Tielke v. Auto Owners Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 16 August 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-18-1756,1-18-1756 |
| Citation | 434 Ill.Dec. 234,2019 IL App (1st) 181756,135 N.E.3d 118 |
| Parties | Joanna TIELKE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AUTO OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY; Leahy Eisenberg & Fraenkel Ltd.; Manor Bowling and Billiard, Inc. ; Kevin Killerman; 3124 North Central, LLC; and Tara Ryniec-Stanek, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Robert P. Groszek, of Chicago, for appellant.
Richard M. Waris, James J. Sipchen, Quinn P. Donnelly, and Scott Howie, of Pretzel & Stouffer Chtrd., of Chicago, for appellees Auto Owners Insurance Company, Manor Bowling and Billiard, Inc., and 3124 North Central, LLC.
Monica Fazekas, of Leahy, Eisenberg & Fraenkel, Ltd., of Chicago, for other appellees.
¶ 1 Plaintiff, Joanna Tielke, appeals the circuit court's order dismissing her breach of contract action against Auto Owners Insurance Company (Auto Owners), Leahy Eisenberg & Fraenkel Ltd. (LEF), Manor Bowling and Billiard, Inc. (Manor Bowling), Kevin Killerman, 3124 North Central, LLC (North Central) and Tara Ryniec-Stanek because it constituted an improper collateral attack on a judgment order in another case. We affirm.1
¶ 2 The two cases involved here are (1) a personal injury action filed by plaintiff against defendants North Central, Mr. Killerman, and Manor Bowling in case No. 13-L-011557; and (2) a subsequent breach of contract action filed by plaintiff against defendants North Central, Mr. Killerman, Manor Bowling, Ms. Ryniec-Stanek, LEF, and Auto Owners in case No. 17-L 10764 and assigned to Judge Patrick J. Sherlock.
¶ 3 I. THE PERSONAL INJURY ACTION (CASE NO. 13- L-011557)
¶ 4 On September 18, 2017, plaintiff filed a fifth amended complaint (hereinafter personal injury action) against defendants North Central, Mr. Killerman, and Manor Bowling alleging that their negligence caused her to slip, fall, and injure herself on February 16, 2013, at a bowling alley under defendants' control. In the personal injury action, defendants were represented by Tara Ryniec-Stanek and her law firm, LEF. Auto Owners was the liability insurer for defendants.
¶ 5 On September 26, 2017, Ms. Ryniec-Stanek, on behalf of all defendants, and in open court, engaged in settlement negotiations with plaintiff and made a settlement offer of $700,000, with the proceeds to be hand-delivered by Friday, September 29, 2017. No settlement was reached on September 26, 2017, but that night Ms. Ryniec-Stanek sent a text to plaintiff confirming that she had spoken with Auto Owners and that the $700,000 settlement offer was still open and available. Ms. Ryniec-Stanek stated that if plaintiff accepted the settlement offer, the check would be delivered on Friday.
¶ 6 The next day, September 27, 2017, at the break in the testimony of Mr. Killerman, plaintiff spoke with Ms. Ryniec-Stanek and orally accepted the settlement offer. Plaintiff further confirmed the acceptance via a text message sent to Ms. Ryniec-Stanek and asked that the check be delivered on Friday, September 29. About 15 minutes later, right before the reconvening of court, Ms. Ryniec-Stanek returned a text stating, Plaintiff demanded that the settlement agreement be honored, but Ms. Ryniec-Stanek refused.
¶ 7 Plaintiff brought the matter before the trial court, who stated:
¶ 8 The trial court further stated:
¶ 9 The trial proceeded, and on October 2, 2017, the jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and against defendant Manor Bowling in the amount of $332,425. The jury found that defendants Mr. Killerman and North Central were not liable. The trial court entered judgment on the verdict and later awarded plaintiff certain costs that she was entitled to recover as the prevailing party at trial.
¶ 10 Two days later, on October 4, 2017, plaintiff made a written demand that Auto Owners tender the full amount of the $700,000 settlement agreement. In response, Ms. Ryniec-Stanek wrote a letter to plaintiff on October 6, 2017, denying that a settlement had been reached before the offer was withdrawn. Ms. Ryniec-Stanek stated:
¶ 11 Ms. Ryniec-Stanek further stated that Auto Owners had prepared a check for $332,425 in satisfaction of the judgment on the verdict.
