Tichon v. Harder

• Decision Date: 09 February 1970
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 13605.
• Citation: 308 F. Supp. 839
• Parties: Juliette A. TICHON, Plaintiff, v. John F. HARDER, Acting Commissioner of Welfare of the State of Connecticut; Charles J. Sheehan, Agency Personnel Administrator of the Department of Welfare of the State of Connecticut; Alice H. Sheahan, individually and as District Director of the New Haven District of the Department of Welfare of the State of Connecticut; Aldean E. Painter, individually and as Program Supervisor, Division of Child Welfare, Department of Welfare of the State of Connecticut; and Robert Budney, individually and as Case Supervisor, Division of Child Welfare, Department of Welfare of the State of Connecticut, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

308 F. Supp. 839

Juliette A. TICHON, Plaintiff, v. John F. HARDER, Acting Commissioner of Welfare of the State of Connecticut; Charles J. Sheehan, Agency Personnel Administrator of the Department of Welfare of the State of Connecticut; Alice H. Sheahan, individually and as District Director of the New Haven District of the Department of Welfare of the State of Connecticut; Aldean E. Painter, individually and as Program Supervisor, Division of Child Welfare, Department of Welfare of the State of Connecticut; and Robert Budney, individually and as Case Supervisor, Division of Child Welfare, Department of Welfare of the State of Connecticut, Defendants.

Civ. No. 13605.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

February 9, 1970.

Charles A. Pulaski, Jr., Tyler, Cooper, Grant, Bowerman & Keefe, New Haven, Conn., for plaintiff.

Robert K. Killian, Atty. Gen., F. Michael Ahern, Robert L. Hirtle, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., Hartford, Conn., for defendants.

RULING ON MOTION FOR A TEMPORARY INJUNCTION

ZAMPANO, District Judge.

The plaintiff, Juliette A. Tichon, instituted this action for injunctive relief and damages after she was notified that her position as a probationary employee of the Connecticut Welfare Department was to be terminated. She claims that the discharge from employment violates her rights under the Constitution and under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3).

Initially the Court signed a temporary restraining order and scheduled a hearing on the plaintiff's motion for a temporary injunction. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court vacated the restraining order and reserved opinion on the request for injunctive relief. The parties now having filed briefs and oral arguments having been heard, the matter of the temporary injunction is ripe for decision.

On June 10, 1969, the plaintiff graduated from Southern Connecticut State College where she majored in social welfare. She obtained employment with the Connecticut Welfare Department on June 27, 1969, and was assigned to the Division of Child Welfare as a Case Worker I, a classification for one who receives training in and performs social case work of a gradually increasing responsibility under close supervision. As a new state employee she was required to serve a probationary "working test" period of six months from the date of her appointment. 5 Conn.Gen.Stats. § 230. On December 11, 1969, the plaintiff received a written notice signed by the Agency Personnel Administrator, defendant Charles Sheehan, informing her that she was to be discharged on December 25, 1969, because of her "unsatisfactory work and judgment." Several conferences with various members of the Welfare Department proved fruitless, and this suit followed.

It is fundamental that the award of a preliminary injunction restraining state action is an extraordinary remedy which should be granted only upon a clear showing of probable success at trial and possible irreparable injury. Checker Motors Corporation v. Chrysler Corporation, 405 F.2d 319, 323 (2 Cir. 1969). The Court is of the opinion the plaintiff has failed to sustain her burden of proof in both respects and, therefore, the motion for a preliminary injunction must be denied.

In rather vague, unrefined terms, the plaintiff first complains her discharge was due to the personal bias of her immediate supervisor, in violation of equal protection. However, she expressly disclaimed in open court that she was discriminated against by reason of her "race, color, creed, religion, or national origin." Compare, Birnbaum v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672 (2 Cir.1966). Apparently the source of the difficulty was a personality conflict between Miss Tichon and her supervisor. Since the plaintiff failed to prove that her supervisor applied a different standard of performance to her as opposed to other probationary employees in her category, her equal protection argument is rejected.

The plaintiff next asserts she was denied substantive due process because of the arbitrary, capricious, and factually inaccurate reasons given for her unsatisfactory service rating. The Court disagrees. Sufficient cause existed for her supervisor's recommendation that the plaintiff not be considered for permanent employment. The reasons supporting his determination were set forth in a comprehensive evaluation report which was submitted to a hierarchy of three different supervisors for review before the final decision to release the plaintiff was made. Under the facts of this case substantive due process did not require more.

The plaintiff's contention that procedural due process requires a formal hearing and a right to appeal upon notice of discharge merits more serious attention. A starting point is found in Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960), where the Supreme Court stated:

"Due Process" is an elusive concept. Its exact

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