallowance of part of the claim, as well as sale of the real property and the renunciation under the terms of the will by the widow as factors showing such an adverse interest as to cause removal.

As previously set forth, the administratrix testified at the hearing. These things can be stated, as to her testimony:

1. She did not take any action without consulting her attorney, and attended to all affairs of the estate as she was instructed by her attorney.

2. The legacies could not be paid because there was not enough money in the estate.

3. None of the assets have been lost or injured by delay.

4. She has done all she can to properly carry out her duties.

5. She received her widow's allowance until her attorney told her she was no longer entitled to it.

6. She has taken proper care of all the estate property and has abided by the court's orders.

7. She has the automobile, has reported its purchase details.

8. She has not filed an accounting because she left it to her attorney to prepare.

9. She has prepared a final account, inheritance tax reports and petition for distribution and is prepared to file them.

10. She is bonded for $34,000.

From this showing can it be said that the evidence clearly shows her retention in office will jeopardize the interests of the estate? Appellant argues that even so, the probate file shows the matters heretofore mentioned to be such a conflict of interest as to require removal.

For this position In re Rinio's Estate, 93 Mont. 428, 19 P.2d 322, is cited. In that case, one Kester was appointed to be special administrator of each estate of partners, who died simultaneously. Kester carried on the partnership business 'as if the business were his private affair.' Our court applied section 10068, R.C.M.1921, now section 91-1401, R.C.M.1947, which prohibits a member of a partnership from being appointed administrator of the estate. The special administrator was administrator of each partner's estate. In addition, the opinion in that case reveals many irregularities and failures to comply with the statutes plus the fact that an accounting was necessary between the partners.

The court at p. 436 of 93 Mont. at p. 325 of 19 P.2d said in its opinion:

'Here we find one person acting at the same time in three capacities; exercising a power akin to that of a surviving partner, and carrying on the administration of the estates of the two men who composed the partnership. To this situation the reasons against...

To continue reading

Request your trial
5 cases
  • Estate of Robbin, Matter of
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • December 31, 1987
    ... ... If the court can readily remedy a matter of the complaint, no removal will be ordered ...         Matter of Estate of Tice (1962), 140 Mont. 28, 35, 367 P.2d 771, 774-775 (citing, 2 Bancroft's Probate Practice, 2d ed, Sec. 294, 1960 Pocket Supplements, p. 22). Since Paul ... ...
  • Obstarczyk's Estate, In re
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • January 8, 1963
    ...fund is so patently wrong on the basis of the facts herein that we cannot agree. Appellant cites our recent case, Estate of Tice v. Tice, 140 Mont. 28, 367 P.2d 771. We find that case distinguishable on its facts, and in harmony with our holding The administratrix in that case made a full d......
  • Estate of Peterson, Matter of
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • May 20, 1994
    ... ...         [265 Mont. 109] In the Tice [Tice's Estate v. Tice, 140 Mont. 28, 367 P.2d 771 (1962) ] case, supra, we quoted with approval from In re Rinio's Estate (1933), 93 Mont. 428, 435, ... ...
  • IN RE ESTATE OF ZEMPEL
    • United States
    • Montana Supreme Court
    • November 14, 2000
    ... ... 16 We have long held that a personal representative should not be removed except for good cause shown. Tice's Estate v. Tice (1962), 140 Mont. 28, 35, 367 P.2d 771, 774. Pursuant to 72-3-526(2), MCA, a district court may find good cause for removal of the ... ...
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT