Tiernan v. Charleston Area Medical Center

• Decision Date: 21 May 1998
• Docket Number: No. 24434.,24434.
• Citation: 506 S.E.2d 578,203 W.Va. 135
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Betty A. TIERNAN, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. CHARLESTON AREA MEDICAL CENTER, INC., a West Virginia Corporation, Defendant Below, Appellee.

506 S.E.2d 578

203 W.Va. 135

Betty A. TIERNAN, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. CHARLESTON AREA MEDICAL CENTER, INC., a West Virginia Corporation, Defendant Below, Appellee.

No. 24434.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted February 17, 1998.

Decided May 21, 1998.

Dissenting and Concurring Opinion of Justice Starcher June 2, 1998.

Concurring Opinion of Justice McCuskey June 29, 1998.

Dissenting and Concurring Opinion of Justice Workman July 21, 1998.

Walt Auvil, Pyles & Auvil, Parkersburg, for Appellant.

Stephen A. Weber, Dina M. Mohler, Kay, Casto, Chaney, Love & Wise, Charleston, for Appellee.

DAVIS, Chief Justice:

This is an appeal by Betty A. Tiernan, appellant/plaintiff, (hereinafter "Ms. Tiernan") from two orders entered by the Circuit Court of Kanawha County granting summary judgment to Charleston Area Medical Center, appellee/defendant, (hereinafter "CAMC"). The plaintiff asserted numerous theories of liability regarding the termination of her employment by CAMC. The circuit court made the following rulings on those theories: that as a matter of law Ms. Tiernan's constitutional theories of liability did not apply to a private employer; that Ms. Tiernan's statutory claims placed no genuine issue of material fact in dispute; and that the theories of breach of contract/detrimental reliance, tortious interference with a business relationship, and violation of statutory and regulatory public policies were not supported by evidence sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact. Ms. Tiernan assigns error to each of the circuit court's rulings on her claims for recovery. We find that the circuit court correctly granted summary judgment on Ms. Tiernan's constitutional claims. We further find that the circuit court correctly granted summary judgment on Ms. Tiernan's claim for tortious interference with a business relationship; and that the circuit court's orders failed to present adequate findings for review by this Court on all remaining claims. Consequently, we affirm in part and reverse in part the circuit court's summary judgment orders.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case arose as a result of Ms. Tiernan's discharge from employment by CAMC. Ms. Tiernan was employed as a nurse by CAMC from May of 1985 to May 2, 1994. Prior to 1994, Ms. Tiernan had a good relationship with CAMC. She had an excellent work history and was part of CAMC's management staff.

On February 19, 1994, Ms. Tiernan wrote a letter to the editor of The Charleston Gazette. The letter was edited and published in the newspaper on February 23, 1994.¹ The letter criticized CAMC's budgetary cutbacks. CAMC officials spoke with Ms. Tiernan about the letter and cautioned her to consult with CAMC in the future, before airing her views in the press. CAMC advised Ms. Tiernan that, as part of the management team, she had a duty to portray to the public and other staff members that management was united. Ms. Tiernan was informed that no repercussions would be taken against her for the letter.² A few weeks after the letter appeared in the newspaper, Ms. Tiernan was given an evaluation. Ms. Tiernan was rated by CAMC as "meets" or "exceeds" on each of the evaluation categories. The evaluation also noted that Ms. Tiernan needed to be more supportive of management. Ms. Tiernan was given a raise after the evaluation.

On May 2, 1994, CAMC scheduled a nonpublic meeting to discuss a planned merger or affiliation with St. Francis Health Care Systems, Inc. The meeting was to be televised on CAMC's internal, closed-circuit television station. The broadcast was specifically limited to viewing at television screens located at employee workstations. Furthermore, the broadcast was blocked from patient television. CAMC planned to hold a news conference immediately after the meeting to inform the general public of the proposed affiliation agreement. CAMC invited only specific upper and middle managers to the meeting. The invitation did not include members of the media.

Shortly after the meeting began, Ms. Tiernan entered the room where the meeting was being held accompanied by a newspaper reporter.³ A CAMC employee standing at the door did not recognize Ms. Tiernan; but, recognized the reporter. The employee informed the reporter she could not enter the meeting. The reporter stated that she was invited by Ms. Tiernan. Ms. Tiernan and the reporter entered the meeting. Both Ms. Tiernan and the newspaper reporter had tape recorders and recorded the meeting.

