Ticknor v. Ticknor

Decision Date28 March 1960
Citation23 Misc.2d 257,200 N.Y.S.2d 661
PartiesLoretta Lucy TICKNOR, Plaintiff, v. Charles Horace TICKNOR, Defendant.
CourtNew York Supreme Court

Glasser, Baily & Litwack, New York City, for plaintiff.

Arthur I. Trager, Mt. Vernon, for defendant.

FRANK A. GULOTTA, Justice.

This is a motion for alimony pendente lite and counsel fee in a separation action which includes general allegations of cruel and inhuman treatment, conduct on the part of the defendant which has made it unsafe for plaintiff to cohabit with him, abandonment, refusal and neglect of the defendant to provide for plaintiff, and adultery.

The defendant has made a cross-motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice, asking that the complaint be dismissed on the ground that the parties were divorced in the State of Alabama by decree dated June 16, 1958, issued by the Circuit Court of that State in the Tenth Judicial District. In support of his contention defendant has submitted documentary evidence consisting of a power of attorney executed by the plaintiff on May 31, 1958, authorizing one William L. Allison to appear for her in the action commenced by this defendant against her in the State of Alabama, an Answer and Waiver signed by her and the Final Decree of Divorce.

Plaintiff counters by saying she did not know what she was signing and that defendant '(threatened) the plaintiff with bodily harm unless she executed some documents which were thrust under her nose.'

It appears that the parties were married on July 18, 1952. There is no issue of this union although plaintiff has a daughter by a prior marriage. On April 18, 1958, the parties separated, plaintiff returning with her daughter to the family home in Sunbury, Pennsylvania, and the defendant remaining in Mount Vernon, New York, where they then lived.

Plaintiff contends that the reason for the separation was that defendant no longer desired to live with her. On the other hand, defendant says that plaintiff just packed her belongings and with her daughter went to reside in Sunbury, Pennsylvania, because she couldn't live in New York and got too homesick and lonesome. Defendant's version seems to be substantiated by a letter postmarked May 8, 1958, sent by plaintiff from Sunbury, Pennsylvania, to defendant at Mount Vernon, New York, wherein she says, in part:

'* * * as I told you don't think I'll ever live in N. Y. again. I get too homesick & lonesome * * *. Maybe it is best we call it quits as I don't feel you could settle here ever & you have a good job so please keep it. In time I feel you will probably find a nice girl. There is no one else I want & probably never will marry again. If I ever do it will be a surprise to me. So if you want to go out go. Also in time you can get a divorce if you want as I won't stop you.'

The letter is very solicitous and written in a very friendly and understanding tone. It ends as follows:

'Be good & take care of yourself. May God Bless You. Love, Loretta.'

The Alabama documents above referred to were signed by her on May 31, 1958, some three weeks later, when defendant visited her in Pennsylvania. The power of attorney was executed before a Notary Public in Sunbury and her signature to the Answer and Waiver was witnessed by the same Notary.

Apparently both parties felt that a divorce was the only solution because on May 20, 1958, defendant wrote to plaintiff:

'If you feel that divorce is our solution, why don't you see about obtaining one in Sunbury there. You have established a residence there and know a great many people. I would be more than willing to shoulder whatever expense would be incurred in such action.'

Plaintiff could not have been surprised by being given the Alabama papers to sign for the correspondence on both sides was leading to just that. On May 26, 1958, she received a letter from defendant stating:

'I cannot see much practical sense in us being married when you are out there in Sunbury and I am working and trying to get along up here alone. My lawyer is a very nice man and he feels that a clean break is the best thing for both of us under the circumstances.

'I do want you and Phyllis to have all your personal belongings and things that you might want. That is why I am coming out and I can bring the papers for you to sign in order to make the necessary preparations for divorce.'

For two years plaintiff did nothing and has now suddenly brought this action on very tenuous allegations, with no facts.

There is no need to discuss the lack of probability of success in the plaintiff's matrimonial action, since the only point involved is the validity of the Alabama decree. Concededly the defendant has not supported the plaintiff since it was obtained and that decree must be the justification for not having done so, or there is none.

Insofar as the foreign decree is attacked...

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4 cases
  • Harges v. Harges
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court
    • July 7, 1965
    ...Stauffer v. Stauffer, 26 Misc.2d 254, 204 N.Y.S.2d 217; Matter of White v. White, 26 Misc.2d 631, 208 N.Y.S.2d 746; Ticknor v. Ticknor, 23 Misc.2d 257, 200 N.Y.S.2d 661; Towers v. Towers, 21 Misc.2d 56, 195 N.Y.S.2d 556. Neither the parol evidence rule, Niman v. Niman, 15 Misc.2d 1095, 181 ......
  • Roberts v. Roberts
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court
    • July 23, 1965
    ...valid and existing. By statute, this summary procedure is open only to the defendant in a matrimonial action. (See Ticknor v. Ticknor, 23 Misc.2d 257, 200 N.Y.S.2d 661; Brandstadter v. Brandstadter, Sup., 193 N.Y.S.2d 687.) Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment should be On its face, defe......
  • White v. White
    • United States
    • New York Domestic Relations Court
    • December 14, 1960
    ...58 N.Y.S.2d 392; Schwartz v. Schwartz, 190 Misc. 757, 75 N.Y.S.2d 592; Towers v. Towers, 21 Misc.2d 56, 195 N.Y .S.2d 556; Ticknor v. Ticknor, Sup., 200 N.Y.S.2d 661. In the instant case the Respondent husband in the City of New York and in the year 1956 induced the Petitioner, a person of ......
  • Shahmoon Industries, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division
    • April 13, 1962
    ...are considered, which we properly think they should have been under Rule 113 of the Rules of Civil Practice (see Ticknor v. Ticknor, 23 Misc.2d 257, 200 N.Y.S.2d 661; Richardson on Evidence, [8 Ed.] § 2) a question of fact which was presented as to the direction Golden gave respondent with ......

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