Tice v. State Ind. Acc. Comm.
| Decision Date | 23 January 1948 |
| Citation | 183 Or. 593,195 P.2d 188 |
| Parties | TICE <I>v.</I> STATE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT COMMISSION |
| Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
1. The Workmen's Compensation Law must be construed in favor of compensation. O.C.L.A. § 102-1701 et seq.
Workmen's compensation — Workmen's Compensation Law — Discretion
2. Word "discretion" as used in provision of compensation law that Industrial Accident Commission, on sufficient showing being made, may, in its "discretion", permit filing of claim in a nonfatal case within one year after accident, means that Commission is to be guided by sufficiency of the showing, and that when facts found constitute a valid reason for failure to make a timely filing, Commission is not at liberty to refuse relief, and does not mean a free and unhampered discretion, governed only by Commission's own sense of right and wrong. O.C.L.A. § 102-1771(e).
See Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, for all other definitions of "Discretion".
Administrative law and procedure — Workmen's compensation — Legislature — Appeal — Jury trial — Final order — Industrial Accident Commission
3. The Legislature has the power to provide for an appeal to circuit court, with right to trial by jury on any question of fact, after a final order of the Industrial Accident Commission. O.C.L.A. §§ 102-1773, 102-1774.
Administrative law and procedure — Workmen's compensation — Appeal — Workmen's Compensation Law
4. The word "appeal" as used in provision of compensation law providing for an "appeal" to circuit court with right to trial by jury on any question of fact after final order of the Industrial Accident Commission, is not used in restricted sense of an appeal from an inferior court to a superior court, but rather in sense of calling upon a competent court for a determination of the claim. O.C.L.A. §§ 102-1773, 102-1774.
See Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, for all other definitions of "Appeal".
Administrative law and procedure — Workmen's compensation — Claimant — Appeal — Industrial Accident Commission — Trial de novo — Questions of fact
5. Compensation claimant had right to appeal from order of Industrial Accident Commission rejecting claimant's application for compensation to circuit court, and to have a trial de novo with a jury in circuit court, where there were questions of fact to be determined. O.C.L.A. §§ 102-1773, 102-1774.
Workmen's compensation — Fracture — Logging operations — Jury question
6. In compensation proceeding, question whether fracture of claimant's hip joint bone occurred during logging operations when claimant jumped from a spring board ten or eleven feet from the ground was for the jury. O.C.L.A., § 102-1701 et seq.
Workmen's compensation — Sufficient showing — Failure to file claim within three months
7. Evidence that during logging operations claimant jumped from a spring board to ground ten or eleven feet below, that his leg immediately felt numb, that he consulted physicians who informed him that he was suffering from sciatic rheumatism, and that he finally consulted a physician who caused an X-ray picture to be taken of claimant's hip and discovered fracture of hip joint bone, sustained finding that claimant made sufficient showing under the compensation law for his failure to file his claim within three months after accident. O.C.L.A. § 102-1771 (e).
Administrative law and procedure — Workmen's compensation — Instruction
8. On claimant's appeal to circuit court from order of Industrial Accident Commission denying claimant's compensation, court properly refused to give Commission's requested instruction that would have required claimant to prove that Commission's findings of fact were contrary to the admitted or clearly proven facts. O.C.L.A. §§ 102-1773, 102-1774.
Administrative law and procedure — Workmen's compensation — Attorney's fees — Supreme court
9. Claimant who successfully resisted Industrial Accident Commission's appeal from circuit court to Supreme Court was entitled to an attorney's fee of $250 for services of his counsel in the Supreme Court. O.C.L.A. § 102-1774.
See 71 C.J., Workmen's Compensation Act § 810
Note, 78 A.L.R. 1232
42 Am. Jur. 549
IN BANC.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah County.
C.S. Emmons, Assistant Attorney General, of Albany, argued the cause for Appellant. With him on the brief were George Neuner, Attorney General, T.W. Gillard, Assistant Attorney General, and Roy K. Terry, Assistant Attorney General, of Salem.
