Tice v. Comm'rs of City of Long Branch

• Decision Date: 20 November 1922
• Docket Number: No. 18.,18.
• Citation: 119 A. 25
• Parties: TICE v. COMMISSIONERS OF CITY OF LONG BRANCH et al.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

119 A. 25

TICE

v. COMMISSIONERS OF CITY OF LONG BRANCH et al.

No. 18.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

Nov. 20, 1922.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Appeal from Supreme Court.

Certiorari by Norman S. Tice against the Commissioners of the City of Long Branch and others. From a judgment of the Supreme Court, affirming an award of a contract for the removal of garbage, prosecutor appeals. Reversed, and award set aside.

Reilly, Quinn & Parsons, of Red Bank, for appellant.

Thomas P. Fay and Leo J. Warwick, both of Long Branch, for respondents.

BLACK, J. The only problem for solution in this case is: Are the specifications inviting bids for a garbage removal contract sufficiently definite and precise, so as to secure actual competitive bidding as required by law?

The court said, in the case of Browning v. Freeholders of Bergen, 79 N. J. Law, 497, 76 Atl. 1054, when no common standard is set up, and no competition is proposed. It is universally recognized, where there is no common standard, there is no competition. So, in Johnson v. City of Atlantic City, 85 N. J. Law, 145, 88 Atl. 950, whatever element enters into the competitive scheme, it should be the same for all, not left for each bidder to fix for himself, and thereby estimate his bid upon a basis different from that of any other bid. The general vice of such a course is that no common standard for competition is set up. Armitage v. Mayor, etc., of Newark, 86 N. J. Law, 9, 90 Atl. 1035. So, in the case of Ricketson v. City of Milwaukee, 105 Wis. 591, 81 N. W. 864, 47 L. R. A. 689. The indefinite character of the specifications, and the absence of plans, had the effect of stifling all competition. Each bidder was called upon to make a proposal, resting largely upon his own judgment, with absolutely no guide as to details. No one could tell which was the lowest bid, because, no two would be on the same basis. That fact alone condemns the action taken.

The purpose of the law obviously is to secure economy, to prevent fraud, favoritism, and extravagance, so that all bidders will be on the same basis in matters material to the proposed municipal action. The rule is one which is rooted deep in sound principles, in public policy, of general application. It should be rigidly adhered to by the courts, and not frittered away by a careless or indifferent application to specifications, that are not clear, precise, and definite on all matters, that are material to the proposals, to which bidders are invited to compete. The necessity of having a common standard, and the importance of definite and precise specifications upon which to found corporate action, are too apparent to require argument.

When we turn to the specifications in the case under discussion, and test them by the rule above stated, we find there is no plan or method of disposal of garbage provided for. This is left entirely to the discretion of the commissioners. Thus paragraph 5 provides:

"Awards will not be made until it has been shown to the satisfaction of the board of commissioners that the method of disposal proposed can be conducted without nuisance or injury to public health."

Paragraph 6:

"The contractor will be required to furnish evidence satisfactory to the board of commissioners that he Or they have permission from the proper authorities of the municipality in...