Tiffany v. Morgan

• Decision Date: 07 July 1909
• Citation: 73 A. 465
• Parties: TIFFANY v. MORGAN.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

73 A. 465

TIFFANY

v. MORGAN.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

July 7, 1909.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Providence and Bristol Counties; Charles F. Stearns, Judge.

Action by William A. Morgan against Henry L. Tiffany, executor. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendant excepts. Exceptions overruled, and cause remanded for judgment on verdict and for further proceedings.

The executor disallowed plaintiff's claim; but on trial in the municipal court, after full hearing, the claim was substantially allowed.

Exception No. 8, was to the refusal to charge that the jury are to consider, from testator's habits and other circumstances surrounding the matter, whether or not his language as stated by the witnesses for claimant was intended by him to make an express contract with the claimant; the court charging in its place that the question of whether an express promise was made was a question of veracity, and in determining that question the jury could consider, not only his statement expressly given, but also all the other evidence in the case, including testator's habits of mind and of business.

The charge to which exception No. 10, was taken was, in substance, that where there is positive testimony as to a fact, in the absence of other evidence, circumstantial or direct, or evidence which the jury might take from the appearance of the witness, or from any other proper element, as already charged, discrediting any such testimony, in such a case, having in mind the presumption of the law that each witness testifies to the truth, they must accept the testimony of such witness as true.

Henry W. Hayes and John Henshaw, for appellant.

Irving Champlin, for appellee.

PER CURIAM. This case comes before this court upon the appellant's bill of exceptions. The exceptions are 14 in number and may be grouped as follows:

Exceptions Nos. 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7 relate to evidence attempted to be introduced by the appellant as to declarations in writing or statements by James Tiffany to third parties not in presence of Mr. Morgan, tending to contradict the evidence of the appellee and his witnesses as to an express promise by the deceased to pay the appellee for his professional services. The letters and statements were offered in the endeavor to show that James Tiffany, the deceased, had in mind only that the business which he requested Mr. Morgan to do would be good practice for him, would bring him into prominence, and would advertise him, and that Mr. Tiffany had no intention of paying for such services. The court rightly excluded such evidence, on the ground that self-serving statements, made to third parties and not in presence of Mr. Morgan, were inadmissible under the hearsay rule.

Furthermore, the evidence offered from two letters written by James Tiffany to his son, James F. Tiffany (Exhibit 1), was immaterial and incompetent, because it did not show that Mr. Tiffany did not intend to pay Mr. Morgan for services. It merely showed that Mr. Morgan had "to economize" and needed practice, and that Mr. Tiffany felt "like giving him all the chance to practice," and was entirely consistent, not only with a desire to give Mr. Morgan prominence at the bar, but also with an intention to benefit him financially by paying him for his work. So the...