CAMC terminated Ms. Tiernan several hours after the meeting. CAMC's basis for termination was that Ms. Tiernan's conduct of bringing the newspaper reporter to a closed meeting was wrong and warranted dismissal. Ms. Tiernan invoked CAMC's appeal procedures. Her appeal was unsuccessful.

After termination, Ms. Tiernan secured per diem employment as a nursing supervisor with Arthur B. Hodges Center, Inc., (hereinafter "ABHC") a geriatric patient nursing home affiliated with CAMC.⁴ When CAMC learned of Ms. Tiernan's employment with ABHC, CAMC contacted ABHC and informed ABHC that Ms. Tiernan was also working as a union organizer.⁵ ABHC provided no further work for Ms. Tiernan upon learning of her union activities.

Ms. Tiernan filed suit against CAMC on February 2, 1995. Ms. Tiernan's complaint asserted (1) that her termination violated public policy embodied in the state constitutional right to free speech and association; (2) that in terminating her, CAMC breached their oral contract not to retaliate against her for publishing the February 19, 1994, letter and that she detrimentally relied upon the agreement; (3) that CAMC tortiously interfered with her business relationship with ABHC; and (4) that Ms. Tiernan's termination by/from CAMC resulting from inadequate patient to nurse ratio⁶ was a matter of substantial concern and therefore violative of public policy.

After the parties conducted discovery, CAMC moved for summary judgment. The circuit court initially granted summary judgment to CAMC on Ms. Tiernan's constitutional theories and the theory of tortious interference with a business relationship. The circuit court reserved ruling on the other theories. Ultimately, the circuit court granted CAMC summary judgment on the remaining theories.⁷ It is from the circuit court's two summary judgment orders that Ms. Tiernan now appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court stated in syllabus point 1 of Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994), that "[a] circuit court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo." We have held that "[a] motion for summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of fact to be tried and inquiry concerning the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law." Syl. Pt. 3, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Federal Ins. Co. of N.Y., 148 W.Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963). Of course, "[t]he mere fact that a particular cause of action contains elements which typically raise a factual issue for jury determination does not automatically immunize the case from summary judgment. The plaintiff must still discharge his or her burden under West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) by demonstrating that a legitimate jury question, i.e. a genuine issue of material fact, is present." Syl. Pt. 1, Jividen v. Law, 194 W.Va. 705, 461 S.E.2d 451 (1995). This Court indicated in syllabus point 5 of Jividen that:

Roughly stated, a "genuine issue" for purposes of West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) is simply one half of a trialworthy issue, and a genuine issue does not arise unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for that party. The opposing half of a trialworthy issue is present where the non-moving party can point to one or more disputed "material" facts. A material fact is one that has the capacity to sway the outcome of the litigation under the applicable law.

III. DISCUSSION

A. State Constitutional Free Speech Claim

Ms. Tiernan contended before the lower court that she was terminated because of the publication of her letter criticizing budgetary cuts by CAMC. The circuit court found as a matter of law that the Free Speech Clause of the state constitution does not apply to private employers.⁸ Ms. Tiernan argues⁹ that the basis for her firing violated a substantial public policy embedded in the state constitutional right to free speech¹⁰ contained in W.Va. Const. Art. 3, Sec. 7.¹¹ In this case, Ms. Tiernan was an atwill employee of a private sector employer. This Court has generally held that "[a]t will employees, as well as other employees, have certain protections in circumstances involving public policy." Cordle v. General Hugh Mercer Corp., 174 W.Va. 321, 325, 325 S.E.2d 111, 114 (1984). "A determination of the existence of public policy in West Virginia is a question of law, rather than a question of fact for a jury." Syl. pt. 1, Cordle. CAMC argued that any public policy contained in the state constitutional Free Speech Clause is inapplicable to private sector employers. This issue is one of first impression for this Court.

Public Policy In General. Twenty years ago this Court held that "[t]he rule that an employer has an absolute right to discharge an at will employee must be tempered by the principle that where the employer's motivation for the discharge is to contravene some substantial public policy princip[le], then the employer may be liable to the employee for damages occasioned by this discharge." Syl., Harless v. First National Bank, 162 W.Va. 116, 246 S.E.2d 270 (1978). In syllabus point 2 of Birthisel v. Tri-Cities Health Services Corp., 188 W.Va. 371, 424 S.E.2d 606 (1992), we held that "[t]o identify the sources of public policy for purposes of determining whether a retaliatory discharge has occurred, we look to established precepts in our constitution, legislative enactments, legislatively approved...