Tigrett v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. Of Va

• Decision Date: 01 March 2001
• Docket Number: No. CIV. A. 3:99CV100094.,No. CIV. A. 3:00CV00031.,CIV. A. 3:99CV100094.,CIV. A. 3:00CV00031.
• Citation: 137 F.Supp.2d 670
• Parties: Harrison Kerr TIGRETT, Plaintiff, v. The RECTOR AND VISITORS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, et al., Defendants. Bradley Clark Kintz, Plaintiff, v. The Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia

137 F.Supp.2d 670

Harrison Kerr TIGRETT, Plaintiff, v. The RECTOR AND VISITORS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, et al., Defendants.

Bradley Clark Kintz, Plaintiff, v. The Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, et al., Defendants.

No. CIV. A. 3:99CV100094.

No. CIV. A. 3:00CV00031.

United States District Court, W.D. Virginia, Charlottesville Division.

March 1, 2001.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Frank L. Watson, Jr., Frank L. Watson, III, Michael Fitzgerald, Baker, Donelson, Bearman & Caldwell, Memphis, TN, C. James Summers, Charlottesville, VA, for Harrison Kerr Tigrett, plaintiff.

Stephen Neal, Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, Washington, DC, for Bradley Clark Kintz, plaintiff.

Richard C. Cast, Susan M. Davis, Patrick B. Kelly, Associates General Counsel, Special Assistants Atty. General, Office of General Counsel of Univ. of Virginia, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

MOON, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Supplemental Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs Harrison Kerr Tigrett and Bradley Clark Kintz, former students at the University of Virginia ("University"), brought separate actions against the Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, University President John T. Casteen, III, University Vice President William W. Harmon, individual members of the University's Board of Visitors ("BOV"),¹ individual members of a University Fact-Finding Panel,² and individual members of the University's Judiciary Committee ("UJC").³ By Order of this Court of August 30, 2000, these two matters were consolidated for purposes of discovery and trial.

Pursuant to this Court's previous ruling in Tigrett v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 97 F.Supp.2d 752 (W.D.Va. 2000), and the Stipulation and Order of July 13, 2000, making the findings in Tigrett, and the earlier rulings in the related case of Smith v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 78 F.Supp.2d 533 (W.D.Va. 1999) ("Smith I"); 115 F.Supp.2d 680 (W.D.Va.2000) ("Smith II"), binding in the Kintz case, the only claims remaining before this Court are Plaintiffs' allegations that they were: (1) denied procedural due process when the November UJC hearing panel tried them in absentia and recommended that they be expelled; (2) denied procedural due process due to inadequate notice that they would be charged with violating Section 8 of the University's Standards of Conduct; (3) denied due process by Casteen, Harmon, and members of the BOV by their failure to instruct, train, supervise, and control the November UJC hearing panel in the performance of their duties; (4) denied due process by Casteen and individual members of the BOV by their failure to instruct, train, supervise, and control Harmon; (5) damaged by individual members of the UJC hearing panel who conspired to deprive them of their civil rights; and (6) damaged by Casteen and Harmon who conspired to deprive them of their civil rights. Plaintiff Tigrett's breach of contract claim, seeking prospective injunctive relief, and Plaintiff Kintz's substantive due process claim also remain.

FACTS

This Court's earlier Opinion summarized the essential factual background of Tigrett's claims in detail. See Tigrett, 97 F.Supp.2d at 753-56. The facts of Tigrett are quite similar to those described in Smith I and Smith II. And in light of the Stipulation and Order of July 13, 2000, the same similarity necessarily exists between Kintz and Smith. Given the rather exhaustive recitation of the underlying facts in these earlier opinions, the Court will now briefly summarize only those facts bearing particular relevance to current motions.

In the early morning hours of November 21, 1997, Tigrett, Kintz, and fellow fraternity brothers and University students Richard Smith, Wes McCluney and Wes Kaupinen, went for a drive. They encountered Alexander Kory, another University student who was on foot. Kory and one or more of the car's occupants engaged in a verbal exchange. Events escalated to the point where Kintz and Tigrett exited the car to confront Kory. Smith then exited the car and attempted to calm the situation by telling Kory to go home and Kintz and Tigrett to go back to the car. Kory then directed some profanity toward Smith and, in a burst of anger, Smith punched Kory in the face, causing him extensive injuries to the face, jaw, and teeth.

