Tiessen v. Chrysler Capital
| Decision Date | 20 October 2016 |
| Docket Number | Court File No. 16-cv-422 (JRT/LIB) |
| Parties | Crystal Tiessen, Plaintiff, v. Chrysler Capital, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
This matter came before the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to an order of referral, [Docket No. 37], made in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and upon the Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendant Repossessors, Inc. ("Repossessors"), [Docket No. 14], and Defendants Chrysler Capital ("Chrysler") and PAR North America ("PAR"), [Docket No. 18]. A hearing was conducted on September 14, 2016, and the motion thereafter taken under advisement. ([Docket No. 40]).
For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, [Docket Nos. 14 and 18], be GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.
In June 2013, Crystal Tiessen ("Plaintiff"), a member of the Fond du Lac Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indian Tribe ("the Tribe"), obtained a loan from Chrysler to finance the purchase of a vehicle. (Amend. Compl., [Docket No. 2], 2-3). Chrysler received a security interest in the vehicle to secure repayment of the loan. (Id.). When Plaintiff fell behind on herpayments, Chrysler hired PAR, who in turn hired Repossessors, to repossess the vehicle. (Id. at 4).
On April 27, 2015, between 5:00 a.m. and 7:00 a.m., Repossessors and John Doe Repossession Agent entered the Fond Du Lac Reservation, where Plaintiff was living with her mother, and repossessed the vehicle from Plaintiff's mother's driveway. (Id. at 4, 6-7). Later that morning, when Plaintiff called the Fond du Lac Tribal Police Department to report the vehicle missing, she learned that Chrysler had authorized the repossession. (Id. at 7). The Tribal Police Department gave Plaintiff PAR's telephone number, and Plaintiff called PAR, attempting to locate the vehicle and demanded its return. (Id. at 7-8).2
On February 19, 2016, Plaintiff filed her Complaint and an Amended Complaint, bringing suit against Chrysler, PAR, Repossessors (collectively, "Defendants"), and John Doe Repossession Agent.3 . Plaintiff alleged (1) a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) by Defendants and John Doe because the repossession did not comply with the Tribe's applicable ordinances,4 so Repossessors and John Doe had no present right of possession, as required by the FDCPA for repossession; (2) wrongful repossession by Defendants and John Doe in violation of Minnesota state statutes; (3) conversion by Defendants and John Doe; (4) trespass by Repossessors and John Doe; and (5) violation of privacy by intrusion upon seclusion by Repossessors and John Doe. (Amend. Compl., [Docket No. 2], 9-14). At the heart of Plaintiff's Complaint is the assertion thatDefendants' failure to comply with the tribal ordinance rendered the repossession wrongful, leading to the claims she now pursues. (Amend. Compl., [Docket No. 2], 9-14).
Repossessors answered the Amended Complaint and then filed a Motion to Dismiss and accompanying Memorandum in Support, ([Docket Nos. 14-15]), arguing that that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff's claims under the tribal exhaustion doctrine. Chrysler and PAR likewise answered the Amended Complaint and filed a Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support that joined Repossessors' Memorandum. ([Docket Nos. 18, 20]). Plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motions to Dismiss. (Mem. in Opp. to Motions to Dismiss, [Docket No. 28]). Repossessors filed a Reply Memorandum, which Chrysler and PAR joined. (Repossessors' Reply Mem., [Docket No. 33]; Chrysler and PAR's Mem., [Docket No. 35]).5 On August 3, 2016, the Motions were referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge by order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (Order, [Docket No. 37]).
Defendants now move the Court for dismissal based on the purported doctrine of exhaustion of tribal court remedies. (Repossessors' Mem. in Support of Motion to Dismiss, [Docket No. 15], 3-8).
