Tierinni v. Owens

• Decision Date: 26 September 2016
• Docket Number: HHDCV145038064S
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: Christopher Tierinni #271574 v. David Owens et al

Christopher Tierinni #271574 v. David Owens et al

No. HHDCV145038064S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Hartford, Hartford

September 26, 2016

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (#196)

Cesar A. Noble, J.

On July 29, 2014, the plaintiff, Christopher Tierinni, filed a one-count complaint against the defendants, David Owens Hartford Courant, Mike Savino, and the Journal Inquirer.^[1] As a result of the court's ruling on the defendants' request to revise, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint on November 18, 2014. The plaintiff alleges the following facts. In May of 2014, Mike Savino wrote an article (JI article) reporting on the plaintiff's sentencing from the plaintiff's trial that took place on January 27, 2014, at Rockville Superior Court. The plaintiff alleges that the facts contained in the JI article are false and therefore libelous.

On April 19, 2016, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the article is substantially true and accurately reports what occurred at the plaintiff's sentencing hearing as evidenced by a comparison of the article to the transcript of such hearing. The motion is accompanied by a memorandum of law and the following exhibits: (A) transcript excerpts of the plaintiff's sentencing hearing on April 30, 2014; (B) a copy of the JI article published online; (C) a copy of the JI article printed in hardcopy; and (D) an affidavit of Mike Savino. On April 27, 2016, the plaintiff filed an objection, memorandum of law in opposition and the following exhibits: (A) a copy of the plaintiff's Order of Protection; (B) a copy of the JI article published online; and (C) a copy of the JI article printed in hardcopy. This matter was heard at short calendar on July 25, 2016.

STANDARD

" Summary judgment is a method of resolving litigation when pleadings, affidavits, and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Grenier v Cointnissioner of Transportation, 306 Conn. 523, 534, 51 A.3d 367 (2012). " [T]he party moving for summary judgment . . . is required to support its motion with supporting documentation, including affidavits." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Romprey v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 310 Conn. 304, 324 n.12, 77 A.3d 726 (2013). " Likewise, [t]he existence of the genuine issue of material fact must be demonstrated by counteraffidavits and concrete evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Foote 151 Conn.App. 620, 632-33, 94 A.3d 1267, cert. denied, 314 Conn. 930, 101 A.3d 952 (2014).

" [I]t is only [o]nce [the] defendant's burden in establishing his entitlement to summary judgment is met [that] the burden shifts to [the] plaintiff to show that a genuine issue of fact exists justifying a trial." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mott v. Wal-Mart Stores East LP, 139 Conn.App. 618, 626, 57 A.3d 391 (2012). " In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Patel v. Flexo Converters U.S.A., Inc., 309 Conn. 52, 57, 68 A.3d 1162 (2013).

DISCUSSION

The court will note at the outset that this decision is not written on a blank slate. The court takes notice of the decision rendered in Tierinni v. Savino, Docket No HHD-CV-14-5037719-S (Docket Entry #210), as the current motion for summary judgment and objection are similar. Even so, the court has done an independent analysis and for the following reasons grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment.

The defendants argue that the JI article written by Savino reports on the plaintiff's sentencing hearing. The transcript excerpts of the plaintiff's sentencing hearing on April 30, 2014, produced by the defendants, which the JI article was based, demonstrate that the article is substantially true. Because the JI article accurately reports what occurred at the plaintiff's sentencing hearing, the defendants argue that they are protected by the fair reporting privilege. Further, to the extent that there are minor misstatements in the JI article, the defendants argue that the JI article remains substantially true and such minor misstatements are negligible, not material, do not affect the substantial truth of the article as a whole, and are not the type that would harm the plaintiff's reputation or standing in the community. Moreover, the defendants argue that the plaintiff, as a public figure, is required to establish that the defendants acted with actual malice.

The plaintiff counters that genuine issues of material fact exist because: (1) the case has been assigned for trial because a pretrial/settlement conference was scheduled for August 8 2016; (2) the article in question is substantially false as it does not accurately report what occurred at the plaintiff's sentencing hearing; (3) the article is not protected by the fair reporting privilege as the defendants did not claim this in their answer and special defenses; and (4) the defendants did in fact act with actual malice and there is evidence which the plaintiff can prove by clear and convincing evidence.

" A defamatory statement is defined as a communication that tends to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him . . . To establish a prima facie case of defamation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the defendant published a defamatory statement; (2) the defamatory statement identified the plaintiff to a third person; (3) the defamatory statement was published to a third person; and (4) the plaintiff's reputation suffered injury as a result of the statement . . . Defamation is comprised of the torts of libel and slander . . . Slander is oral defamation . . . Libel . . . is written defamation." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mercer v. Cosley, 110 Conn.App. 283, 296-97, 955 A.2d 550 (2008). " Truth is an absolute defense to an allegation of libel." Id., 301.

" [N]otably, our courts have held that only substantial truth need be shown by a defendant . . . A defendant may show only that the main charge, or gist, of the libel is true . . . If he succeeds, he does not have to further justify statements that do not add to the sting of the charge." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gianetti v. Connecticut Newspaper Publishing Co., 136 Conn.App. 67, 76, 44 A.3d 191, cert. denied, 307 Conn. 923, 55 A.3d 567 (2012). " [W]here minor inaccuracies [are] immaterial to the sting or harm suffered by the plaintiff . . . [or] where the inaccuracies [are] of a technical nature that conveyed the same meaning as the true facts would have in the eyes of the average reader, summary judgment may be appropriate." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mercer v. Cosley, supra, 110 Conn.App. 303-04.

" In a civil action for libel, where the protected interest is personal reputation, the rule in Connecticut is that the truth of an allegedly libelous statement of fact provides an absolute defense . . . Contrary to the common law rule that required the defendant to establish the literal truth of the precise statement made, the modern rule is that only substantial truth need be shown to constitute the justification . . . It is not necessary for the defendant to prove the truth of every word of the libel. If he succeeds in proving that the main charge, or gist, of the libel is true, he need not justify statements or comments which do not add to the sting of the charge or introduce any matter by itself actionable . . . The issue is whether the libel, as published, would have a different effect on the reader than the pleaded truth would have produced." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Mercer v. Cosley, supra, 110 Conn.App. 304.

Moreover, according to the fair reporting privilege, " [e]ven when there is a defamatory statement, [t]he publication of defamatory matter concerning another in a report of an official action or proceeding . . . is privileged if the report is accurate and complete or a fair abridgement of the occurrence reported. 3 Restatement (Second), Torts, Report of Official Proceeding or Public Meeting, § 611, p. 297 (1977); see also Wang v. Frankl, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. 391493, (October 18, 1999 [Thompson, J.]) (publication of public proceeding, record thereof privileged as long as report is fair, accurate representation of event). According to the comments to § 611, the basis of the privilege is the public's interest . . . in having information made available to it as to what occurs in official proceedings and public meetings . . . If the report is accurate or a fair abridgment of the proceeding, an action cannot constitutionally be maintained for defamation." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. American Lawyer Media, Inc., 83 Conn.App. 134, 137-38, 847 A.2d 1115, cert. denied, 270 Conn. 914, 853 A.2d 526 (2004).

In the plaintiff's operative complaint, he identifies ten statements in the JI article that he claims are defamatory and thus constitutes libel. After reviewing each allegation the court agrees with the defendants, that each is substantially true and, therefore, not libelous. Although the plaintiff disagrees, each statement is clearly taken from the transcript of the sentencing hearing. " The most persuasive evidence that a [purportedly libelous] statement is accurate is the existence of a public record...