Tierco Maryland, Inc. v. Williams

Decision Date14 May 2004
Docket NumberNo. 65,65
Citation849 A.2d 504,381 Md. 378
PartiesTIERCO MARYLAND, INC. v. Linda WILLIAMS, Charles Smith, Katrina Smith, Shaniqua Smith, and Frances Williams.
CourtMaryland Court of Appeals

James T. Ferrini (Paul V. Esposito of Clausen Miller, P.C., Chicago, IL; Pamela A. Bresnahan and Steven R. Becker of Vorys, Sater, Seymour and Pease LLP, Washington, DC), on brief, for Petitioner.

Paul W. Spence (Spence, Kohler & Christie, P.A., Towson; Emanuel M. Levin of Emanuel M. Levin & Associates, P.A., Baltimore), on brief, for Respondents.

Argued Before BELL, C.J., RAKER, WILNER, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA and JOHN C. ELDRIDGE (Retired, specially assigned), JJ. HARRELL, Judge.

It should surprise no one that a fundamental jurisprudential principle is that irrelevant considerations may not be a proper basis for a jury's verdict. In this civil action asserting theories of recovery based solely on assault, battery, false imprisonment, and negligent supervision, as submitted to the jury, the Respondents/Plaintiffs repeatedly raised at trial, through argument and testimony, insinuations of racial discrimination by at least some of the corporate defendant's alleged employees. Because the record demonstrates a significant probability that the jury's award to Respondents/Plaintiffs of substantial compensatory and punitive damages was induced by irrelevant racial considerations, we shall reverse the judgment and remand the case to the Circuit Court for Prince George's County for a new trial. In so doing, we also shall unsnare a procedural trap for the unwary.

I.

On 31 July 1999, Eddie and Linda Williams took their children and grandchildren on a family outing to Six Flags America ("Six Flags"), an amusement park in Prince George's County, Maryland.1 Mr. and Mrs. Williams were joined at the park by their daughters, Frances Williams and Katrina Smith, along with Katrina's husband, Charles Smith. With them also were two grandchildren: Frances Williams's two-year-old son, Daquan, and Shaniqua Smith, the four-year-old daughter of Katrina and Charles Smith. After several hours of enjoying the amusement park's other attractions, the family decided to ride the Typhoon Sea Coaster ("the ride"), a hybrid roller coaster/log flume ride. Daquan, it was decided by the adults, was too young to go on the ride, so he was left in the care of his grandfather while the rest of the family joined the queue for the ride.

The summer day was hot, and the wait was long for the ride. After about an hour in the queue, Linda Williams, Frances Williams, Katrina Smith, Charles Smith, and Shaniqua Smith ("Respondents") reached the ride's loading station. As they approached the ride's boats, a ride attendant carrying an L-shaped measuring stick indicated to the ride operator that Shaniqua did not meet the ride's forty-six inch minimum passenger height requirement. The ride operator stopped the ride.

A different ride attendant approached Respondents, who had seated themselves in one of the ride's boats. The second ride attendant explained to Respondents that he believed that Shaniqua was not tall enough to go on the ride, and that the ride would not be restarted until she left the boat. Respondents refused to leave the boat, insisting that Shaniqua be allowed to ride. Respondents claimed they had seen "white children"2 smaller than Shaniqua allowed on the ride without being stopped by park attendants and, therefore, Shaniqua should be allowed to ride.3 A standoff ensued, during which several additional park employees, including managers and security personnel, arrived on the scene.

After ten or fifteen minutes,4 Respondents agreed to leave the boat they occupied. Most of the events that followed were disputed at trial by the parties.

Witnesses for Six Flags testified that, just after leaving the boat, Charles Smith threw a punch at a Six Flags employee. Mr. Smith denied such aggressive conduct. Witnesses for both Respondents and Six Flags testified that Charles Smith was "thrown to the ground," restrained, and handcuffed by Six Flags security staff. Witnesses for Six Flags testified that Linda Williams, Frances Williams, and Katrina Smith, while attempting to pull the security staff off Charles Smith, became violent with Six Flags employees. Witnesses for both sides testified that Linda Williams, Frances Williams, and Katrina Smith were restrained and handcuffed. Respondents were then forced to walk approximately one thousand feet within the park to the park security office. During this walk, conducted in plain view of other park patrons then present, each Respondent, with the exception of Shaniqua, was handcuffed.