The tribal exhaustion doctrine establishes that "due to considerations of comity, federal court jurisdiction does not properly arise until available remedies in the tribal court system have been exhausted." See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Tribal Court of Spirit Lake Indian Reservation, 495 F.3d 1017, 1021 (8th Cir. 2007). The "doctrine is based on 'a policy of supporting tribal self-government and self-determination,' and it is prudential, rather than jurisdictional.Exhaustion is mandatory, however, when a case fits within the policy, and the legal scope of the doctrine is a matter of law to be reviewed de novo." Gaming World Int'l, Ltd. v. White Earth Band of Chippewa Indians, 317 F.3d 840, 849 (8th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). Unless it is plain that tribal jurisdiction does not exist, "[a] federal court should 'stay [] its hand until after the Tribal Court has had a full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction.'" Id. (quoting Nat'l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985)); see also DISH Network Serv., L.L.C. v. Laducer, 725 F.3d 877, 882 (8th Cir. 2013) ().
As the Supreme Court has explained, examination of tribal court jurisdiction "should be conducted in the first instance in the Tribal Court itself," as part of the congressional "policy of supporting tribal self-government and self-determination." Allowing tribal courts to make an initial evaluation of jurisdictional questions serves several important functions, such as assisting in the orderly administration of justice, providing federal courts with the benefit of tribal expertise, and clarifying the factual and legal issues that are under dispute and relevant for any jurisdictional evaluation. This rule is prudential, however, and is not an absolute bar to federal jurisdiction. If it is "plain" that tribal jurisdiction does not exist and the assertion of tribal jurisdiction is for "no other purpose than delay," the exhaustion requirement does not apply.
(Citations omitted.) DISH Network Serv. L.L.C., 725 F.3d at 882; see also Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 369 (2001) ().
Generally, a tribe has no jurisdiction over the actions of non-Indians who come within the tribe's borders. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316, 328 (2008). "Given [the] general proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe, efforts by a tribe to regulate nonmembers, especially on non-Indian fee land, are presumptively invalid." (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 330.
There are, however, exceptions to this general rule. First, a federal statute or treaty may expressly provide a tribal court with jurisdiction over certain claims. See Atkinson Trading Co., Inc. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645, 649-50 (2001). Where there is no such federal statute or treaty, a tribe has only such jurisdiction over nonmembers within its borders as stems from its retained or inherent sovereignty. Id.
Under this retained or inherent sovereignty, two sets of circumstances exist "in which tribes may exercise 'civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands.'" Plains Commerce Bank, 554 U.S. at 329 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981)). Known as the Montana exceptions:
First, "[a] tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements." Second, a tribe may exercise "civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within the reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."
(Citations omitted) Id.
Although Defendants agreed to a stay of these proceedings rather than an outright dismissal in their Reply Memoranda and at the motions hearing, Defendants' original Memoranda in Support of the Motions to Dismiss argued that because Plaintiff's claim is based upon tribal ordinances and stems from acts that allegedly occurred within the tribal reservation boundaries, the tribal exhaustion doctrine requires this Court to dismiss the case and direct Plaintiff to proceed first in tribal court if she wants to pursue the action. (Repossessors' Mem. in Support of Motion to Dismiss, [Docket No. 15], 3-8). Plaintiff responded that the tribal court lacks jurisdiction, so requiring exhaustion of tribal remedies would serve no purpose other thandelaying the case. (Mem. in Opp. to Motion to Dismiss, [Docket No. 28], 1). Plaintiff first argues that under the language of the FDCPA, the tribal court has no jurisdiction over FDCPA claims, which is the basis for this Court's jurisdiction over her other claims. (Mem. in Opp. to Motion to Dismiss, [Docket No. 28], 4-5). If Plaintiff is correct and the tribal court plainly would not have jurisdiction, the tribal exhaustion doctrine does not apply. See Gaming World Int'l, Ltd., 317 F.3d at 849.
The FDCPA states: "An action to enforce any liability created by this subchapter may be brought in any appropriate United States district court without regard to the amount in controversy, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from the date on which the violation occurs." 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d) (emphasis added). Plaintiff argues that tribal court is not a "court of competent jurisdiction," analogizing to Hicks, 533 U.S. at 353.
In Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001), Nevada state game wardens and tribal officers...
To continue reading
Request your trial