Tiffey v. Speck Enterprises, Ltd.

• Decision Date: 08 March 2006
• Docket Number: No. 4:04 CV 40297 JEG.,4:04 CV 40297 JEG.
• Citation: 418 F.Supp.2d 1120
• Parties: John TIFFEY, Plaintiff, v. SPECK ENTERPRISES, LTD., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

418 F.Supp.2d 1120

John TIFFEY, Plaintiff, v. SPECK ENTERPRISES, LTD., Defendant.

No. 4:04 CV 40297 JEG.

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, Central Division.

March 8, 2006.

Paige Ellen Fiedler, Thomas Andrew Newkirk, Fiedler & Newkirk PLC, Johnston, IA, Pamela J. Walker, Sherinian & Walker PC, West Des Moines, IA, for Plaintiff.

Gregory J. Wilson, Janice M. Thomas, Cory D. Abbas, Patterson Lorentzen Duffield Timmons, Des Moines, IA, for Defendant.

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

GRITZNER, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Plaintiff John Tiffey ("Tiffey") is represented by Paige Fiedler, Pamela Walker, and Thomas Newkirk. Defendant Speck Enterprises, Ltd. ("Speck"), is represented by Gregory Wilson, Janice Thomas, and Cory Abbas. Defendant requested oral argument, and the matter came on for hearing February 3, 2006. The matter is now fully submitted for ruling. For the reasons listed below, Defendant's motion is granted in part and denied in part.

SUMMARY OF MATERIAL FACTS¹

Speck is an Iowa corporation owned by Mark and Lisa Fargo. The Des Moinesbased company provides parking lot and street maintenance to its clients. Each crew of laborers is supervised by a crew leader, who is paid at an hourly rate. The seasonal nature of the work leads to varying weekly hours, with the fewest working hours in the winter and spring.

Tiffey began full-time employment with Speck as a crew laborer in 1998. He was paid an hourly wage, and his weekly hours varied. In October 2001, Tiffey was offered a promotion to Operations Coordinator, which he understood to involve starting the crews, monitoring completion of their jobs, and generally assisting Rich Wood, the Operations Manager. He also understood that any position with Speck, labor or management, would involve some weeks of work beyond 40 hours and that each week's hours would vary based upon the weather and amount of work available. By May 2003, Tiffey's weekly hours varied from 32.14 to 89.27 hours.

Speck told Tiffey the Operations Coordinator position was salaried and did not include overtime pay. Tiffey denies he was ever paid on a salary basis, though he negotiated an increased salary when he began the position and later obtained another salary increase in May 2003. Tiffey also denies that he performed any Operations Coordinator duties or any other duties that would render him exempt from the overtime provisions of the FLSA.

By March 2004 it became clear the Operations Coordinator position was not a suitable fit for Tiffey, and he was demoted to a "floating" crew leader position. He no longer had use of a company truck, but he retained phone and credit card privileges as was customary for crew leaders. The floating position had an expected average work week of 55 hours.

While Tiffey was the Operations Coordinator, he was not paid overtime wages. He claims he was not actually a salaried employee during this time and is entitled to overtime wages and vacation pay. After his demotion, but still in March 2004, Tiffey took his concerns to the Wage and Hour Board. He complained to the Department of Labor that his pay was docked on numerous occasions even though Mike Roberts, a salaried employee, was paid when he took leave for a knee injury. He also claims his job did not change after his promotion and that he continued to perform the duties of a laborer as the Operations Coordinator.

Tiffey claims once he began inquiring about his right to overtime pay he was retaliated against in the form of restricted hours, shunning by co-workers, and the rehiring of an employee he fired when he was Operations Coordinator. According to Tiffey, these alleged retaliatory events caused him to resign in June 2004.

Tiffey filed his final amended Complaint in this Court on October 20, 2004, alleging claims against Speck under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq., and the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Act, Iowa Code ch. 91A, as well as a claim for retaliatory discharge.

Speck filed an Amended Answer on April 13, 2005. Speck admits it is an "employer" within the meaning of the FLSA and the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Act. Speck further admits that jurisdiction is proper under the Court's federal question and supplemental jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1367 (2000). Speck denies the substance of the allegations and asserted the affirmative defenses of statute of limitations, good faith, and FLSA exemption.

Speck moved for partial summary judgment on October 11, 2005, and requested oral argument. Tiffey filed a resistance² on December 12, 2005, and Speck filed a reply brief on December 21, 2005.

APPLICABLE LAW AND DISCUSSION

I. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). A summary judgment motion should be interpreted by the trial court to dispose of factually unsupported claims and defenses. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Therefore, the trial judge is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but rather to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. The Court is bound to view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and to give that party the benefit of any reasonable factual inferences. See, e.g., Girten v. McRentals, Inc., 337 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir.2003).

While the moving party initially must make a showing of the basis for its motion and the portions of the record that support the party's assertion that there is no issue of material fact, Rule 56 does not require the moving party to support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548).

When the moving party has carried its initial burden, the nonmoving party must proffer specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue for trial and may not rely on mere allegations. Vaughn v. Roadway Express, Inc., 164 F.3d 1087, 1089 (8th Cir.1998) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548). The nonmoving party must make a satisfactory showing on every element of its case for which it has the burden of proof at trial. Wilson v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 55 F.3d 399, 405 (8th Cir.1995); see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. "[T]o survive the defendant's motion, [the plaintiff] need only present evidence from which a jury might return a verdict in his favor. If he does so, there is a genuine issue of fact that requires a trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

"Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. It is thus the task of the trial court to "assess the adequacy of the nonmovants' response and whether that showing, on admissible evidence, would be sufficient to carry the burden of proof at trial." Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 396 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548).

II. RETALIATORY DISCHARGE

Tiffey does not resist Speck's motion for summary judgment on his retaliatory discharge claim, conceding that the facts do not support this claim. The Court will accordingly grant Speck's motion for summary judgment on this claim.

III. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT³

An employee can come within the provisions of FLSA under individual or enterprise coverage. See 29 C.F.R. § 779.100 (2005). Both parties seem to presume that the more common enterprise coverage is the applicable standard in this case. Enterprise coverage encompasses those businesses (enterprises) whose employees engage in commerce and have an annual gross volume of $500,000. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(1)(A). Defendant admits it has been an "enterprise engaged in commerce" within the definition of section 203(s). Neither party challenges the applicability of the FLSA to this dispute.

1. Statute of Limitations

Tiffey seeks recovery of overtime wages for the period from October 2001 to March 2004. The applicable statute of limitations is found in 29 U.S.C. § 255 (the Portal-to-Portal Act), which provides for causes of action under the FLSA accruing after May 14, 1947, "every such action shall be forever barred unless commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued, except that a cause of action arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within three years." 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). Tiffey filed his Complaint June 1, 2004, so Speck argues any claims that accrued prior to June 1, 2002, are time-barred. Tiffey, on the other hand, argues that Speck willfully violated FLSA provisions, invoking the three-year statute of limitations and rendering all his wage claims timely.

For purposes of the Portal-to Portal Act, a cause of action accrues upon each regular payday following the pay period when the employee rendered the services for which compensation is allegedly due. Hartt v. United Constr. Co., 655 F.Supp. 937, 938 (W.D.Mo.1987), aff'd, 909 F.2d 508 (8th Cir.1990) (unpublished table decision); Reid v. Solar Corp., 69 F.Supp. 626, 629 (N.D.Iowa 1946); 29 C.F.R. § 790.21(b) (2003). Accordingly, the dates at issue are each payday that occurred between October 2001 and June 1, 2002. The claims that matured on these dates can only form the basis for liability in the present...