¶ 12 On October 16, 2017, the defendants in the personal injury action filed a motion to "enforce full satisfaction of [the] verdict and judgment." Defendants alleged that "[t]o date, plaintiff's counsel has refused to accept the tender of the verdict check and post-judgment interest in full satisfaction of the jury's verdict and judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff, Joanna Tielke, and against the defendant, [Manor Bowling]."
¶ 13 On October 27, 2017, plaintiff accepted the check. In correspondence with defendants, plaintiff indicated that she was accepting the check as payment of the jury verdict only and not as full payment of the amount owed to her under the settlement agreement. Plaintiff stated that she was still owed the difference between the $700,000 settlement agreement and the amount tendered to her in payment of the jury verdict.
¶ 14 On November 1, 2017, plaintiff brought a posttrial motion in the personal injury action, seeking an award of costs as well as sanctions against defendants for various alleged improprieties before and during the trial. Plaintiff did not seek rehearing or reconsideration of the denial of the motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The trial court granted plaintiff's posttrial motion in part, awarding her certain costs. The court denied her request for sanctions. Plaintiff did not file any appeal.
¶ 15 II. THE BREACH OF CONTRACT ACTION (CASE NO. 17-L-10764)
¶ 16 On October 24, 2017, plaintiff filed her breach of contract action in case No. 17 L 10764 () against defendants, Auto Owners, LEF, Manor Bowling, Mr. Killerman, North Central, and Ms. Ryniec-Stanek, alleging that they had breached the settlement agreement in the personal injury action by refusing to pay the agreed-upon $700,000.
¶ 17 On February 27, 2018, Auto Owners filed a motion to dismiss the breach of contract action. The motion was labeled as being brought pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) ( 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2016) ), but the memorandum in support sought dismissal based on section 2-619 (id. § 2-619). Specifically, Auto Owners alleged that plaintiff's breach of contract claim constituted an improper collateral attack on the judgment entered on the verdict in the underlying personal injury action and that the contract claim was also barred by res judicata , judicial estoppel, and accord and satisfaction. Manor Bowling, North Central, LEF, and Ms. Ryniec-Stanek subsequently joined in the dismissal motion. Mr. Killerman was not served with a summons and complaint and therefore did not join in the dismissal motion.
¶ 18 On July 13, 2018, Judge Sherlock dismissed plaintiff's breach of contract action against all defendants. Judge Sherlock noted that although the dismissal motion was labeled as being brought pursuant to section 2-615, the memorandum in support cited to section 2-619. The judge found that "[s]ince the brief argues affirmative matter defeating the claim, the Court will proceed under [section] 2-619." The judge rejected the arguments as to res judicata , judicial estoppel, and accord and satisfaction but found that the breach of contract action was an impermissible collateral attack on the order entered in the underlying personal injury case denying plaintiff's motion to enforce the settlement agreement. Accordingly, the judge ordered:
¶ 19 Plaintiff now appeals the order dismissing her breach of contract action.
¶ 21 Initially, plaintiff notes that Auto Owners' motion to dismiss was labeled as being brought pursuant to section 2-615 but that the supporting memorandum filed by Auto Owners and the joinder motions filed by Manor Bowling, North Central, LEF, and Ms. Ryniec-Stanek referenced section 2-619. Given the references to both section 2-615 and section 2-619, plaintiff contends that the motion should be deemed a section 2-619.1 motion seeking relief under both sections and analyzed accordingly.
¶ 22 A motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-615 attacks the sufficiency of the complaint and raises the question of whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted. Burton v. Airborne Express, Inc. , 367 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 1029, 306 Ill.Dec. 308, 857 N.E.2d 707 (2006). A section 2-619 motion to dismiss admits the legal sufficiency of the plaintiff's complaint but raises defects, defenses, or other affirmative matters that appear on the face of the complaint or that are established by external submissions acting to defeat the complaint's allegations. Id. The resolution of either motion involves only a question of law, and therefore this court's review is de novo . Id. at 1030, 306 Ill.Dec. 308, 857 N.E.2d 707.
¶ 23 Section 2-619.1 provides that section 2-615 and section 2-619 motions may be filed together as a single motion but that such a combined motion shall be divided into parts that are limited...
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...of the complaint and challenges whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted. Tielke v. Auto Owners Insurance Co. , 2019 IL App (1st) 181756, ¶ 22, 434 Ill.Dec. 234, 135 N.E.3d 118. When ruling on a motion to dismiss under either section, "the court should construe ......