Harry George, Jr., of Portland, argued the cause for Respondent. With him on the brief was John F. Conway, of Portland.
Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law by Ralph Tice, claimant, opposed by the State Industrial Accident Commission, State of Oregon, a corporation. From a judgment of the circuit court in favor of the claimant, the Commission appeals.
AFFIRMED.
This appeal presents important questions of procedure arising under the Workmen's Compensation Law. §§ 102-1701, et seq., O.C.L.A. The plaintiff, a workman subject to the Act, claims that he suffered a compensable injury. He did not attempt to file a claim with the State Industrial Accident Commission until nearly a year after the occurrence of the alleged accident. The statute provides:
"No application shall be valid or claim thereunder enforceable in nonfatal cases unless such claim is filed within three (3) months after the date upon which the accident occurred." § 102-1771 (e), O.C.L.A.
But the same section also provides:
"The commission, upon a sufficient showing being made, may, in its discretion, permit the filing of a claim in a nonfatal case within one (1) year of the time the accident occurred."
When he presented his claim to the commission the plaintiff made a showing as to the reasons for his delay, which he contends was sufficient to require the commission, in the exercise of its discretion, to permit the filing of the claim. The commission, however, rejected it, and the plaintiff then appealed to the Circuit Court, where there was a jury trial which resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff. From the consequent judgment the commission has prosecuted this appeal.
The principal questions to be determined are these: (1) What is the proper interpretation of the duties of the commission under the above-quoted discretionary provision; (2) may a decision of the commission under that provision be reviewed by appeal to the Circuit Court with the right to jury trial as in the case of other orders of the commission; (3) assuming that the proper procedure is that stated in (2), did the evidence warrant submission of the cause to the jury?
First. As originally passed, the Workmen's Compensation Law provided:
"No application shall be valid or claim thereunder enforceable unless filed within one year after the day upon which the injury occurred or the right accrued." General Laws of Oregon 1913, Ch. 112, § 27 (d).
In 1917 the time in which to file claims for non-fatal injuries was shortened to three months after the date upon which the injury occurred. General Laws of Oregon 1917, Ch. 288, § 13 (d).
In Lough v. S.I.A.C., 104 Or. 313, 207 P. 354, (1922), this court, construing the word "injury" in the foregoing provision, held that the time began to run from the date of the accident and the immediate consequent injury, and that the fact that the claimant was rendered partially demented by the accident so that he was unable to file his claim within the three-months period did not excuse him. See, also, Landauer v. S.I.A.C., 175 Or. 418, 427, 154 P. (2d) 189. In 1925 the legislature, apparently for the purpose of ameliorating the harshness of the statute as thus construed , ), added the proviso above quoted giving the commission discretionary power to permit the filing of a claim in a nonfatal case within one year after the date of the injury. General Laws of Oregon 1925, Ch. 133, § 5 (d). In 1935 a provision was adopted which applies specifically to a situation such as was presented in the Lough case. It reads:
Oregon Laws, 1935, Ch. 139, § 1 (e).
At the same time and in the same section the legislature substituted the word "accident" for "injury" in the provision as to filing claims in nonfatal cases, thus making the language of the statute conform to the interpretation placed upon the word "injury" in the Lough case. The existing law with reference to these matters is now found in § 102-1771, O.C.L.A. Summarized, it provides that claims in nonfatal cases must be filed within three months after the date of the accident; that, where mental incapacity ensues, a claim may be filed by the workman within sixty days after the removal of such mental incapacity or, during such incapacity, on his behalf by certain designated persons but in any event such claim must be filed within one year from the date of the accidental injury, and finally (the provision with which we are immediately concerned) that the commission, upon a sufficient showing being made, may, in its discretion, permit the filing of a claim in a nonfatal case within one year after the date of the accident.
This provision has never been definitively construed. It was involved in Wooldridge v. S.I.A.C., supra. But that case goes no further than to hold that the commission had never assumed jurisdiction of the claim for the purpose of determining whether or not it...
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