Tidwell v. American Oil Company

• Decision Date: 02 September 1971
• Docket Number: No. C 240-68.,C 240-68.
• Citation: 332 F. Supp. 424
• Parties: Juanita TIDWELL, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN OIL COMPANY, a Foreign Corporation, doing business in the State of Utah, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Utah

332 F. Supp. 424

Juanita TIDWELL, Plaintiff, v. AMERICAN OIL COMPANY, a Foreign Corporation, doing business in the State of Utah, Defendant.

No. C 240-68.

United States District Court, D. Utah, C. D.

September 2, 1971.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Donn E. Cassity, Stephen G. Morgan, and Ford G. Scalley, Salt Lake City, Utah, for plaintiff.

Albert J. Colton, Salt Lake City, Utah, and James A. Sullivan III, Chicago, Ill., for defendant.

David R. Cashdan, Washington, D. C., Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, amicus curiae.

OPINION

RITTER, Chief Judge.

In this case plaintiff charges that she was fired by defendant, American Oil Company, because she refused to discriminate on the basis of race against an applicant for employment. Plaintiff was a resident of Salt Lake City, Utah, at the time the alleged unlawful practice occurred and also at the time this suit was filed. Defendant is incorporated in Maryland and licensed to do business in Salt Lake City, Utah. Defendant is also a national product marketing, manufacturing, distributing and research affiliate of Standard Oil of Indiana with a regional office in Salt Lake City. This action is brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) and § 2000e-5(g) for the economic loss plaintiff suffered from her wrongful discharge.

JURISDICTION

Defendant has persistently maintained that this court does not have jurisdiction of the case. Two separate jurisdictional defects are alleged: (a) That plaintiff failed to commence timely state proceedings as a condition precedent to bringing an action in the federal courts, and (b) That plaintiff failed to commence this action within ninety days after filing charges with the EEOC. Defendant raised these allegations initially on a motion to dismiss. The court denied that motion then and finds no reason to rule otherwise now.

The following events preceded this suit: Plaintiff was employed by defendant in December, 1961. On October 21, 1966, plaintiff was given a choice between voluntarily resigning or being discharged, and on October 24, 1966, she elected to be discharged. The next day (October 25) plaintiff went to the office of the Anti-Discrimination Division of the Utah Industrial Commission and met with M. Phyl Poulson, Executive Secretary of the Division, and Henry Adams, Assistant Attorney General for the State of Utah. At that time plaintiff complained orally of her discharge, but she was not advised of any need to file a written complaint.

After numerous consultations and telephone conversations with Mr. Poulson, plaintiff received a letter (dated November 28, 1966) from Mr. Poulson asking her to sign and file written complaints against defendant, which were enclosed. On December 22, 1966, plaintiff executed and filed the complaints with the Utah Commission. The following day Mr. Poulson forwarded the complaint on the federal form to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, with the explanation that the complaint did not meet the time requirements of the Utah statute.

The EEOC finally served the complaint on defendant on February 23, 1967. After an unsuccessful attempt to obtain voluntary compliance with Title VII from defendant, the EEOC sent plaintiff notice of her right to institute a civil action within thirty days pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). Plaintiff received the notice on November 15, 1968, and subsequently filed this action on December 13, 1968.

State Proceedings

Before persons aggrieved by unlawful employment practices may pursue the remedies provided by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, they must first resort to certain state remedies as follows:

"In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no charge may be filed under subsection (a) of this section by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated * * *." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).

Subsection (a) referred to above permits the filing of charges with the EEOC. Utah has a statute prohibiting the practice alleged and the state procedures in question are found in Utah Code Ann. § 34-17-7(1) and § 34-17-7(15).¹ Defendant insists that the Utah statute requires the filing of a written complaint with the Anti-Discrimination Division within thirty days after the alleged discriminatory practice as a prerequisite to any state action. As indicated above, plaintiff went to the responsible state agency and orally complained of her discharge within four days of the effective date of her termination. The written complaint was not filed until approximately sixty days after the alleged violation. Defendant asserts that plaintiff's oral complaint was totally ineffective to commence the state's administrative procedures.

