Tidball v. Miller

• Decision Date: 04 June 1948
• Docket Number: 8962
• Citation: 32 N.W.2d 683,72 S.D. 243
• Parties: J. B. TIDBALL, Respondent, v. W. C. MILLER, et al., Board of Equalization of Ziebach County, Appellants.
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court

72 SD 243, 32 NW2d 683 (1948)

J. B. TIDBALL,

Respondent,

v. W. C. MILLER, et al.,

Board of Equalization of Ziebach County,

Appellants.

South Dakota Supreme Court

Appeal from Circuit Court, Ziebach County, SD

Hon. H. E. Mundt, Judge

#8962—Reversed

N. E. Wanous, State’s Attorney, Dupree, SD

Williamson & Williamson, Aberdeen, SD

Attorneys for Appellants.

Morrison & Skaug, Mobridge, SD

Attorneys for Respondent.

Opinion Filed Jun 4, 1948

HAYES, Judge.

From a determination of the assessed valuations to be placed upon a considerable number of his tracts of land in 1945 by the board of equalization of Ziebach County respondent Tidball appealed to circuit court. After a prior appeal to this court, 71 SD 442, 25 NW2d 554, and upon rehearing in 71 SD 552, 27 NW2d 587, the court entered judgment substantially reducing the valuations fixed by the board. A history of this litigation and a general outline of the facts before us on this appeal are found in the former opinions. The sole question we are now called upon to decide is whether there is competent evidence in the record sufficient to support the findings and judgment of the trial court fixing the values of the property involved.

With the exception of a few tracts to the west and in adjoining townships, the land holdings of respondent lie in irregular groupings in the range of townships north of the town of Dupree and along the western boundary of Dewey County. Respondent has made his home in this area for a long period of years and has been and now is engaged in raising livestock and conducting operations generally incident to ranching in that part of the state. The lands involved in this controversy are parts of his range or grazing areas. Some portions thereof are described as reasonably level and productive of good stands of grass and hay in seasons when moisture is sufficient. Other areas are more or less rough and rolling suitable only for grazing. Some parts of respondent’s holdings embrace what are known as hard-pan patches, rough ranges and river breaks. The latter are of course nonproductive except for comparatively light grass growth thereon in normal years and but tend to fill out the range territory in a given area.

Over objections of counsel for the board the respondent was permitted to introduce proofs and the testimony of witnesses disclosing the price at which lands of similar character in that general area had been sold in recent years by the county after taking tax deeds and the prices last obtained for some of the remnants of rural credit holdings thereabout. Basing opinions upon their knowledge and information respecting such sales witnesses for respondent opined that the lands involved had a value in 1945 of $1.00 and $1.25 an acre.

Board members and witnesses called by the appellant board valued most of said lands at about three dollars an acre and quite in line with the assessor’s valuations. A few private sales of land similar to some of respondent’s holdings were shown to have brought higher prices due largely to the improvements thereon. Some further testimony received by the court tended to establish the results of farming activities during recent years in the vicinity of parts of respondent’s holdings and estimated the amount of hay which might have been produced at that time on some of the lands of respondent. The trial court’s findings fixed the valuations of the tracts in dispute at 81.50 to $2.00 an acre, the latter figure prevailing. About 12,000 acres were valued at $21,590 or averaging approximately $1.80 per acre.

In a memorandum decision to counsel the trial court treated at some length the question of the probative value of the testimony and proofs upon which respondent Tidball relied in seeking to establish the usual cash selling price of his lands here involved. From such decision it is readily apparent that the trial court regarded as a controlling factor in fixing the value of said lands the cash price usually obtained by the county in the spring of 1945 from sales of similar lands previously acquired by the county as a result of tax sale proceedings. Such price was usually $1.00 or $1.25 per acre. Appellants contend that it was error on the part of the trial court to treat as competent evidence the proof of such sales by the county and to be guided to a decision by opinions of the value of respondent’s lands based upon the knowledge of witnesses respecting such county sales. This contention brings us to a consideration of the pertinent code provisions.

Under SDC 57.0334 all property must be assessed at its true and full value in money. Omitting the wording of the second sentence of said section not here applicable, the same reads as follows:

“In determining the true and full value of real property the assessor shall not adopt a lower or different standard of value because the same is to serve as a basis of taxation, nor shall he adopt as a criterion of value the price for which the property would sell at auction or at a forced sale, or in the aggregate with all the property in the ... district; but he shall value each ... description of property by itself and at such a sum or price as he believes the same to be fairly worth in money.”

By SDC 57.0301(5) it is provided that “true and full value” means “the usual cash selling price” at the time of the assessment. It is conceded that these code provisions are equally binding upon all unless the same or parts thereof are in conflict with § 2 of Article XI of our state constitution. This section of the constitution embraces a safeguard against excessive valuations for purposes of taxation and provides that the valuation of property for such purposes shall never exceed the actual value thereof. It was recognized by this court in Richardson v. Howard, 23 SD 86, 120 NW 768, 769, that there is a marked distinction between the term “full and true value” and the term “full and true cash value”. It is not here suggested that an assessment of property “at its true and full value in money” would be in excess of its actual value. We think therefore that there is no constitutional question here presented.

In assailing the evidence of respondent it is argued by appellants that the “usual cash selling price” of respondent’s property may not be determined by giving consideration to the price at which similar lands were sold by the county at that time and in that vicinity. They invoke the inhibition found in SDC 57.0334 quoted...