Respondents sat in the security office for about an hour. During that time, Six Flags employees issued "trespass letters" to Respondents, informing them that they no longer were welcome on the amusement park property. Park employees also called the Prince George's County Police Department, which dispatched an officer to the scene. When the police officer arrived, he immediately removed the handcuffs from Respondents and they were escorted to the park gate, where they were released.

The family drove to a local hospital where they were examined and underwent various tests. The doctors found cuts and bruises on one of Charles Smith's elbows and his chest, but no fractured bones. Charles also complained to them of muscular soreness in his chest. Katrina complained of swollen wrists and sore shoulders from being handcuffed, as did Linda Williams. There were no other physical injuries identified at that time.

Respondents sued Six Flags in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, alleging assault, battery, false imprisonment, and negligent supervision. Respondents did not allege in the complaint racial animus on the part of Six Flags or its employees. Indeed, no mention of race appeared at all in the complaint. Nevertheless, race became a major focus of the trial. Race, or a particular race, was mentioned sixty-three times during the three day trial.5

Aside from the physical injuries described above, Respondents' main complaints in the suit, were for embarrassment, public humiliation, and upset feelings. Linda Williams also alleged the loss of two days of work as a nurse. No evidence of permanent injuries of any type suffered by any Respondent was adduced at trial. The jury awarded Respondents collectively $1,000,000 in compensatory damages6 and $1,500,000 in punitive damages against "Six Flags." Judgment in those amounts was ultimately entered against Tierco. The trial judge, granting in part Tierco's post-judgment motions, vacated the punitive damages award because she concluded that the jury's finding of actual malice was not supported by the evidence.

Disposing of Tierco's direct appeal, the Court of Special Appeals, in an unreported opinion, reinstated the original jury verdict and dismissed Petitioner's appeal.7 We granted Tierco's petition for a writ of certiorari, 377 Md. 111, 832 A.2d 204 (2003), to consider the following five questions:

1. Did the Court of Special Appeals err in denying Petitioner's motion to voluntarily dismiss its appeal without prejudice and subsequently improperly exercise appellate jurisdiction over the case, where judgment had not been entered against all of the parties below and there was more for the trial court to do?
2. Did the Court of Special Appeals erroneously dismiss Petitioner's appeal as untimely under the Maryland Rules?
a. Did the Court of Special Appeals, in dismissing the appeal, misinterpret Maryland Rule 2-532 to require the entry of "final judgment"—as opposed to the Rule's stated condition of "entry of judgment on the verdict"—as a prerequisite to the timely filing of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV")?
b. Should the dictum in the Court of Special Appeals's ruling in Atlantic Food & Beverage Systems, Inc. v. Annapolis, 70 Md.App. 721, 523 A.2d 648 (1987), which has been applied so as to require entry of final judgment before a motion for JNOV may be filed, be overruled because it constitutes an erroneous interpretation of the plain reading of the Rules and creates a trap for the unwary?
3. Did the trial court err in denying Petitioner's motions for JNOV, for a new trial or for remittitur, where Respondents' counsel repeatedly utilized race to prejudice and impassion the jury and the verdict was so excessive in light of the de minimus injuries that the verdict can only reasonably be viewed as having been the product of the jury's prejudice and passion?
4. Was the compensatory damages verdict, totaling one million dollars, so far from the range of verdicts in similar cases that it was an abuse of discretion of the trial court to refuse to order remittitur?
5. Was judgment erroneously entered against Petitioner, where Respondents failed to prove that Petitioner was the employer of the alleged malfeasants?
II.

The first issue we must address is whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Petitioner's appeal because of a "premature" post-judgment motion (or motions). Although the pertinent Maryland Rules, as currently framed and as interpreted by an earlier reported opinion of the Court of Special Appeals, supply fertile soil for the conflicting arguments offered in the present case, we conclude that the post-judgment motions in the present case were not untimely and, therefore, the Court of Special Appeals should have exercised appellate jurisdiction in this case.

The underlying relevant facts are straightforward. From the inception of the suit in the Circuit Court, Respondents included Shaniqua's grandfather, Eddie Williams, as a plaintiff. Ultimately, however, because Mr. Williams was not present during the events occurring at the Typhoon Sea Coaster on 31 July 1999 (supra at 2), Respondents' counsel voluntarily dismissed Mr. Williams's claims...

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