Tidwell v. Carter Products

• Decision Date: 26 February 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-2070,97-2070
• Citation: 135 F.3d 1422
• Parties: 76 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 226, 72 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,191, 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1069 Jerry E. TIDWELL, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant. v. CARTER PRODUCTS, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee,
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1422

135 F.3d 1422

76 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 226,

72 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,191,

11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 1069

Jerry E. TIDWELL, Plaintiff-Appellee-Cross-Appellant. v. CARTER PRODUCTS, Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Appellee,

No. 97-2070.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

Feb. 26, 1998.

Mark Stephen Herdman, Herdman & Sakellarides, Palm Harbor, FL, for Appellee-Cross-Appellant.

Sylvia Walbolt, John P. McAdams, Carlton, Fields, Warde, et al., Tampa, FL, for Appellants-Cross-Appellee.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before ANDERSON and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and O'KELLEY, ^* Senior District Judge.

O'KELLEY, Senior District Judge:

Carter Products appeals from a judgment entered against it pursuant to a jury verdict in favor of Jerry Tidwell in this age discrimination case under the Age Discrimination and Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (the ADEA). Carter challenges the district court's denial of its motion for judgment as a matter of law on Tidwell's claim that his termination by Carter constituted age discrimination as well as the district court's award of equitable relief in the form of front pay to Tidwell. In his cross-appeal, Tidwell challenges the court's grant of judgment as a matter of law to Carter on the issue of willfulness. The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether Tidwell produced adequate evidence to allow a reasonable factfinder to disbelieve Carter's proffered nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Tidwell. We conclude that he did not and that Carter was entitled to judgment as a matter of law for that reason.

Facts

Carter Products manufactures and sells health and beauty care products. Tidwell began his employment with Carter as a district sales manager in 1972. He later served as Territory Representative for Carter's central Florida region, working out of Tampa, until his April 23, 1993 termination at the age of fifty.

Tidwell alleges that he was terminated because of his age. Carter contends that Tidwell's position was eliminated as part of a nationwide reduction-in-force (RIF). Carter eliminated twelve positions, from an original force of 58. While four of the original 48 sales employees over 40 were discharged, 19 were retained.

During its reorganization, key accounts, including many of Tidwell's, were transferred to regional and divisional managers. Carter also developed a new sales philosophy, beginning to outsource to independent contractors. The number of sales territories were reduced in order to reduce costs, and it was determined that Florida could be served by a single territory manager. At that time there were two territory managers--Tidwell in Tampa (age 50) and James Booth in Miami (age 26). Carter determined that it would be best served by a Miami territory, contending that Miami had more direct accounts and more independent stores requiring individual attention. Carter contends that Tidwell's performance had nothing to do with this decision. The Tampa territory manager position was therefore eliminated, its accounts to be absorbed by other workers. Similar decisions were made throughout the country, with no apparent pattern of retention according to age (several older employees were retained while their younger counterparts were eliminated). Carter explained its methodology used in the selection process: If there was only one sales representative in the area to be eliminated, that person would be released; if there were more than one representative, their relative performances would be compared. Carter characterized Tidwell's situation as falling into the first category.

Procedural History

The EEOC issued a "no reasonable cause" determination to Tidwell's charge of discrimination. The EEOC found no cause to believe Carter had violated any statutes in terminating Tidwell. "The evidence obtained did not support [Tidwell's] allegation of unlawful employment discrimination." DX 20. The EEOC explained in a memorandum that plaintiff's low rating in his 1992 evaluation "signifies that [Tidwell] was performing below the reasonable expectations of [Carter]." It reasoned that plaintiff's performance "was a factor along with [Carter's] other reasons to terminate [Tidwell's] employment." DX 20.

Tidwell then filed an action in the District Court for the Middle District of Florida, claiming he was discharged because of his age in violation of the ADEA. Before the jury, Tidwell attempted to prove his claim under a disparate treatment theory, which requires proof of intentional age discrimination. Tidwell offered several indications of age discrimination: (1) his 1992 performance evaluation; (2) Carter's retention of Booth and the Miami territory; (3) inconsistent reasons given for his termination.

The trial court denied Carter's motions for judgment as a matter of law at the close of Tidwell's case. Carter then offered its nondiscriminatory reason, the RIF, for Tidwell's termination. The court denied Carter's motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence. The jury returned a verdict for Tidwell and awarded $60,000 in lost wages and benefits. The amount was doubled as liquidated damages because the jury found the discrimination to be a willful violation of the ADEA. The court reserved entering judgment until it concluded a supplemental hearing regarding valuation and certain evidence of Tidwell's side business which he had concealed during discovery. The court found that Tidwell had indeed lied about his side business but rejected Carter's unclean hands defense to preclude a front pay award. Instead, the court ordered a set-off against the front pay award in the amount of Carter's expenses associated with the additional discovery caused by Tidwell's false testimony. The court awarded front pay for the period from the jury verdict until Tidwell's 62nd birthday--more than eight years. Upon Carter's motions, the Court permitted the jury's verdict on liability to stand and refused to reconsider its ruling on front pay. The Court did, however, overturn the jury finding as to willfulness.

Standard of Review

A district court's denial of a defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law is reviewed de novo, entailing the application of the same standards used by the district court. Dade County v. Alvarez, 124 F.3d 1380, 1383 (11th Cir.1997). Those standards require the consideration of "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). All evidence and inferences are considered in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Carter v. City of Miami, 870 F.2d 578, 581 (11th Cir.1989).

If the facts and inferences point overwhemingly in favor of one party, such that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict, then the motion was properly granted. Conversely, if there is substantial evidence opposed to the motion such that reasonable people, in the exercise of impartial judgment, might reach differing conclusions, then such a motion was due to be denied and the case was properly submitted to the jury.

Id. (footnotes omitted). The nonmoving party must provide more than a mere scintilla of evidence to survive a motion for judgment as a matter of law; "there must be a substantial conflict in evidence to support a jury question." Id. Accordingly, we must determine whether reasonable jurors could have concluded as this jury did based on the presented evidence. Quick v. Peoples Bank, 993 F.2d 793, 797 (11th Cir.1993).

Discussion

Carter contends that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because (1) Tidwell presented no evidence, statistical or otherwise, of age bias or discrimination and (2) Tidwell failed to demonstrate that Carter's articulated reason for its decision to include him in the RIF was pretextual. Tidwell disagrees, arguing that judgment as a matter of law is inappropriate because he introduced sufficient evidence to permit the jury to disbelieve Carter's proffered explanation for his dismissal.

To create a jury question in a discrimination case based on circumstantial evidence, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). A prima facie case effectively creates a presumption of unlawful discrimination by the employer: "If the trier of fact believes the plaintiff's evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in the case." Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981)(footnote omitted). Tidwell established a prima facie case by proving that he was 50 years old, had worked for Carter for 21 years, was terminated, and that his accounts were assumed by a 26 year old with only one year of experience with the company. ¹

The establishment of a prima facie case shifts the burden to the employer to produce legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the allegedly discriminatory employment action. Id. at 254, 101 S.Ct. at 1094. To satisfy this burden, the employer "need only produce admissible evidence which would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not been motivated by discriminatory animus." Id. at 257, 101 S.Ct. at 1096. If the employer successfully produces a nondiscriminatory reason for its action, the presumption of discrimination disappears. Id. at 255, 101 S.Ct. at 1094-95. The plaintiff then has the opportunity to show the employer's proffered reason to be pretextual. Id. at 256, 101 S.Ct. at 1095.

Once an employer offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action, a plaintiff must show...