On December 3, 1997, Kory initiated student disciplinary charges against Tigrett, Kintz, Smith, and McCluney pursuant to the procedures of the UJC. Initially, Tigrett and Kintz were charged with violating Sections 1 and 5 of the University's Standards of Conduct. Section 1 prohibits:

Physical or sexual assault of any person on University — owned or leased property or at University — sponsored or supervised functions, or conduct which threatens the health or safety of any such person or the physical or sexual assault of any University student, faculty member, or employee at the local residence of any student, faculty member or employee within the City of Charlottesville or Albemarle County.

Section 5 prohibits:

Unlawfully blocking or impeding normal pedestrian or vehicular traffic on or adjacent to University property.

A UJC hearing for Smith, Kintz and Tigrett was initially scheduled for February, 1998, but was postponed until after the disposition of pending criminal charges arising from the incident.⁴ Tigrett and Kintz pled nolo contendere to the charge of disorderly conduct in Albemarle County General District Court. The UJC hearing was rescheduled for November 21, 1998.

The day before the rescheduled hearing was to take place, Smith, Smith's father, Tigrett, and Tigrett's student counsel attended a meeting with Harmon. During the course of the meeting, Tigrett and Kintz allege that Harmon agreed to postpone the hearing after conferring with the University's general counsel.

Meanwhile, the UJC held its hearing on November 21 despite the absence of Kintz, Tigrett, and Smith. The UJC panel found the three guilty of violating Sections 1, 5, and 8 of the University's Standards of Conduct and ordered their expulsion from the University. Specifically, Section 8 prohibits:

Disorderly conduct on University — owned or leased property or at a University sponsored function. Disorderly conduct is defined to include acts which break the peace or are lewd, indecent or obscene and which are not constitutionally — protected speech.

Kory did not initially seek to charge Tigrett and Kintz with "disorderly conduct" under the University's Standards of Conduct.

On review, Harmon referred the UJC panel's decision to the University's Judicial Review Board ("JRB"), which is charged with hearing certain appeals of UJC decisions. On February 11, 1999, the JRB set aside the UJC panel's decision and remanded the matter for a new hearing. Pursuant to the remand, the UJC named a new hearing panel and scheduled a new hearing for April 17, 1999. However, that hearing was canceled when the UJC chair-person recused herself. Subsequently, the UJC determined that it was unable to hear the case in a timely manner and referred it to Harmon, who then appointed a hearing panel consisting of student, faculty and administration representatives to hear the case and to make a recommendation to Casteen. This panel convened a hearing on May 17, 1999, at which Tigrett and Kintz appeared, witnesses were called, evidence was presented, and factual findings were made. The panel found Tigrett and Kintz guilty of violating sections 1 and 8, and recommended that they be suspended for one semester (not to include a summer session) and that they perform seventy-five hours of community service. The panel then forwarded its recommendations to Casteen.

Casteen reviewed the panel's report and recommendations and affirmed the findings of guilt reached by the panel. However, he modified Tigrett's recommended sanction by imposing a suspension for one full academic year (not to include a summer session), with expulsion in abeyance pending any further violation of the University's Standards of Conduct while a student of the University. Casteen did not modify the suspension of one academic semester for Kintz. Tigrett appealed his sanction to the JRB, which upheld it. Kintz, through counsel, notified Casteen that he would not appeal the decision to the JRB. These suits followed.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment should only be granted if, viewing the record as a whole in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Terry's Floor Fashions, Inc. v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 763 F.2d 604, 610 (4th Cir.1985). In considering a motion for summary judgment, "the court is required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party." Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir.1994) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 813, 115 S.Ct. 67, 130 L.Ed.2d 24 (1994).

III. ANALYSIS

1. Whether the UJC denied Plaintiffs of due process by trying them in absentia

In the context of student discipline, the Due Process Clause requires "notice and an opportunity to be heard." See Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.1961); Gorman v. University of Rhode Island, 837 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir.1988); Carey v. Maine Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 17, 754 F.Supp. 906, 918 (D.Me.1990); Reilly v. Daly, 666 N.E.2d 439, 444 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). It is no longer open to question that any expulsion from a state university or college must comport with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 576, n. 8, 95 S.Ct. 729, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975).

In analyzing a...