Tift v. Jones
| Decision Date | 31 July 1874 |
| Citation | 52 Ga. 538 |
| Parties | NELSON Tift, plaintiff in error. v. Taliaferro Jones, defendant in error. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Roads and bridges. Evidence. Witness. Practice in the Superior Court. Before Judge Strozer. Dougherty Superior Court. April Term, 1874.
*Jones brought case against Tift for $50,000 00 damages, alleging that the defendant was the proprietor of a toll-bridge across the Flint river, at the city of Albany; that he kept it so negligently and carelessly that the plaintiff fell through the same a distance of twenty-eight feet, and was thereby damaged in the sum aforesaid. The defendant pleaded that he was neither negligent or careless; that at the time the plaintiff was injured all crossing on the bridge was suspended for the purpose of making repairs; that the bridge was then torn up; that he was charging no toll; that the crossing being thus suspended, and no toll being charged the bridge was not at that time a toll bridge; that the plaintiff was injured by his own fault.
The evidence made, in brief, this case: The bridge, at the time of the accident, was not in a condition to be crossed. A large potion of the flooring had been taken off, and the timbers sustaining the same removed from their usual place. This dangerous condition was patent. The collection of toll was suspended. Planks, several feet apart, were laid down for the use of the workmen. The plaintiff was drinking; there was some evidence to show that he was drunk. He crossed the larger portion of the bridge in safety, but upon entering into conversation of an unpleasant nature with defendant on the other side, seemed to become disconcerted, and fell through. He was urged not to cross. The defendant was present at the time, superintending the repairs.
The jury found for the plaintiff $7,500 00. The defendant moved for a new trial upon the following among other grounds:
1st. Because the court erred in substituting the word "prohibit" for "forbid, " and in adding, "provide he did not cross by permission of defendant or his agents, " to the following request: "If the defendant's bridge was out of repair, it was his duty to repair it, and he had the right to tear up so much thereof as was necessary to repair it, and to forbid persons fromcrossing the same, or to refuse to take toll for the *crossing at the time the bridge was torn up, then the plaintiff is not entitled to recover."
2d. Because the court erred in allowing the witness, Frank Tharp, to testify, for the purpose of showing that the defendant had charged toll on the day of the injury, that the bridge-keeper had presented him with an account embracing such items, which he had paid, and which he now receipted; that said account was in his trunk.
3d. Because the court erred in refusing, when the defendant moved to have the plaintiff's witnesses separated, to cause the plaintiff to be first examined out of the hearing of his witnesses, and before he had heard their testimony.
4th. Because the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence.
The motion was overruled and the defendant excepted.
Poe, Hall & Lofton; D. H. Pope, for plaintiff in error.
Wright & Warren; H. Morgan, by R. H. Clark, for defendant.
1. This case may be reduced to very narrow compass, without going into all the learning growing out of the law as to the general obligations of the proprietor of a toll-bridge, whilst it is used as such, to the public or to passengers. It is unquestionably true that it is the duty of such a proprieter to keep his bridge in a safe condition. For a failure so to do, he would be responsible for any damages resulting therefrom to a passenger. To secure this condition of the bridge, repairs are necessary. To make these repairs, he has the right to take up any portion of the bridge which is required to be moved, in order to discharge his duty. As to the obligations imposed by law upon the owner of toll-bridges, see Code, section 670, paragraph 5, and section 690. There is no complaint made in this case that the defendant took up more of his bridge than was necessary to make the needed repairs.
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re Phillips
...treated as a component of the due process of law in both criminal and civil cases since the early decisions of this Court.... Tift v. Jones, 52 Ga. 538, 542 (1874) (explaining that a civil litigant has a “right to be present in the court during the whole trial of his case.”) ... The right t......
-
Kesterson v. Jarrett
...“the right to be present, and see and hear, all the proceedings which are had against him on the trial before the Court”); Tift v. Jones, 52 Ga. 538, 542 (1874) (explaining that a civil litigant has a “right to be present in the court during the whole trial of his case”). See also Hampton v......
-
Walker v. State
...remains inside the courtroom to testify before the other witnesses on his side of the case, so he will not hear them testify. In Tift v. Jones, 52 Ga. 538(4), it is held: 'When a party to an action intends to be a witness for himself, and the court directs that his witnesses be separately e......
-
Parham v. State
...cannot be called first. Massey v. State, 220 Ga. 883(5), 142 S.E.2d 832, supra; McGruder v. State, 213 Ga. 259(9), 98 S.E.2d 564; Tift v. Jones, 52 Ga. 538(4); Stuart v. State, 123 Ga.App. 311, 312, 180 S.E.2d 581. The right of sequestration is absolute, subject only to the discretion of th......