Tiffin Building Corp. v. Balaban & Katz Corp.
Decision Date | 21 October 1949 |
Docket Number | No. 48 C 1520.,48 C 1520. |
Citation | 87 F. Supp. 121 |
Parties | TIFFIN BUILDING CORPORATION v. BALABAN & KATZ CORPORATION et al. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Seymour F. Simon, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff.
Poppenhusen, Johnston, Thompson & Raymond, Chicago, Ill., for defendants Paramount Pictures, Balaban & Katz Corp. and others.
Mayer, Meyer, Austrian & Platt, Chicago, Ill., for defendants Warner Bros., Loew's Inc., and others.
Matthews & Springer, Chicago, Ill., for defendant 20th Century Fox Film Corp.
LA BUY, District Judge.
The complaint herein is brought pursuant to the treble damage section of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 15, and alleges that defendants during the period January 1, 1941 to May 1, 1945 and prior thereto entered into a conspiracy in violation of the antitrust laws of the United States which conspiracy resulted in injury to plaintiff's business. The complaint was filed October 18, 1948 and is alleged to be based upon the complaint of the government in United States v. Paramount Pictures et al., D.C. N.Y.1946, 70 F.Supp. 53, affirmed in part and reversed in part 334 U.S. 131, 68 S.Ct. 915, 92 L.Ed. 1260.
Defendants plead affirmatively that the Illinois Revised Statutes, Chapter 83, Section 16, bars any recovery sought for injuries suffered more than five years before October 18, 1948.
Plaintiff raises three points to substantiate its right to sue for injuries suffered in 1941 and 1942, but has withdrawn the first basis since its premise is applicable to criminal cases only wherein it is held that the statute does not run until the last act constituting the conspiracy is done; Momand v. Universal Film Exchange, D.C. Mass.1942, 43 F.Supp. 996; and has also temporarily withdrawn its third contention that Section 16 of the anti-trust laws suspends the statute of limitations in this action from July 30, 1938 when the United States filed suit for violation of the antitrust laws since this suit is based in whole or in part on matter complained of therein for the reason that such contention is premature and is dependent upon evidence to be heard by the court.
If the evidence in this action should not disclose that the suspension provided by Section 16 of the anti-trust laws applies, the parties have requested the court to decide at this time whether Act of Congress, October 10, 1942, Ch. 589, 56 Stat. 781, as amended June 30, 1945, Ch. 213, 59 Stat. 306, 15 U.S.C.A. § 16 note tolled the Illinois statute of limitations as to the plaintiff's rights.
It is a rule that where a statute is susceptible on its face of two constructions, the court may look into prior and contemporaneous acts, the reasons which induced the act in question, mischiefs intended to be remedied, and extraneous circumstances and purpose intended to be accomplished thereby, but where the statute is clear upon its face, and standing alone, is fairly susceptible of one construction, that construction must be given thereto. Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6167, United Mine Workers, D.C.Va., 53 F.Supp. 935, certiorari denied 322 U.S. 756, 64 S.Ct. 1267, 88 L.Ed. 1585, reversed 4 Cir., 145 F.2d 10, affirmed 325 U.S. 161, 65 S.Ct. 1063, 89 L. Ed. 1534.
The statute here in question reads as follows:
The term which defendant's contend here has a restricted meaning is the term "subject to civil proceedings". Defendants urge that legislative history surrounding the passage of this act shows it was intended to apply only to government proceedings and not to private actions.
The anti-trust law envisaged two classes of action: (1) those made available only to the government, which include criminal prosecutions and suits in equity, and (2) civil suits for treble damages to redress private injury. United States v. Cooper, 1941, 312 U.S. 600, 612, 61 S.Ct. 742, 85 L. Ed. 1071. The term "proceeding" has been used in the anti-trust laws in connection with any suit or proceeding brought by any other party than the government, Section 16, 15 U.S.C.A. and has been used in referring to action by the government, Sections 4, 5, 6, 15 U.S.C.A.
The term "proceeding" in common general usage means a prescribed course of action for enforcing legal rights and remedies according to the regular course of judicial procedure. 34 Words and Phrases, Perm. Ed., p. 83; Webster's International Dictionary.
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