Tigner v. Lee Cnty. Jail

• Decision Date: 10 January 2022
• Docket Number: 3:21-cv-342-ECM-JTA
• Parties: ARTHUR JAMES TIGNER, Plaintiff, v. LEE COUNTY JAIL, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama

ARTHUR JAMES TIGNER, Plaintiff, v. LEE COUNTY JAIL, et al., Defendants.

No. 3:21-cv-342-ECM-JTA

United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Eastern Division

January 10, 2022

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE

JEBMHA T. ADAMS UNIT/ED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Arthur James Tigner (“Plaintiff”), appearing pro se, filed this action alleging claims relating to his treatment as an inmate kitchen worker at the Lee County Jail. (Doc. No. 1-1 at 2-5.) Plaintiff names as defendants the following: Lee County Jail, Gwendolyn Crawell Carl Key, Deborah Teodoro and unnamed members of the kitchen staff at the jail (collectively “Defendants”). (Doc. No. 1-1.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 636, this case was referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for all pretrial proceedings and entry of any order or recommendations as may be appropriate. (Doc. No. 2.)

This cause is before the court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint or, in the alternative Motion for a More Definite Statement (Doc. No. 10) Plaintiff's response in opposition (Doc. No. 17), and Defendants' reply (Doc. No. 18). For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned recommends that the motion for a more definite statement be GRANTED and the motion to dismiss be DENIED as moot.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 12, 2021, Plaintiff filed a hand-written, partially illegible Complaint alleging discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against Defendants in the Circuit Court of Lee County, Alabama. (Doc. No. 1-1 at 2.) Plaintiff complains of a “hostile work environment” as an inmate kitchen worker, alleges he was subject to “verbal abuse” and “verbal harassment” from his supervisor and the kitchen staff, and alleges that his “constitutional rights [have] been violated [because he] was made to leave [his] job.” (Id. at 2.) Plaintiff further alleges the cook is “selling food without [a permit] or being a restaurant[, ]” he ate some of the food “and got sick, ” and that “the sell [sic] of food without [permit] or [being] a restaurant is against the law.” (Id. at 2, 3.)

Defendants removed the action to this court on May 11, 2011.^[1] (Doc. No. 1.) Thereafter, Plaintiff filed another Complaint against the Lee County Jail in the Circuit Court of Lee County, Alabama, after an assault by a corrections officer and an unknown inmate.^[2] (Doc. No. 8-1.)

On May 28, 2021, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for a more definite statement.^[3] (Doc. No. 10.) Defendants contend that the Plaintiff's complaint is due to be dismissed for the following reasons:

(a) Plaintiff does not enjoy an employee-employer relationship with the Defendants and, thus, is not entitled to the protections of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964;

(b) Plaintiff has failed to exhaustive administrative remedies of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, a prerequisite for Title VII suits;

(c) Plaintiff has failed to plead that he was discriminated against on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin as required under Title VII;

(d) Plaintiff lacks standing to seek prosecution or redress for claims that the jail kitchen is being operated as a restaurant without a permit;

(e) the Lee County Jail is not an entity subject to suit;

(f) Plaintiff's claims against “kitchen staff” are due to be dismissed as fictitious party pleading is not allowed in federal court;

(g) the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from Plaintiff's claims;

(h) Plaintiff has failed to satisfy the Prison Litigation Reform Act's exhaustion requirements; and

(i) Plaintiff cannot maintain an official capacity claim against Defendants.

Id. However, Defendants acknowledge that a pro se plaintiff is held to a less stringent standard than an attorney and the court will ordinarily afford a plaintiff an opportunity to amend the complaint prior to dismissal. (Doc. No. 11 at 17, 18.) Thus, Defendants request, in the alternative of dismissal, that the court require Plaintiff to replead his claims in numbered paragraphs and separate counts pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10 so they can adequately respond. (Id. at 19.)

Plaintiff filed a rambling response in opposition to the motion on July 22, 2021. (Doc. No. 17.) Although Plaintiff does not specifically address the legal arguments in Defendants' motion and memorandum in support thereof, Plaintiff requests the “court deny the denfendant's [sic] motion to dismiss[.]” (Doc. No. 17.) Defendants filed a reply on July 26, 2021. (Doc. No. 18.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

When evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must take the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Resmick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1321-22 (11th Cir. 2012). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the allegations in the complaint must “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . . on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. While Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A complaint is insufficient if it “offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action, '” or if it “tenders ‘naked assertions' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557). In short, the complaint must provide a “‘plain statement' possess[ing] enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)).

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e), a party “may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive pleading is allowed, but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot reasonably prepare a response.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e). Where a plaintiff's complaint makes it “virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact are intended to support which claim(s) for relief, ” the Eleventh Circuit has granted relief under this Rule. Lewis v. Marriott International Inc., No. 1:18-CV-5917-WMR, 2019 WL 12338316 at *1 (N.D.Ga. 2019) (citing Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Cent. Fla. Cmty. Coll., 77 F.3d 364, 366 (11th Cir. 1996)). “The Eleventh Circuit has also held that a ‘shotgun' pleading is improper and, therefore, cannot serve as an action's operative complaint.” Id. (citing Davis v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 979 (11th Cir. 2008)).

Finally, a plaintiff's pro se status must be considered when evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint. “A document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed,' and ‘a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). Although the court is required to liberally construe a pro se litigant's pleadings, the court does not have “license to serve as de facto counsel for a party . . . or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” GJR Inv., Inc. v. Cty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359, 1369 (11th Cir. 1998) (citations omitted) (overruled on other grounds by Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)); see also Giles v. Wal-Mart Distrib. Ctr., 359 Fed.Appx. 91, 93 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal citations and quotation omitted). A pro se complaint still must allege factual allegations that “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Saunders v. Duke, 766 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Indeed, a pro se litigant “is subject to the relevant law and rules of court including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Poursaied v. Reserve at Research Park LLC, 379 F.Supp.3d 1182, 1187 (N.D. Ala. 2019) (quoting Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989)).

III. DISCUSSION

The undersigned has thoroughly reviewed Plaintiff's Complaint and finds that it is the prototypical example of a “shotgun pleading” that does not comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A complaint constitutes a shotgun pleading when it fails “to identify claims with sufficient clarity to enable the defendant to frame a responsive pleading.” Beckwith v. Bellsouth Telecomms. Inc., 146 Fed.Appx. 368, 371 (11th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff's Complaint - albeit short - consists of a large body of undifferentiated factual allegations, random references to case law, and abundant legal conclusions. In addition, Plaintiff's Complaint is completely devoid of specificity - providing little notice to Defendants and to the court of what claims Plaintiff has asserted and what factual allegations support his claims. See Weiland v. Palm Beach Cty. Sheriff's Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015) (“The unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun pleadings is that they fail . . . to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.”).

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to contain “a short and plain statement of the...