Tignor v. Parkinson

• Decision Date: 15 March 1984
• Docket Number: No. 82-2046,82-2046
• Citation: 729 F.2d 977
• Parties: 10 Collier Bankr.Cas.2d 729, 11 Bankr.Ct.Dec. 965, Bankr. L. Rep. P 69,772 Henry Clay TIGNOR, Appellee, v. William C. PARKINSON, Jr., Appellant. In re Henry Clay TIGNOR, Debtor.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 977

729 F.2d 977

10 Collier Bankr.Cas.2d 729, 11 Bankr.Ct.Dec. 965,

Bankr. L. Rep. P 69,772

Henry Clay TIGNOR, Appellee, v. William C. PARKINSON, Jr., Appellant In re Henry Clay TIGNOR, Debtor.

No. 82-2046.

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Argued May 10, 1983.

Decided March 15, 1984.

R. Shawn Majette, Richmond, Va., for appellant.

John L. Gayle, Charles O. Boyles, Richmond, Va., for appellee.

Before WIDENER and ERVIN, Circuit Judges, and HAYNSWORTH, Senior Circuit Judge.

WIDENER, Circuit Judge:

This case presents two issues on appeal: (1) whether this debtor can amend his bankruptcy schedules, and (2) whether and to what extent an exemption is allowable from the bankrupt estate for the debtor's personal injury settlement proceeds. We agree with the district court that the debtor may amend his schedules, but we reverse that court's decision permitting his claimed exemption for all of the personal injury settlement proceeds.

Appellee Henry Clay Tignor, the debtor, filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on August 18, 1980, and in his schedule of personal property listed an unliquidated claim against his former employer, the Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad Company (RF & P), for personal injuries sustained November 9, 1978. The market value of this Federal Employers' Liability Act claim was listed as "unknown." The debtor claimed homestead exemption and what is known as the poor debtors' exemption under Va.Code Secs. 34-4 and 34-26, and exemption for property held as tenant by the entirety under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 522(b)(2)(B), but did not claim as exempt the personal injury claim. ¹ Appellant William C. Parkinson, Jr., as trustee of the bankrupt estate, conducted the first creditors' meeting on September 24, 1980. The debtor settled his claim against RF & P on June 5, 1981, for $150,000, of which $45,000 went for attorneys' fees, and then amended his bankruptcy schedules on October 21, 1981, to reflect the additional $105,000 from the settlement and to claim this sum as exempt. He contended that the personal injury claim was exempt under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 522(b)(2)(A), Va.Code Sec. 8.01-26, and the common law. The trustee objected, arguing that the debtor could not amend his schedules and that no exemption for the personal injury claim or its proceeds existed under Virginia law. The bankruptcy court entered an order with opinion denying the trustee's objections to the claimed exemption, In re Tignor, 21 B.R. 219 (Bkrtcy.E.D.Va.1982), and the district court summarily affirmed.

I

We agree that the debtor's amendment was proper. Under Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 110, which was in effect when this dispute arose, "[a] voluntary petition, schedule, or statement of affairs may be amended as a matter of course at any time before the case is closed." This rule adopted a permissive approach to amendment of a voluntary petition, replacing General Order 11 which required application for leave to amend. See Advisory Committee Note to Bankruptcy Rule 110. Under a plain reading of Rule 110, a court ordinarily does not have discretion to deny leave to amend or to require a showing of good cause. We agree with the courts of appeals that have, with some variation in precise holdings, so held. In re Doan, 672 F.2d 831, 833 (11th Cir.1982); In re Gershenbaum, 598 F.2d 779, 781 (3d Cir.1979); cf. Redmond v. Tuttle, 698 F.2d 414, 416-17 & n. 6 (10th Cir.1983). Bankruptcy Rule 1009, which became effective August 1, 1983, takes the same approach. ²

The trustee claims, however, that in this case creditors were entitled to rely on the debtor's personal injury claim as a fund from which their claims would be paid and to rely on the debtor's election to exempt other property, particularly because the debtor did not seek exemption of the claim until a year after the first creditors' meeting. The trustee claims that he also relied to his prejudice on the debtor's election, incurring legal fees and costs to secure the proceeds of the claim for the estate. It is true that exceptional circumstances may prevent the debtor in bankruptcy from amending his petition or schedules, see In re Doan, 672 F.2d 831, 833 (11th Cir.1982) (bad faith or prejudice to creditors might bar amendment). Also, all property of the bankrupt estate does not automatically qualify to be included in an exemption claimed by amendment. Redmond v. Tuttle, 698 F.2d 414 (10th Cir.1983). The clear mandate of the rule, however, is to allow amendment freely. Although the debtor in this case failed to claim an exemption for his personal injury claim in August 1980 when he originally filed his petition and schedules, the trustee had taken no action toward securing funds for creditors from the claim until the case was settled in June 1981. The trustee's position had not changed in the slightest as a result of the exemption not being claimed when the petition was filed. No exceptional circumstances are present here which warrant denial of the debtor's amendment. The trustee may not successfully claim detrimental reliance simply because a schedule that could be amended was in fact amended, nor may he claim laches simply because of the passage of time between the petition or the creditors' meeting and the amendment. In re Doan, 674 F.2d 831 (11th Cir.1982).

