Tiffany & Co. v. Starzmann

• Decision Date: 12 April 1937
• Docket Number: No. 211.,211.
• Citation: 191 A. 465
• Parties: TIFFANY & CO. v. STARZMANN.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

191 A. 465

TIFFANY & CO.

v. STARZMANN.

No. 211.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

April 12, 1937.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law by Christina Starzmann, claimant, against Tiffany & Company, employer. To review a judgment of Court of Common Pleas affirming a judgment of the Workmen's Compensation Bureau in favor of the claimant, the employer brings certiorari.

Affirmed.

Argued January term, 1937, before CASE and PERSKIE, JJ.

Edwin F. Smith, Raymond Dawson, George Echelman, and Edwards, Smith & Dawson, all of Jersey City, for prosecutor. Arthur F. Mead, Harvey A. Lieb, and William B. McMichael, all of Newark, for defendant.

CASE, Justice.

The writ brings up for review a judgment entered in the Essex common pleas which in effect affirmed a judgment in the Workmen's Compensation Bureau under a petition for compensation filed by Christina Starzmann, an employee of Tiffany & Co. The award was for percentage permanent disability together with fees and expenses. The essential facts will appear in the discussion of the points.

Prosecutor's first point is that the judgment should be reversed because the claim for permanent disability, based on an accident in December of 1929 and presented by a petition filed in October of 1934, was barred by the failure to file a petition within a reasonable period after the enactment of the procedural regulations effective April 27, 1931 (chapters 278, 279, 280, P.L.1931 [N.J.St. Annual 1931, §§ ** 236—11, **236—24, **236—32 (f-h), **236 —46, **236—60, **236—99]), which imposed a two-year limitation on applications for compensation. The employer had notice on January 16, 1930, that on December 12, 1929, the employee, while leaving the building of her employment, slipped and fell on the stairs. The employer contends—and there is testimony to support, and we shall assume, the truthfulness of the contention—that it sent to its insurance carrier and to the Department of Labor of the state the preliminary notice required by section 1, chapter 187, Pamph. Laws 1924 (Comp.St.Supp. 1924, § **236— 94). It is conceded that the insurance carrier did not file the report required by section 3 of that statute (Comp.St.Supp. 1924, § **236—96). Section 6 of the statute (Comp.St.Supp. 1924, § **236—99) contains this provision: "Any employer or insurance carrier failing to make report as required by this act, shall in such instance be deprived of the defense provided in paragraph 23 (h) of the Workmen's Compensation Act, approved April fourth, one thousand nine hundred and eleven, as chapter 95 as amended by chapter 93, Laws of 1919." Section 23 (h) of the Workmen's Compensation Law, as amended (Comp.St.Supp. 1924, § **236—32 (h), provided that: "In case of personal injury or death all claims for compensation on account thereof shall be forever barred unless a petition is filed * * * within one year after the date on which the accident occurred." Chapter 278 of the Pamphlet Laws of 1931 (N.J.St. Annual 1931, § **236—99) so amended section 6 of chapter 187, P.L.1924, supra, as to omit the provision, quoted supra, which deprived the employer or insurance carrier of the defense provided in paragraph 23 (h) of the Workmen's Compensation Act. It is the contention of the prosecutor that chapter 278 of the Laws of 1931 is retroactive, and that consequently, even though the employee up to and at the time of the passing of that statute had a cause of action which was without limitation, she came at once, upon the passage, within the field of operation of the statute. We are constrained by the decision of the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Florence Thread Company, 175 A. 96, 12 N.J.Misc. 774, at p. 775 (which makes very clear that the subject under discussion is the report required from the insurance carrier), and by the decision of the Court of Errors and Appeals in the same case on review, 115 N.J. Law, 175, 178 A. 729, to hold that the insurance carrier was under the duty to make the report required by section 3 of the 1924 statute that the failure of the carrier to make that report subjects its...