This court holds that plaintiff's oral complaint was sufficient to "commence" state proceedings as required by Title VII. Utah's statute, while authorizing a written complaint, does not require all complaints to be in writing. The statute provides that "any person claiming to be aggrieved * * may * * * make, sign and file with the commission a written complaint * * *." Utah Code Ann. § 34-17-7(1). An aggrieved employee may file a written complaint, but the statute neither requires a written complaint nor prohibits an oral complaint. Indeed, Mr. Poulson's practice was to institute informal proceedings to bring about a conciliation. Poulson did not inform plaintiff of any need for a written complaint until after his limited effort at seeking a solution and after he had already contacted the EEOC to arrange for that agency to attempt a solution. A form furnished by the Commission (Utah Code Ann. § 34-17-7(1)) was not made available to plaintiff until more than thirty days after her initial complaint.

Defendant contends that the case of Goodman v. City Products Corporation, Ben Franklin Division, 425 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1970), should control the interpretation of the Utah statute. In Goodman, the plaintiff filed his lawsuit in the federal district court thirty-one days after receiving notice from the EEOC of his right to file suit. The statute 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e), provides: "* * * The Commission shall so notify the person aggrieved and a civil action may, within thirty days thereafter, be brought against the respondent named in the charge * * *." The plaintiff in that case argued that the thirty-day requirement was merely directory, but the court held: "The permissive verb `may' refers to the option of the aggrieved party to bring a lawsuit, not to a discretion in the Court to receive the case following the expiration of 30 days." 425 F.2d at 703. Defendant maintains that the word "may" in the Utah statute likewise refers to the option of bringing a complaint and not to the form of the charge. However, the federal statute deals with a time limitation and the state statute deals with a matter of form. The thirty-day limitation in the federal statute is clearly an intentional limitation. The Utah statute, however, is completely silent as to the efficacy of proceeding under an oral complaint. Absent any showing that the Utah legislature intended that all complaints be in writing, the court holds that a written complaint was not required in the circumstances of this case.

Defendant points out that Poulson's letter of transmittal sent with the complaint to the EEOC states that plaintiff's complaint did not meet the time requirements of the statute. That, however, is obviously an excuse devised to justify not taking further state action on the matter. Poulson was an employee of defendant American Oil on leave of absence. He requested the EEOC to assume investigation of plaintiff's complaint because of this serious conflict of interest.

Defendant also contends that the Tenth Circuit decision in Love v. Pullman, 430 F.2d 49 (1969), affirmed on rehearing, 430 F.2d 56 (10th Cir. 1970), requires that the Utah procedures for commencing an action be strictly construed —requiring a written charge within thirty days. In Love v. Pullman, the plaintiff did not file a charge with the EEOC until May, 1966, whereas state proceedings had terminated in July, 1965, after being revived by an oral complaint. (The initial complaint was made to the state agency in 1963.) The plaintiff thus failed to comply with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d). The Love case, however, is distinguishable from the present case since it involved an oral reopening of previous state proceedings and dealt with § 2000e-5(d) rather than § 2000e-5(b). The case does, on the other hand, provide some guidance for this case. The district court's determination that the oral complaint to the state agency, while not literally complying with the Colorado statute, constituted substantial compliance was not disturbed by the circuit court. In addition, the circuit court wrote:

"The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is precise in its requirements that the States with adequate statutes and machinery have the first opportunity to consider complaints. This first opportunity is a clear requirement in the sequences set out in the Act." 430 F. 2d at 53.

The court then held that the EEOC could not assume automatic jurisdiction and bypass the state agency. In this case, the Utah state agency was afforded the first opportunity to consider the complaint. Plaintiff met immediately with Poulson and Adams, giving them the details of her discharge. Still, Poulson's conflict of interest prevented full investigation of the complaint. Even if plaintiff had brought a signed and verified written complaint with her to the first meeting with Poulson, the conflict...