Local Rule 23(C) of the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia does not alter this conclusion. This rule required that objections to a debtor's claimed exemptions be filed within twenty days after the first creditors' meeting. ³ The trustee argues that this rule necessarily precluded the debtor from amending his exemption schedule after that date. Trustees and creditors could not under the rule raise objections to these newly claimed exemptions, he argues, and in the absence of objection such exemptions would be allowed. See 11 U.S.C. Sec. 522(l ). The argument is without merit for two reasons. First, Local Rule 23(C) may not limit Bankruptcy Rule 110 as sought here. Second, the two rules may be reconciled to permit objection to exemptions claimed by amendment for 20 days after the amendment is filed. This was held in Redmond v. Tuttle, supra, and we follow that case.

We are thus of opinion the district court correctly permitted the amendments to be made. ⁴

II

Even though debtor's amendments were permissible, we cannot agree that debtor's personal injury settlement proceeds were fully exempt.

An unliquidated personal injury claim clearly would not have been included in the bankrupt estate in Virginia before passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act. Former 11 U.S.C. Sec. 110(a)(5) (Sec. 70(a)(5) of the old Bankruptcy Act) only gave the bankruptcy trustee title to property that, prior to the debtor's filing a bankruptcy petition, creditors could have reached by judicial process or the debtor could have transferred under state law. We held in Ruebush v. Funk, 63 F.2d 170 (4th Cir.1933), construing Virginia law, that a tort claim for bodily injuries not reduced to judgment but on which a jury verdict had been rendered was not property that could be transferred under Virginia law. An alternative holding was that the claim was not within the statute. The debtor in Ruebush had secured a verdict on his tort claim ten days prior to filing a petition in bankruptcy but judgment had not been entered on the verdict. Because there was no judgment on the verdict prior to the filing of the petition, the debtor was found to have no transferable property interest in the claim sufficient to bring it into the bankrupt estate. Payment of the debtor's tort claim did not occur until after the debtor filed his bankruptcy petition, and thus proceeds of the claim also did not come into the estate. Ruebush, 63 F.2d at 172-73. Thus, under the old Act and Ruebush the status of the bankrupt's claim for bodily injuries at the moment he filed his petition in bankruptcy determined whether such a claim and its proceeds came into the bankrupt estate at all. Since the claim for personal injuries was not as of that time transferable property under Virginia law, it remained outside the bankrupt estate under the former statute, 11 U.S.C. Sec. 110(a)(5). ⁵

The Bankruptcy Reform Act ⁶ which repealed the old Bankruptcy Act is a significant change in the law applicable to the property of a bankrupt estate. Under the old Act only non-exempt property was included as a part of the bankrupt estate under Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U.S. 294, 23 S.Ct. 751, 47 L.Ed. 1061 (1903). Under the Reform Act, however, all property of the debtor is included in the bankrupt estate, including exempt property. "After the property comes into the estate, then the debtor is permitted to exempt it under proposed 11 U.S.C. Sec. 522, and the court will have jurisdiction to determine what property may be exempted and what remains as property of the estate." Legislative History, 1978 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 5787, 5868, 6324 [hereinafter Leg.Hist.]. The Reform Act thus overrules Lockwood, Leg.Hist. at 5868, 6324, and we have previously so acknowledged in Shirkey v. Leake, 715 F.2d 859, 863 (4th Cir.1983). Under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 541(a), a bankrupt estate includes, with minor exceptions not relevant here, "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case." "This includes all exempt property." Shirkey v. Leake, 715 F.2d at 863. The legislative history of this statute is explicit in that: "The scope of this paragraph is broad. It includes all kinds of property, including tangible or intangible property, causes of action ... and all other forms of property currently specified in section 70(a) of the Bankruptcy Act...." Leg.Hist. at 5868, 6323. It "includes as property of the estate all property of the debtor, even that needed for a fresh start." Id.

The fact that the schedule of exemptions established by Congress in the Reform Act includes an exemption of...